Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, JANUARY 21, 1939. WAR AND WAR PORTENTS

Wairarapa Times-Age, 21 January 1939, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age SATURDAY, JANUARY 21, 1939. WAR AND WAR PORTENTS

APPROVING Mr Chamberlain’s refusal to reverse the policy of non-intervention in Spain, the London Daily .’I elegraph has said, in an article quoted in a cablegram published today, that

supplying arms to Spain would be tantamount to intervention, which General Franco’s allies would emulate and, it is possible that this would transform a civil war into a world war against which the Spanish issue would be insignificant.

This, no doubt, is a reasonably accurate statement, of probabilities, but the implied suggestion that world war is to be avoided or averted by allowing events to continue their present course in Spain imposes a heavy tax, not so much on optimism, as on credulity.

Under the policy of non-intervention, as it is strangely called, Italy and Germany have been and are free to give all the assistance they like to the Spanish rebels, while Britain and 'France have abstained from giving any assistance to the legally-constituted Government of Spain. As the British Leader of the Opposition (Mr Attlee) has put it, “non-inter-vention is now only a method by which the (Spanish) Republicans are prevented from defending themselves against the aggression of a foreign Power.” While Britain and France have adhered strictly to a policy of non-intervention, Italy and Germany between them have not only supplied General Franco with troops, aircraft, artillery and other material., but, it is now reported, with four destroyers and two submarines.

From a standpoint of international fair dealing and justice t 0 Spain—in light, for example, of Mr Chamberlain’s declared view that the Spanish people should be left to settle their own differences —this state of affairs evidently leaves a great deal to be desired. Even if that aspect of the position be ignored, however, it is still necessary to consider the probable, or inevitable outcome as it affects the interests of countries other than Spain, particularly those of Britain and France.

The British Prime Minister and those who support him in insisting upon a continuance of the policy of one-sided nonintervention defend that policy on the ground chiefly that it is the only alternative to precipitating a world conflict. Even if they are right, as they may be, at an immediate view, it remains to be considered whether this policy is. not leading up to world war in which Britain and France will be placed at a much greater disadvantage than if they had rejected the policy of one-sided non-intervention at the outset.

Both the British and French Governments avowedly are basing their present policy on the hope that Italy and Germany, when”they have conquered Spain, will resign the fruits of conquest and retire gracefully from the battlefield. This hope was defined the other day by the French Foreign Minister (M. Bonnet) at a meeting of Cabinet at which he

upheld a policy of strict non-intervention, quoting Signor Mussolini’s undertaking to Mr Chamberlain that he would withdraw all forces (from Spain) after the war and respect the status quo in the Mediterranean.

It may be agreed that a realisation of these hopes—that is to say a complete withdrawal of all foreign forces from Spain at the end of the war—would in some measure justify the policy Britain and France have thus far pursued. If, on the other hand, the end of the war finds Spain dominated and controlled by Italy and Germany, the British and French statesmen who now so confidently defend the policy of so-called non-inter-vention may find themselves open to the charge of having betrayed their respective countries by laying them open to exceedingly damaging and dangerous attack.

Spain obviously is capable of becoming a formidable base of attack on French territory and on British and French sea communications in both the Atlantic and Mediterranean, ft is held by the defenders of non-intervention that Italy and Germany will make no attempt to hold and develop Spain as a strategic base. It is on the basis of that belief that the British and French Governments uphold their present policy of inaction. Should the belief prove presently to be unfounded, the issues that are now being ignored or pushed into the background will speedily force themselves most unmistakably on at tent ion.

Before long, British and French Ministers may find themselves confronted by a refusal on Italy’s part, to withdraw from Spain and to respect the status quo in the Mediterranean. What then would be the prospect of averting world war?

The possibility and likelihood of that position being reached stands out quite clearly. Ministers in Britain and in France are citing Signor Mussolini’s assurance that he intends to carry out the Anglo-Italian Agreement in its entirely and to respect the status quo in the Mediterranean, but Italy is and has been for some time past engaged in active, though underhanded efforts to extort territorial and other concessions from France—that is to say, she has been and is violating the AngloItalian Agreement. What, in these circumstances, are the assurances”and undertakings of the Italian dictatorship worth? Yet it is only on the assumption that these pledges are to be relied upon that- the policy with regard to Spain meantime being pursued by Britain and France is capable of being defended.