KEY TO PACIFIC

Wairarapa Times-Age, 1 March 1939, Page 3

KEY TO PACIFIC

IMPORTANCE OF GUAM U.S.A. NAVAL PLANS. DEFENSIVE AIMS STRESSED. WASHINGTON. January 26. A careful distinction between development of ’‘defensive” air and submarine facilities at Guam on the one hand and potentially “offensive” advance naval base facilities was drawn before the House Naval Affairs Committee today in its deliberations on the proposal to expend 5,000,000 dollars as the first step in preparing the tiny Pacific Island for national defense uses. Naval opinion, expressed successively by two top-ranking spokesmen, maintained that the type of facilities developed at Guam make all the difference. Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn, former Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and Chairman of the Board which recently recommended 41 different developments to increase the mobility and efficiency of American naval forces, informed the Committee that with development of only air and submarine facilities at Guam “the United States would not be in a position to project offensive operation beyond that point.” NAVY’S PRESENT PLANS. Admiral William D. Leahy ,Chief of Operations of the Navy, had previously told the Committee tha't the only proposal under consideration by the Navy and recommended to Congress is for such development. He explained that to achieve adequate air and submarine facilities would cost approximately 80,000,000 dollars. Admiral Hepburn took the position that development of this character would help to insure the safety of the Philippines .and also would be impoiiant primarily as preventing possible hostile offensive operations against the Hawaiian Islands from the westward. He held that the strategic desirability of such development from the point of view of defence alone was sufficient to justify such a recommendation by his Board. But he considered that the development of an advance fleet base at Guam was a subject which comes under a different category. He believed it desir-, able because with it “the whole position of the United States in the Pacific could be made stable and secure.” He conceded that development of such a base involves questions of policy beyond the scope of either his Committee or the Navy Department. The distinction drawn by the two Admirals serves here to clarify somewhat the intentions of the Administration towards Guam. It appears now that whatever the ultimate hopes of the naval experts the Administration is proposing nothing more at this time than initial steps towards development at Guam of air and submarine facilities. And this is to be undertaken slowly. The initial proposed expenditure of nearly 5.000,000 dollars is to be spread over a 3-year period —1,000,000 dollars the first year, 2,148,000 dollars the second year. The presumption is left that after this initial step has been taken it will be time enough to consider and decide then whether to progress farther in the direction of developing Guam into one of the .key strategic points of the world .

NAVY’S POSITION. The strategic reasons behind the Navv's recommendation for development of Guam Were outlined by Admiral Leahy as follows: "The establishment of a base for submarines and aircraft on the .Island of Guam would be extremely valuable in augmenting the defensive power of the American fleet because no foreign power would like to project an advance in force across the Pacific without first reducing such a base. v “If the United-States is to continue the maintenance of an Asiatic Squadron it is necessary that a base for repairs be available in the Western Pacific somewhere. “If the United States is to withdraw entirely from the Western Pacific and to also leave the defence of the Philippine Islands to the natives thereof without assistance, the whole value of an airplane and submarine base at Guam would be a deterrent effect on anybody contemplating a hostile move from that general area toward the Hawaiian Islands. GUAM CALLED INVALUABLE. “If the United States expects to afford an assistance in the event of the Philippines being attacked by a foreign power a base at Guam would be invaluable. “A strong, fully equipped base at Guam capable of protecting itself against an attack, together with the fleet available if the present international naval ratios are maintained, would practically prohibit an invasion of the Philippines and would add to the difficulty of attacking from the Pacific Ocean and American territory. “The necessity for a fully equipped base at Guam seems to depend entirely on national policies'for which the Navy has no responsibility. “Without giving any consideration to the establishment of such a base, the improvements in facilities for handling airplanes at Guam proposed in this bill will be of much value to existing American commercial air transportation and to the facility of operation of any naval airplanes that may at any time be in that area.” During the course of questioning by Committee members he disclosed officially that the Navy’s public plans at the present time contemplate only developing air and submarine bases at Guam. The total cost for this practical type of military development he estimated at 80,000,000 dollars.. Cui rent programme projects are limited to the total of 5,000,000 dollars proposed in the bill before the Committee which would be used for harbour deepening and development . It is clear, however .that the 80,000,000 dollars air and submarine base programme is not the whole of projected Navy plans .Although it has not been stated officially, no real secret is made of the fact that the Navy would like very much'to see Guam developed into a major naval base after the order of Pearl Harbour or Singapore. The total cost of such development is estimated at 200.000.000 dollars. But this is a long range programme which would require many years for completion. There is no purpose in -projecting the entire programme at once. The first essential io such development is harbour development which is as far as the current programme goes.