Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1938. GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY.

Wairarapa Times-Age, 3 October 1938, Page 4

Wairarapa Times-Age MONDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1938. GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY.

QNE very interesting outcome of the crisis which lias lately shaken Europe and the world is the signing by Mr Chamberlain and Herr Hitler of an agreement intended to govern the future relations of Britain and •Germany by ensuring that methods of consultation shall be adopted to deal with any questions arising between them. It goes without saying that in the extent to which it promises to establish and consolidate peace in Europe, this agreement is to be welcomed unreservedly.

The value of the agreement and that of others like it must always depend, however, on the extent to which it is based upon a. genuine identity of principles and aims. > From that standpoint, the Chamberlain-Hitler agreement does not obviously, at an immediate view, commend itself as likely to usher in an epoch of peace and security.

In the first place the agreement is more or less a byproduct of the settlement of a particular European problem—the problem of Czechoslovakia —on lines which are held in some quarters, and by no means altogether without reason, to represent a rather ignominious and dangerous surrender to an aggressive dictatorship. If the cession of Sudetenland had not come to be regarded as the only apparent alternative to a European war—if, that is to say, it had been possible to consider and deal with the question dispassionately on its merits—it is most improbable that any such extreme concession to Germany would ever have been considered.

That the Sudetdns had some grievances is admitted, but that these people of mixed German and Slav blood had any genuine affinity with Nazi Germany is not, and .does not seem likely to be, established. Very possibly many of the Sudetens will soon have vastly more serious grievances as citizens of the Reich than they ever had as citizens of Czechoslovakia. The dismemberment of the last-mentioned country, although it has been held to be necessary in the interests of European peace-—undoubtedly a great and weighty consideration—does not commend itself to admiration as an achievement of constructive statesmanship.

Apart from the circumstances of its origin, the Cham-berlain-Hitler agreement, at a larger and broader view, must be regarded on'some grounds rather doubtfully. . The essential conditions which should govern any agreement, of the kind into which Britain enters presumably are that the agreement must not endanger vital British interests, that it must not commit Britain to use her power or her influence foT other than worthy ends, and that it must not stand in the way of friendship with any other nation.

Is it consistent with, the observance of these conditions to enter into relations of unbreakable amity with Nazi Germany? The best way to approach a verdict on the agreement may be to say that it can. never have much value or significance in British eyes until Germany modifies greatly the policy she has followed under Herr Hitler’s leadership—a policy of arming to the teeth, at the expense of internal economic ' and social welfare, and extorting concessions from other nations by means of menaces. No service can be rendered to the cause of peace by turning a blind eye on the well-established fact, that Hitler, besides being a remarkably gifted and successful demagogue, is one of the most dangerous reactionaries known in history. What is. there in the record either of his control of internal affairs in Germany or in his direction of foreign policy that can be regarded as a contribution to human progress and welfare?

If there is any real value in the Chamberlain-Hitler agreement it must be in the extent to which the agreement is calculated to encourage liberal and enlightened sentiment in Germany and in other countries and so to weaken reactionary dictatorships and reduce their power for harm. Operating in that way, the agreement may do something to facilitate and assist the establishment of a better world order.

Britain and her Empire partners evidently are called upon, however, to guard against the clanger of being lulled by unsupported talk of peace into a sense of false security. The desire to eliminate war and to cultivate friendship with Germany most decidedly should not be allowed to become an excuse for allowing the forces of democracy and freedom to be attacked and overcome in detail.