SINGAPORE BASE

Wairarapa Times-Age, 6 May 1939, Page 5

SINGAPORE BASE

GUARDING BRITISH INTERESTS IN PACIFIC i NEW GIBRALTAR IN EAST. ] —— i TWO HEMISPHERES NAVAL - POLICY. The S’-ngapre Base a new G.'br ' 'a? hl''’', bon. I was fatherby the ‘Twenty-One Demands” enu .dated fay Japan way bank in l r ’ V7 u; ,ch marked the entrance of the 1 ter as a serious competitor to Gr a ■Britain in the China Belt, states Ja” Gunther in "Pearson’s Magazine.” 1919, therefore, Admiral Sir John Js' licoe recommended that a British Pac fie Fleet be created and based on S r. gapore. He wanted battleships instca of mere cruisers in the Far Egsteri waters, he wanted a “two hemispheres naval policy for Britain. In 1921 the Imperial Conference me in London.- pondered Jellicoe’s sugges tipn and decided to build the Singapore Base. Then, in 1922, the Washingtoi Naval Limitation Treaty was signed which established naval ratios among the Great Powers and ended the Anglo Japanese Alliance. At this point critics in England saia that the new base was an unreasonable extravagance, that it would needlessly irritate and provoke Japan, and purists claimed that the pew base was a- moral infringement of the Washington Nayal Treaty, which forbade fortifications oi naval bases east of 100 degrees longitude. Singapore lay outside this zone, but only just outside it—by six degrees. In some circles it was felt that the British had pulled a fast one, but this was officially denied. W?rk on the base began in 1924. It took 15 years in all till it was completed on February 14, 1938, Singapore is an island 27 miles by 14, connected with the mainland ot Asia by a causeway over the Straus of Jahore. At the tip of Malaya, where the boats must turn upward to China and Japan, it commands the sea route to the East. Severe precautions are taken to keep people out of the defended areas dpd all workmen in the dockyard are fingerprinted on Recount of the amount of espionage said tp be *'"* taCAT.ON W BASE. The naval base is at Seletar, on tpe north shore of the island and about 12 miles from Singapore City. Immediately tq the east, below a small mlef, is the air bfise.'There are three designs m Singapore, Qne was written by the British Army, the second by the Navy, and the third by the Air Force. Singapore Base” js the term used to embrace all three- In theory the Arrpy m charge; General Dobbie, the com, manding officer, outranks his naval and air force colleagues. Some 6,000,000 cubic feet of earth were excavated in shifting the hills and rivers; about 8,000,000 cubic feet went to fill the swamps. The dull pew-ter-colour oil-tanks on the right of thisland hold 1,000,000 lons of fuel. Each is built in a sort of saucer to prevent the spread pf fire, if there should be an explosion. Underground are munition dumps where enough stuff is safely' hidden tp blow the whole base to kingdom come. ■ '■ ■ The naval base as a whole covers 21 square miles. Its chief ornaments are the two immense docks, one floating, one a graving dock, which make possible the’quick repair of big warships in case pf action. Without Singapore damaged ships would have to go all the way to Malta for refurbishment. The war might be over by the time th The S9 floatfiig dpek, almost 9°o feet long, almost 200 feet wide, is the third biggest floating dock in the world. It can lift'any battleship afloat; 60,000 men can stand in its giant bottom. The dock was built in England, then towed in sections from Wallsend-on-Tyne to Singapore, fl distance of 10,000 miles. Eight Dutch tugs performed the tow. Which has been termed one of the most remarkable Qf modern marine feats The new graving dock is sngfitiy Digger than its floating brother, being 1000 feet long; to make it took s|x years, about £1,000,000, and 500,000 cubic yards of concrete. Any ship in the world will fit in it readily; it held 68.000,000 gallops Pf Wflter in a recent test. ~ - The floating dock could, in case ot necessity, be moved somewhere else, Hong Kong for example; the graving dock is stationary- Adjacent to both docks are machine shops, power plants, store-houses ,and the biggest crane east of Suez. Everything is in duplicate except the crane, so that air raiders—if they got through—would have to do their job twice. . Singapore's one defect is that the surrounding waters contain submerged reefs which make pilotage of submarines difficult. Of course enemy submarines approaching Singapore are up against the same trouble. There are three different military landing-fields in the highly-efficient air base, as well as a civil airport which cost £1.050,000 and which, opened in June, 1937, was built on reclaimed land cn the water’s edge, so that both land and seaplanes are handled in the same area. The airport is unique in that it is only about seven minutes from the business section of the city. The chief military field similarly pro - vides facilities for both land and sea craft. There are about 20 miles of "per-

