NAVAL DEFENCE

Wairarapa Times-Age, 14 March 1939, Page 4

NAVAL DEFENCE

VALUE OF SUBMARINES TO AUSTRALIA GAME TWO CAN PLAY.

VULNERABILITY TO ATTACK. The arrival in Australian waters of H M submarine Phoenix, which has been lent to the Royal Australian Navy for training purposes, is more than an indication that such craft must still be an important factor in naval warfare, states a special correspondent in the “Sydney Morning Herald.” It is a timely reminder of Australia’s vulnerability to some forms of attack. The establishment in Sydney of an anti-submarine school, which was opened last month, is no mere aca-

demic gesture. Australia’s Navy must be prepared not only to guard coastal communications, but, if necessary, to operate at long distances from these shores. In other words, there may be no ultimate distinction between an offensive and a defensive operation. The submarine is not purely a weapon of attack, against which various defensive measures have been brought to a high pitch of effectiveness. It has indispensable uses as a weapon of defence. ECONOMICAL WEAPON. The motives which actuated Great Britain, after the Great War, to propose that submarines should be abolished by mutual agreement among the interested Powers, sprang neither from a desire to effect economies in naval expenditure nor from a belief that the submarine was no longer a menace to

a country vitally dependent upon ocean communications. The motives were simply humanitarian. Submarines, however, are relatively cheap to build —a fact which accounted more than any other for the failure of the ' British proposal. The French and Italian Governments were naturally unwilling to give up their , most economical weapon of naval defence, and both of them proceeded, especially the former, to build submarines in increasing numbers. Submarine design has improved enormously since the war: A limit seems to have been reached, however, in the advantages derived from a mere increase in tonnage. The improvements are mainly concerned with technical equipment, armament, speed, and cruising range. The watchword, in fact, is not bigger, but better, submarines. It is true, of course, that many large submarines (the so-called submarine cruisers) have been built, but their success has been seriously questioned. The British submarine XI, commissioned in 1925 and accidentally sunk in 1936, had a surface displacement of nearly 2,500 tons, and a French submarine, commissioned in 1932, had a surface displacement of nearly 3,000 tons. These vessels, capable of a high speed on the surface, were large enough to be mounted with 8-inch guns and carry an aeroplane, but it is no secret that they were found awkward to handle. Four large submarines built for the United States Navy between 1923 and 1931 were equally disappointing. SPEED AND’RANGE. On the other hand, developments in recent years have so increased the speed and cruising-range of the submarine that its offensive power has become greater than ever. During the war Germany built at least two submarines capable of crossing the Atlantic. Nowadays British and French submarines voyage from the English Channel to the China seas; Italy claims to possess submarines which can cruise right round Africa to Italian Soma- . liland without refuelling; and Japanese submarines can make non-stop trips to the American coast and back. The ability of such submarines, whether as mine-layers or as commerce- : raiders, to remain at sea for long periods and to cruise at relatively high speeds is, perhaps, the most import- ' ant advance in post-war submarine development. At the same time gunpower has been raised, torpedo'armament and mine-carrying capacity have been increased, and anti-aircraft equipI ment has been made very much more ' effective. None , the less, these improvements . are considered by many experts to be i more than offset by the increased effectiveness of anti-submarine meas- ' ures, such as the devices for detect- ' ing the presence and location of a i submarine, depth charges, fast motor boat “chasers,” seaplane patrols, and the convoy system. This view, whether too optimistic or not, must be modified by geographical considerations. A French newspaper has recently asked whether the convoy system, for example, would have been as successful in 1918 if England’s enemies had possessed a submarine base at, say, Brest. DANGER TO AUSTRALIA. Leaving aside such a hypothetical question, we must assume that in the event of a major war in which Great Britain was involved enemy submarines would be -able to operate in the most distant of the Seven Seas, and that no Empire seaport would be entirely secure from the threat of enemy action. The danger to Australia would be immediate if a Pacific naval Power' were included among our enemies. Submarines working from a base even 2,000 miles distant from us might be able to operate along the sea routes leading to Australia and in the vicinity of the Australian coast. There are regions where mine-laying submarines could inflict enormous damage upon shipping, and it should be remembered that ocean-going submarines may easily carry 40 mines. Certain British submarines are said to carry considerably more. The loss caused by mines during the war was enormous.

There is little comfort in the reflection that international law forbids mine-laying in the open sea or that the Submarine Protocol of 1936, signed by the leading naval Powers, gives merchant shipping immunity from submarine attack. How is a merchant ship to be defined when it be : longs to a belligerent? A view has recently been expressed in Germany that in time of war the whole British mercantile marine would be employed in such a way as to be in effect part of the British Navy. Clearly, the importance to Australia of the Anti-submarine School cannot be over emphasised. But purely defensive measures, however adequate in themselves, may not be enough. Ought not the Australian Navy to possess submarines of a type suited to our geographical situation? Submarine warfare is, after all, a game at which two can play.