ENCIRCLEMENT DENIED STRONG BRITISH NOTE TO GERMANY

Wairarapa Times-Age, 29 June 1939, Page 8

ENCIRCLEMENT DENIED

STRONG BRITISH NOTE TO GERMANY

Action intended Only Against Aggression ANXIETY CAUSED BY INCORPORATION OF TERRITORIES RIGHTS OF SMALL NATIONS UPHELD By Telegraph.—Press Association. —Copyright. (Received This Day, 12.30 p.m.) LONDON, June 28. The British Government, in a strong Note to Germany, published tonight, formally denies that it is pursuing a policy of encirclement. The ITote denies that it is inevitable that Britain must always be hostile to Germany in the event of the Reich being involved in war. The denials are contained in, a memorandum to Germany in reply to Germany's .denunciation of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. The text was issued by the Foreign Office. The British Ambassador (Sir Nevile Henderson) delivered the Note to the Berlin Foreign Office this afternoon. The British text recalls Germany’s justification for the denunciation in a memorandum on April 27 last and proceeds: “It is not the case that in whatever part of Europe Germany might be’involved in warlike conflict Britain must always take up an attitude hostile to Germany. Britain could only be hostile if Germany were to commit an act of aggression against another country, and the political decisions to which it is understood Ihe German Government refers, involving guarantees to certain countries by Britain, could only operate if the countries concerned were to be attacked by Germany. In the German memorandum a claim is made to describe British policy as a policy of encirclement. This description is without any justification and indicates a misunderstanding and misreading of British purposes which must be corrected. The German Government’s recent action to incorporate certain territories in the Reich, whatever may have been held by them to be the justifying reasons, has undoubtedly resulted in a great increase of anxiety in many quarters. The actions subsequently taken by the United Kingdom Government have no other purpose than to contribute to the removal of this anxiety by assisting the smaller nations to feel secure in the enjoyment of their independence, to which they have the same right as Britain or Germany herself.”

EFFECT OF COMMITMENTS. “The commitments which Britain has recently undertaken in pursuance of this purpose are limited, and could only become effective if the countries concerned were the victims of aggression, nor has his Majesty’s Government any intention or desire to restrict the development of Germany's trade.” The Government points out that under the Anglo-German Payments Agreement, a considerable supply of free exchange has been made available to Germany for the acquisition of raw materials, and suggests that further measures for the improvement of Germany’s economic position can be discussed if confidence and goodwill can be established. “The consistent desire of his Majesty’s Government,” it is added, “far from being the promotion of war with Germany, has been and is the establishment of Anglo-German relations on a basis of mutual recognition of the needs of both countries, with, due regard to other nations.” Turning to the Naval Treaty, the Government stresses that it was expressly stated to be of a permanent character and a contribution to the solution of the problem of naval limitation. The text refers to the Notes exchanged between Sir S. Hoare and Herr von Ribbentrop to this effect and the fixing of the’ratio of 35/100 as a permanent relationsnip, and. adds that the only provision contemplating modification of the ratio was a violent disturbance of the equilibrium of naval armaments. The German Government, however, had not maintained that such conditions exist, still less had it invited his Majesty’s Government to examine the situation before taking action, though provision was made for such consultation. Dealing with the qualitative provisions, which presumably the German Government desires to remain unaffected in principle, the Government points out that the retention of these

does not alone suffice to create the feeling of mutual security which was the purpose of the Naval Agreement, and with which the provisions for the exchange of information were associated. His Majesty’s Government, however, is always ready to consider the possibility of reaching, in the words of lhe German Note, “a clear categorical understanding” on a sure basis. CRUISER LIMITS. The Government refers to the present uncertainty with regard to cruiser limits, but presumes that Germany intends to adhere to 8000 ton vessels and 6.1 inch guns, and asks for confirmation of this assumption. The memorandum proceeds to refer to the Government’s past forecasts to Germany of strength at the end of 1942-43, and says it is clear that no further forecasts are necessary, since they are designed merely to allow Germany to make full use of her 1935 quota, but if Germany is no longer pound to the limit of 35 per cent his Majesty’s Government can no longer be bound by its forecasts of strength, which must be considered cancelled. Answering the last paragraph of the German memorandum, expressing readiness to negotiate future problems, the British Government states that an exchange of views would help to clarify the situation, which in some respects is uncertain. For instance, besides the cruiser question, it is desireo to know whether Germany regards herself as bound by all the articles of the Agreement of 1937 outside those in part 3. If, however, Germany contemplates another Agreement replacing the provisions now terminated, his Majesty’s Government desires to know when, in the German view, discussions should occur; secondly, how the German Government proposed to ensure any action in the shape that denunciation or modification of the new agreement during its term of validity should carry the consent of both parties.