feet water” fof flying boats. About 40 aircraft are permanently stationed at the base but the number may be augmented by squadrons flying from India. Technically Singapore is a fortress: Some 7000 regular troops are stationed in the area, but more important are the mysterious secret fortificatidns, the great land batteries at Changi, on the extreme eastward tip of Singapore Island, and on several small islands in the Straits and off the roads, like Blakang Mati and Pulau Brani. These islands house permanent garrisons of artillery and engineers. It is said the defences include not only 15-inch guns with a range of 25 miles, but actually 18-inch guns, which are believed to be the most powerful in the world. The Singapore Base cost a lot of money, part of which was paid for, strangely enough, by opium. Official estimates put the actual cost at £16,100,000 so far, including figures for the naval base alone varying between £8,000,000 and £9,000,000. The floating dock cost £1,000,000, and the fee for towing it to Singapore was £200,000, including £lO,OOO Suez Canal dues. The air base at Seletar cost £710,000, and the two other military aerodromes about £350,000 each. CONTRIBUTIONS MADE. The money came from several sources. The Straits Settlements, the Crown Colony Of which Singapore is the capital, contributed the lapd at Seletar valued at £150,000. New Zealand gave £1,000,000 and Hong Kong £250,000. Australia gave nothing, but built a navy. The rich peninsula of Malaya, above Singapore, is divided into Federated and Non-Federated’States. The Federated States, directly under British con • trol, have contributed £2,000,000, and £3OO 000 to the purchase of two new Royal Air Force squadrons. The NonFederated States are hardly more independent than the Federated. Of these the Sultan of Johore donated £500,000 to the base. The total of these various ’’contributions” is £4,200,000 so far, or roughly one-quarter of the cost of the base.

Moreover, up to 1933 the Straits Settlements had contributed about 60,000,000 Straits dollars to the base; since 1933 it has paid a fixed assessment of 4,000,000 Straits dollars in the past three years. This makes 41 total contribution from the Straits of 81,500,000 Straits dollars, roughly £9,500,000. Add this to the foregoing contributions and we have a total of £13,7Q0,000. Subtract this from the total cost of £16,100,000. The balance of £2,400,000 is the approximate cost of Singapore to the British budget at home. Cheap at the price. Aside from the estimated £500,000 yearly upkeep cost, the Singapore Base cpsts the Mother Country nothing. Roughly 20 per cent of the revenue from the Straits Settlements comes from opium, a Government monopoly. The British buy raw opium from Iran or India and prepare it into what is called Chandu. The tubes are small ipetal containers. The raw opjum costs perhaps one Straits dollar a “tahij” (11-3 mmces); chandu sells for 12 dollars a tahil. The profit is obviously enormous, but the price is put so high in a deliberate effort to diminish sales. FOOD FOR THOUGHT. At the opening of the base considerable flurry was caused by the presence of the American fleet. Viewed in the light of the war in China and of

Japanese pressure to the south and east it certainly must have given Japan something to think about. Subsequently, it was announced that Britain was prepared to “lease the facilities of the new Singapore Naval Base to the United States in case of necessity.” In other words, in case of war. “Lease” the Singapore facilities? In case of. war the British would turn handsprings to get the U.S.A, there for nothing. | On the other hand, the Singapore docking would be a great convenience to the United States in case of war in the Far East since she has no base west of Hawaii capable of repairing big ships.' According to the best military information available, the island is open to attack only from the mainland to, the north. A sea approach is almost impossible, and while an air attack might do damage, it could hardly result in occupation. To take Singapore an enemy would have to land infantry detachments somewhere in Malaya, or possibly Siam, and march south. Hence the anxiety about increasing the aerodromes guarding this approach. Singapore’s chief advantage is its location. It is only 1578 miles from Manilla and 1674 from Hong Kong, but is 2345 miles from Yokohama. Though Japan is building an important airbase in Formosa, to make a full-dress attack the Japanese fleet would have to steam at least 3000 miles which is much more than the cruising radium of a modern fleet going into battle. Actually, though, the essence of naval war is attack on trade. A Pacific war would be largely a matter of intercepting Japanese merchant vessels, plus blockade with the object of starving Japan. For this purpose Singapore is ideal. In addition Singapore has a completely peaceful hinterland. Politics hardly exist in Malaya; there is no nationalist movement. Think by contrast of British bases in Egypt, Iraq or India, where the political consequences of British occupation have been an v acute problem. Moreover, it is beautifully equipped for aircraft, unlike Gibraltar, which has no convenient land-ing-fields. Thus, the concentration of power at Singapore performs a number of functions. It provides oil storage for the British Fleet as well as dock- | yards for naval repair. It backs up Hong Kong and is an indispensable factor in protecting Australia. It guards Colombo and Calcutta and drives an armoured stake into a great Imperial pivot, the junction of the trade routes from India and the west to China and beyond. Above all, it is a warning to Japan. The base tells the Japanese in no uncertain terms that the British still mean business in this part of the world. In this respect it is recalled that FieldI Marshal Lord Roberts, before he died, said that the history of the world would | be decided at Singapore some day. ! Maybe the British are getting ready for S the day. '