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FRONTAL ATTACK

MR DUFF COOPER ON HIS RESIGNATION UNABLE TO AGREE WITH PREMIER BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY CONDEMNED. WRONG WAY TAKEN WITH HITLER. (British Official Wireless.) (Received This Day, 1.10 p.m.) RUGBY, October 3. In his personal statement in the House of Commons on his resignation from Cabinet Mr A. Duff Cooper complained that the chief defect of British foreign policy in recent months had been its failure to make plain to other countries exactly where Britain stood. Thus it had come to the people of Czechoslovakia as a shock of treachery and perfidy that, with their enemies facing them, Britain had turned against them. Thus —in his view—not until the mobilisation of the British Fleet had Herr Hitler taken seriously into account the possibility of Britain’s armed intervention. Coming to the Munich agreement, Mr Duff Cooper said: “I spent the greater part of Friday trying to persuade myself that; these terms were good enough for me. I tried to swallow them, but they stuck in my throat. It seemed to me that although the modifications which the Prime Minister had obtained were important and of great value, there remained the fact that Czechoslovakia was to be invaded, and I think, having accepted the humiliation of partition, she should have been spared the ignominy and horror of invasion. A CLAIM QUESTIONED. “I was aware that there was cause for relief last week, but I was not certain whether there was cause for self-congratulation. When I heard Mr Chamberlain say he had brought peace with honour, I felt lonely and isolated. I have always believed that one of the most important principles of foreign policy was to make the policy plain to other countries. Our first duty was to make plain exactly where we stood and what we would do. ’The great defect of our foreign policy in recent months was its failure to make this clear. On the contrary v/e have been drifting daily nearer war. It was not said until the last moment, and then said in the most uncertain tones, that we were prepared to fight, while information to the opposite effect poured into Germany. Everything pointed to the fact that Germany was preparing for war. The one way in which this could have been prevented was by Britain making a stand. We should not have been fighting for Czechoslovakia had we gone to war last week, but in order that a Great Power should not be allowed to disregard its treaty obligations and dominate the Continent by brute force. Such reserved utterances as Mr Chamberlain and Sir John Simon made meant nothing to the mentality of Hitler and Mussolini. 1 hoped it would be possible to make a statement to Herr Hitler before the Nuremberg speech. We were urged to do so on all sides, even by Germans, but the reply was always that it was dangerous to irritate Hitler before a public speech. I urged mobilisation for many days and thought it was the kind of language easier for Herr Hitler to understand. Mr Chamberlain believed in addressing Herr Hitler through the language of sweet reasonableness. THE FLEET MOBILISATION. “I believed he was more open to the language of the mailed fist. It was not till the fateful Wednesday morning that Herr Hitler changed his policy, due not to argument but to the fact that Herr Hitler for the first time realised that the mobilisation of the Fleet meant that the British people were prepared to fight in a great

cause.” Mr Duff Cooper described Herr Hitler’s terms as those which a cruel and revengeful enemy would dictate to a foe beaten after a long war. IGNOMINY AND HORROR. Mr Duff Cooper broke down, while the Opposition cheered wildly. He continued: “Czechoslovakia should have been spared the ignominy and horror of invasion but the Germans having got their man down, were not to be ueprived of kicking him.” Referring to the Anglo-German agreement, Mr Duff Cooper said that for Mr Chamberlain to sign this document without consulting his colleagues or reference to Britain’s allies, or communication to the Dominions, was not the way the foreign affairs of the Empire should be conducted. We were left with a loss of prestige and a tremendous commitment, as, for the first time in history, we had agreed to defend a frontier in Central Europe. If we were committed to maintain this frontier, it was imperative that we should maintain an army of something like Continental proportions. “I hope the Premier is right,”’ said Mr Duff Cooper, “but I cannot believe what he believes. Therefore I should be only a hindrance to his Government. Though it may have ruined my political career, I can still walk with my head erect.”

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/WAITA19381004.2.48.4

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Wairarapa Times-Age, 4 October 1938, Page 8

Word count
Tapeke kupu
789

FRONTAL ATTACK Wairarapa Times-Age, 4 October 1938, Page 8

FRONTAL ATTACK Wairarapa Times-Age, 4 October 1938, Page 8

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