Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, MAY 22, 1939. MR CHAMBERLAIN'S HESITATION.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 22 May 1939, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, MAY 22, 1939. MR CHAMBERLAIN'S HESITATION.

TN the extended reports which have been cabled, Mr Chamberlain’s latest speech in the House of Commons on the subject of the British negotiations with Russia is extremely unconvincing. A good many people, in the United Kingdom and m other parts of the Empire may be expected to find themselves in the same difficulty as the diplomatic correspondents of most of the London newspapers, who “profess themselves unable to explain why Britain does not accept the Russian propose s in view of the'serious position if Russia withdraws from the talks entirely.”

The British Prime Minister disclaimed emphatically _an idea that Britain “was impeded by some sort of pdeologiea prejudice in her approach to the Soviet. He .insisted that “Britain was not concerned at all with Russia s inteinal pol tical doctrine,” that she was solely concerned with the best method of building up the peace front and that she wajited the Soviet’s co-operation and attached value to it. let ms speech as a whole sought to justify the rejection of, or at all events delay in accepting, the Soviet offer of a straight out pact against aggression.

As the respective proposals are outlined, Russia desires an unqualified agreement providing for common action agains. aggression. Britain prefers an agreement under which cbmmon action would be taken against aggression in some circumstances, but not in others. It is at least a question whether an agreement of this limited type would not. operate as an incitement to new acts of aggression—those against which the democracies and Soviet Russia had not agreed to take common action.

Mr Chamberlain hinted that some of the smaller States of Eastern Europe were unwilling to enter into an agreement with Russia. He said they were seeking means of resisting aggression and would not succeed in that policy if “by ensuring the co-operation-of one country, they rendered another country uneasy and unwilling to collaborate.” It is difficult, however, to perceive grounds on which any small State could reasonably object. to the proposed Anglo-Russian agreement. This does not look to a general alliance, but. would provide simply and solely for combined resistance to aggression. Poland and Rumania, having accepted guarantees from Britain, might be expected to welcome as an additional and valuable safeguard of their independence and security similar guarantees from Russia.

The essential question raised is whether Nazi, Germany and her allies are to be halted in the policy of duplicity and aggiession. on which they have embarked. As Mr Chambeilain justly observed, the annexation of Bohemia, and Moravia, by Germany, in contradiction of her frequent and solemn assurances, profoundly disturbed the public mind everywhere, and created the widespread feeling that the independence of no small State, was safe if it stood in the way of German ambition.

That, however, is only part of the story. No one*who has followed the events of the last year or two can doubt, that nothing would play more directly into the hands of the totalitarian dictatorships, or would be welcomed by them more gladly as opening the way to new acts of international piracy, than a refusal by the European democracies and Russia to take common action against aggression. Though they were made by a Communist, Mr J. R. Campbell, the following observations on this subject are very much to the point :—

Once the democratic West was separated from the Socialist East, Fascism would have a free hand against the Westein democracies no less than against the Soviet Union, and it would have strong grounds for assuming that the way to Fascist world empire lay not in an attack on the Bolsheviks, but in a headlong offensive against the Western democracies. If Britain does not stand shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Union in a peace bloc, it will betray not Russia, but the British people. With the Soviet Union, however, the Western democracies could force Fascism to keep the peace.

Whether or not the last-quoted contention is considered to be too optimistic, the need of building up the strongest, possible peace bloc is plainly defined. Iu light, of that overshadowing need, it is difficult to acquit the British Prime Minister neglecting the main issue and trifling with petty details, the contribution to the debate ol the Parliamentary Undersecretaij for Foreign Affairs (Afr R. A. Butler) appears to have been cast, in conventional and rather meaningless terms. _ On the other hand, encouragement is to be drawn from the fact, tliat other leading representatives of all parties—amongst them Mr Winston Churchill, -Mr Anthony Eden. Mr Lloyd George, and Sir Archibald Sinclair—appeared to be of one mind in favouring an immediate and firm agreement with Russia to resist further aggression.