WAR LOST?

Wairarapa Times-Age, 24 August 1938, Page 9

WAR LOST?

THE JAPANESE IN CHINA "OCCUPIED” TERRITORY. EVIDENCE OF POLITICAL STUPIDITY. The longer one lives in the Japan-ese-occupied areas the more obvious it becomes that Japan has already lost the war, writes a Northern China correspondent of the “Manchester Guardian.” This conclusion is forced upon one not so much by the military aspects of the situation, for it is still apparent that Japan can continue to win victories in traditional warfare, as by the growing evidence of her political stupidity. On January 16, and again on May 10, when the earlier policy was restated in the same terms, Japan, by her decision not to recognise the National Government of China, set herself a political problem for which she cannot possibly find a solution. To chastise the Kuomintang is one thing; to eliminate it is another. By choosing the second the Japanese have committed themselves to the establishment in China of a new Government, a new political theory, and a new Civil Service. Considering the size of China and the length of time it has taken her to build up modern political institutions, it is clear that even under the most, favourable conditions such a task would be a severe test of the highest statesmanship. NO PRO-JAPANESE PARTY. But the conditions were not favourable. In the first place, the Japanese have not been able, as they expected, to rely upon a powerful pro-Japanese party, a quick seizure of power, the goodwill of numerous disaffected elements, and a rapid collapse of the Kuomintang,. which before the war appeared to be so seriously demoralised. The Japanese have reckoned without a quarter of a century of Nationalist education, and they have discovered that Chinese over 50, such as the decrepit, sorry-looking Anfu clique who man their puppet Governments, have neither the ability to rule nor the prestige to command respect. The second mistake came after conflict began; it was the grounds on which they chose to conduct their propaganda. These were, briefly, to pursue a holy war against Communism in a country which had nothing to fear from it and against a people who, if forced to choose, would certainly prefer Communism to Japan; to eliminate “antiJapanese feeling” while at the same time doing everything to create it; and most serious of all, to destroy the first Government which can claim to have united China since the revolution.

GOVERNMENT BY BAYONET. The political problem has been met by pouring old wine into new bottles. Bringing to their task colonial experience in Korea and Manchuria, the Japanese continue to use the methods which have been found to be more or .less successful in those countries. They cannot understand or invent any propaganda designed to appeal to people beyond the reach of their bayonets; and even when people are under their bayonets they defeat their own ends by the unimaginative thoroughness of their methods. This fact is of considerable importance when it is remembered that very few Chinese indeed are under direct Japanese military control. It is the contrast between the highly-developed communications of the big cities and the railways on the one hand and the vast areas of the hinterland on the other which explains the pattern of military operation. It is no accident that the invading armies have penetrated with such startling rapidity along China’s main railways; it is no accident that they have not seen nine-tenths of the area which they are supposed to occupy. Under these conditions the political problem was by no means easy; to succeed it was necessary for the Japanese to set up in the railway zones a Government which would have a fair chance of extending automatically to the hinterland. In other words, the situation is one _in which there is no middle way between a Chinese Government exercising a real power, which would be of no service to the Japanese military, and complete Japanese control behind Chinese puppets. The opportunity to seek the first solution having been thrown away on January 16, the attempt to impose the second naturally followed. NEW PEOPLE’S PRINCIPLE. In this attempt the chief device, apart from the creation of puppet Governments, is the establishment of the Hsin Min Huei, or the New People’s Society. This takes the place of the Kuomintang. The Hsin Min Chu 1., or the New People’s Principal, takes the place of the San Min Chu 1., or Three People’s Principles of Dr Sun Yet Sen, which the Hsin Min Hsueh Yuan, or the New People’s University, is designed to train the new bureaucracy. The most fundamental task was to establish the principle of legitimacy—hence the New People’s Principle. According to this principle all things like to live, but have varying powers of resistance; the good are strong and the weak are bad; heaven allows the good to grow and the weak to die. When men fight it is those who follow the Kingly Way, “Wang Tao,” against those who do not. This Kingly Way includes, according to the Japanese, getting rid of selfishness, avoiding Marxism, achieving sincerity, regulating the heart, and being correct in such important relations as those between husband and wife and parents and children, for those who do not understand these thinks follow the class war. A NATURAL CONFLICT. The new principle is naturally in conflict with the San Min Chu I. Nationalism, the first of the Three People’s

Principles, is said to be merely an outcome of pride and ostentation. Besides the meaning of “Wang Tao” is that those countries with virtue can receive the largest territory, and that distinctions of race do not matter. Democracy. the second of Dr Sun’s principles, is equally .mistaken because democratic institutions are impossible in China, where the population is too big and 'communications too undeveloped. The famous principle of Livelihood is dismissed as being sheer Communism. The only way to secure the livelihood of the people is to develop the resource of China with Chinese manpower and Japanese capital and technique. More significant, however, than this attack upon Dr Sun is the attempt to appeal to conservative elements in China by reviving Confucianism and attacking all the social and political ideas that China has taken over from the West. The New People’s Society is entrusted with the spreading of these ideas. Its organisation is impressive, its membership neglible. Financed by the secret service funds of the Japanese army it has already made its influence felt upon education in the occupied areas. School hours formerly devoted to the study of San Min Chu I. are now given to the Hsin Min Chu I. The changes which the new society has made in textbooks afford an excellent illustration of its methods. Where the word “traitor,” for example, occurs in the pre-war text the words “model citizen” are now substituted. “Confifbius” is to be read for “Dr Sun Yat Sen,” “friend” for “enemy,” “wisdom” for “patriotism,” while such phrases as “Peace has her victories no less renowned than war” are merely omitted.

NO MASS SUPPORT. An organisation of this type cannot hope to secure mass support; it is to be used mainly as a political instrument with which to control thought,, intimidate opposition, and develop -a new bureaucracy. There were, indeed, only two appeals which could be made for popular support. The one was to please the peasants and the Ipcal gentry by reviving Confucianism; this has been ruined by the methods of conquest, such as the burning of villages, raping of women, and the ruthless slaughter of non-combatants. The other appeal was to persuade the Chinese that Japanese help was essential in the struggle against Communism. The value of this has been counteracted, first by the conduct of the Chinese Communists themselves, secondly by the policy of the U.S.S.R. There is every evidence to show that the Chinese Communists have given up their old social revolutionary programme and are adhering rigidly to the terms of their agreement with the Kuomintang. Nor is the help that the U.S.S.R. is giving to China on the same basis as it was before 1927; there are, as far as we can see, no political strings. The new political theory and all the propaganda that goes with it can be and is being rammed down the throats of the Chinese in the occupied areas. But what is the use of all this? It has not converted any Chinese to the Japanese cause, nor has it demoralised the Chinese intellectuals. More serious than this is the fact that this propaganda cannot reach the hinterland, and that the methods of conquest have provided the basis for the development of a peasant nationalism. The Japanese have dug their own graveyard.