EUROPEAN WAR

Wairarapa Times-Age, 19 August 1938, Page 9

EUROPEAN WAR

POSSIBILITIES OF SITUATION ALLIES STRONGER. OBSERVATIONS ON STRATEGIC POSITION. To survey the European situation, I shall deal first with the fundamental question on which the possibilities of any action, anywhere, depend, writes Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, in the “Sydney Morning Herald.” This might be epitomised as “the question of what they can’t do.” Alternatively, it can be described as the problem of the offensive. It was the machine gun, above all, which held up the attack in 1914-18. There is now a much higher proportion of machine guns, light and heavy, in all armies. Tanks have been improved and increased, but anti-tank weapons have made still more rapid progress—and, being cheaper, can be multiplied faster. Mechanisation and motorisation quicken the advance, but help the defence even more —by en-' abling it to rush machine guns and anti-tank guns to any threatened spot. Air action may hinder the arrival of defence reserves, but so long as the defender is at least equal in air strength, It is still easier for him to hinder the attacker —who needs larger reserves and thus offers larger targets—from following up his initial success. To give the offensive an adequate chance, it would seem to need a superiority approaching three to one. As the Italians showed in Abyssinia, and the Japanese are schowing in China, if to a less marked degree, the superiority of the well-armed forces over the ill-armed masses is greater than ever. ■ OBSTACLES TO GERMANS. From the tactical axis of the military situation let us now pass to the strategic. In the examination it is best to begin at the centre and work outwards. The centre is the Franco-Ger-man frontier. A German offensive against the French frontier would be met by the Rhine and the Maginot Line, whose resisting power is enhanced by mechanised rapidity of reinforcement. An attempt to make a renewed sidestep through Belgium would have to overcome, not only the modern superiority of the defence, but a series of waterlines which are serious obstacles to the mechanised forces on which the chances of a rapid advance would largely depend. The alternative detour through Switzerland would have to overcome still more obstacles and a Swiss defence that is better prepared and quicker to mobilise than in 1914. The one comparatively easy target in the west is Holland, and the present weakness of her defences forms a temptation. If a land advance in that direction would still have to face the new-ly-developed fortifications of Belgium before reaching other objectives, it would enable Germany to establish air bases within 100 miles of the English coast.

With this exception, the practicability of a serious German offensive in the west is doubtful. Moreover, even if the bulk of the German army could be concentrated in the west, it would be far short of a three to one superiority unless a great part of the French strength could be drawn away.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA’S STRENGTH What other offensive possibilities are open to Germany? Czechoslovakia forms an obvious target, but it would be unwise to under-estimaffi her capacity for resistance/ as is commonly done. Her army is well trained and seems to have an abundance of up-to-date equipment Her scheme of munition supply has been so arranged as to allow for the contingency of a strategic withdrawal to successive rearward lines of defence. Russia could afford Czechoslovakia prompt, and thus all the more valuable, help by air. But the possibility of any land reinforcement would depend on the acquiescence of Czechoslovakia’s neighbours, especially those whose territory interposes.

The main source, apart from Russia, to which Czechoslovakia has looked for assistance lies in the west. But, without under-rating the political importance of the pledges which France has given, and recently reiterated, it is necessary to take account of the military difficulties in the way of fulfilling them. For if an offensive in the west would be an unpromising venture for Germany, it looks no better for France. And I can imagine nothing that the Germans would appreciate better —as an opportunity to set a trap and inflict a disaster worse than the French suffered in 1914. The French might render as much help, with less risk, by the threat of attack, coupled with an harassing campaign in the air. • ITALIAN INVASION UNLIKELY. Unfortunately, the defence problem of France is newly complicated fyy developments on her southern frontiers. I do not regard with much concern the possibility of an Italian invasion. The natural obstacles are too great, especially as an air counter-stroke' finds its most effective target in large forces that are squeezed through mountain defiles. Similar reflections apply to the new possibility of a threat from a Francoist Spain. Beyond this is the handicap that France would suffer in using her available forces, from the presence of Italy, if hostile, in the Mediterranean. Under present conditions Italy’s sea and air forces might be kept in check by the combined British and French fleets, with their aircraft resources. The possibility would, however, be much diminished if Spain were con-' trolled by a regime in alliance with Italy, or even tacitly favourable to Italy. And the situation would become still worse if guns, especially mobile guns, from the mainland, could menace the anchorage at Gibraltar. Britain would then be left with no secure naval base of her own short of Alex-

andria more than 3,000 miles distant. Such a survey of the military situation in Europe presents a gloomy picture. It suffices to show what strategic advantages the peaceful Powers have forfeited, and what a state of insecurity they have reached, by their hesitation to take.risks in maintaining collective security. But this does not imply that it is better to abandon such mutual insurance, nor that it is too late to retrieve the situation. GERMANY WEAKER TODAY. But it is at least speculative whether Czechoslovakia will form Germany’s next objective. It might seem to Germany more advantageous to extend her grip through Hungary and Rumania towards the Black Sea. Taking account of the possibility, the next question is whether Hungary and Rumania will lend themselves to it. The prospect of becoming a cats’-paw is never a pleasant one. The combination of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia would be a formidable obstacle, and consequently a powerful deterrent to aggressive designs. With such a revival of mutual insurance, the military picture would be changed. To appreciate this we have only to compare it with that of 1914. Impressive as is German’s rearmament, her army is not yet as strong relatively to the conditions as it was then, while her navy is much weaker. And the military strength she has gained by the absorption of Austria is much less than that afforded by hex- alliance with the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1914. If Italy were to be an ally her capacity for distraction in the Mediterranean might be reckoned as compensating the diminution of Austria’s power. Even so, the sum of the alliance would hardly equal the military value of the German-Austro-Turkish combination in 1914. On the other side, the French forces may probably be reckoned as equivalent to those of 1914; allowance' must be made for the subtraction to meet the needs of her southern frontiers if Italy were hostile. In the British forces the Navy is stronger relatively than in 1914; the Army is not quite so strong, but less necessary for the support of the French in defence because of changed conditions. If England her-: self has become more vulnerable, it should be realised that her own Air Force offers a far more powerful means of intervention, and of affecting the scales in the early days of war, than anything she could contribute in 1914.

— RUSSIA’S AIR FORCE. The Russian Army is probably more powerful than that of 1914, although handicapped by the strategic difficulty of access to German territory; on the other hand, Russia’s huge air force is not only a new means, but could be a far more potent menace than was ever developed during the last war. Czechoslovakia’s strength, and power of distraction, would count for more than those of Serbia in 1914, while even her isolation is less marked than that of Serbia then. Even on this reckoning, the forces that could be thrown into the balance, against such an aggression as is pictured, compare not unfavourably with those of the Entente Powers formerly. Their disadvantages are mainly strategic, but'they now stand to benefit from the greatly-increased power of modern defence. If the forces of Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Turkey were added, the balance would be tipped heavily against the success of aggression. And still more so, if Poland were to join

in such an insurance scheme —from which she has much to gain, because of the contingent precariousness of her situation. The participation of Italy on the other side, by no means a certainty even today, would then become improbable—for her course has been ruled by shrewd calculation of comparative odds and prospects. And with that subtraction, a European war would become an improbability.' The chance of avoiding it depends less on idealism than on realism—a deeper realism than those who profess it have yet shown. ■