Thank you for correcting the text in this article. Your corrections improve Papers Past searches for everyone. See the latest corrections.

This article contains searchable text which was automatically generated and may contain errors. Join the community and correct any errors you spot to help us improve Papers Past.

Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image
Article image

THETIS TRAGEDY

DELAY IN SENDING RESCUE SHIPS SUGGEST I I) CAUSE CF Dl r )/-G !!. TOO MAN/ I'i*J )I ‘I, I, ON f ‘J) Af I f). By Telegraph-—lA'“:ocl,'iflr»n Copyright LONDON. July >. At I Im I'c.’Jiiiipl ion Imlay oi' tile inquiry into tlm Im.-; of the submarine Tlmtis, Cuptain (.Irani was rxiiniiiiwl by .111- It. I’agei, |-z-1 > sli n << the relatives of a ('a in im-l Laird apprentice, William i Smith. Air Pagel suggosied that the possibility of saving the submariim a n<l the m-ar certainty of saving 11m crow was lost by dilatoriness in. sending ships Io the scene. Captain Oram replied: “I would not say dilatorincss.” Mr Paget emphasised that instead of every available ship being rushed to the scene by 5.40 p.m., an hour after the submarine was due to come to the surface, the first ship asked was the destroyer Brazen, which was 55 miles away at 6.45 p.m. "I suggest,” he said, “that the real cause of the disaster was dilatoriness in sending vessels to the rescue, and that another cause was the excessive crew.” Captain Oram agreed that the effect of the overcrowding was that instead of having 48 hours’ air the crew had only 24. He admitted that each time the Davis apparatus was used air escaped. Mr Paget asked whether carbondioxide poisoning would come more quickly than was expected. Would that not account for the failure of any more of the crew to escape? Captain Oram said it might have been a contributory cause, and added: “The number of contractors’ men on board was normal for the surface part of the trial, but it is a fact that nobody disembarked prior to the submerging, according to the customary procedure.” Captain Oram agreed that it was inexplicable that the tug did not see the marked buoy. It was always a matter for immediate attention if a submarine did not send a surfacing signal within a specified period. Ships ought to have been in the vicinity by 8.30 p.m., in which event Captain Oram had no doubt the men would have escaped throughout the night.

OPEN TORPEDO TUBE LEADING-STOKER ARNOLD’S EVIDENCE. FLOODING OF .SUBMARINE AVERTED. (Received This Day. 10.35 a.m.) LONDON, July 5. At the resumption of the Thetis inquiry, Leading-Stoker Arnold, in evidence, said that before diving he noticed a small, not serious leak in the dehumidifier pipe. There was a terrible rush of air from the foremost compartments and he heard shouts from' the control tower: “To the surface!” He realised that a torpedo tube was open and saw several people, including Cammell Laird experts, trying to shut the port door. The water was rushing into the second compartment. He helped them to shut the bulkhead ventilators and shafts and the bulkhead was shut later. The Thetis forty-five minutes later settled down on an even keel. The air began to get bad at 11 p.m. Next morning the air was very bad, causing headache and difficulty in breathing. He saw Captain Oram and Lieutenant Woods make their exit. A little water came in, reaching the main motors and smoke came from a short circuit. He shut the bulkhead. Several put on gas masks or Davis equipment. “I flooded the escape chamber for four men to escape,” witnesse continued. "Nothing happened for twenty minutes, so I drained the chamber. Three men were dead and the other was shaky and could not last long. Their Davis mouthpieces had been torn off and they were foaming at the mouth. All were very weak before entering the chamber. Later Shaw and I escaped. My feet became caught in some clips, but I kicked free.”

Stoker Arnold said he could not explain why four men were sent into the escape chamber, except that some were showing acute distress and it was desired to get them up as quickly as possible. He was unable to explain why nobody followed him and Shaw. There were at least half a dozen fit to try to escape. Describing the struggle to shut the door of No. 25 bulkhead as water rushed in from the open torpedo tube, threatening to flood the submarine, Arnold said: “Four cf us nearly succeeded when somebody came and pushed to get through. It was a race whether they succeeded or we got the door shut. Th&y got through and we got the door shut. If we had not it would have been the end of the ship.” Earlier Lieutenant VZoods expressed an opinion that diving trials had not been held before the fatal dive, on the acceptance trial, because of a fault in the hydroplane pressure controls.

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/WAITA19390706.2.69

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Wairarapa Times-Age, 6 July 1939, Page 8

Word count
Tapeke kupu
771

THETIS TRAGEDY Wairarapa Times-Age, 6 July 1939, Page 8

THETIS TRAGEDY Wairarapa Times-Age, 6 July 1939, Page 8

Help

Log in or create a Papers Past website account

Use your Papers Past website account to correct newspaper text.

By creating and using this account you agree to our terms of use.

Log in with RealMe®

If you’ve used a RealMe login somewhere else, you can use it here too. If you don’t already have a username and password, just click Log in and you can choose to create one.


Log in again to continue your work

Your session has expired.

Log in again with RealMe®


Alert