THE FIGHTING POWER OF THE BOERS.

Waikato Argus, Volume VII, Issue 458, 8 July 1899, Page 4

THE FIGHTING POWER OF THE BOERS.

(By a South African Journalist). When it was understood, soon after the Jameson raid, that two million pounds was to be spent upon the fortifications around Johannesburg and the capital of the Transvaal, there were a great number who were ready to cry out at the enormous expense, which they considered unnecessarily extravagant. The wily President, however, had just recovered from a trembling fit of insecurity, made apparent by the recent raid, which, although it had resulted in success to the Boers, left an uneasy apprehension on Oom Paul's mind as to what misfit happen if he were taken by surprise. With his usual amount ot hypocrisy he soon persuaded his good, honest, charitable, and religious, bearing burghers to uphold the expenditure of two million pounds for the fortificatins, and by making the Lord responsible, succeeded iu adding an additional grant of £225,000 a year for maintenance of the forts, £200,000 a year as interest on this capital expended, and £BO,OOO n year to be devoted to the eecret service fund, whereby he hoped to save the Transvaal from an unholy eurpriie. The result of this expenditure has meant the building of forts all round Johannesburg and Pretoiia, whereas Krugersclorp and the Zoutpansburg districts are well protected by smaller forts, and access is rendered difficult owing to the approaching hills acting as natural fortifioations. The phenomonal gold reef, known as the Rand, runs practically from Johannesburg to Krugersdorp, a distance of about thirty-two miles, and it is a circle round this (taking in Pretoria) that requires protection. The whole of South Africa, with but small exception, is a peculiar country to wage war in. Standing on the open plains, you would be encircled by hills, and although the first impression is that upon getting through between these you will then be in open country, it is not so, there are more hills, and this continues without variety for over 100,000 square miles. This is really the main safeguard oftheßjers. They know every inch of the ground, and hide themselves away in the hills, where they could use as targets any force that ventured to march in the open. They are brave at a distance, where they can feel secure from the enemy's fire, and have the pleasure of measuring their skill without fear of re taliation. One could not call them cowardly, for if it came to a hand to hand encounter thoy would fight like very demon?, though the want ot good military organisation would be bound to tell against them. Mind you, we are not dealing vvith savagec, but with men physically strong and naturally cunning, excellent marksmen, and well equipped. It is impossible to estimate the strength of their weapons or of their ammunition. For years past they have been steadily accumulating firearms and quick-firing guns of up to date make, and nobody knows what their resources are in that direction.

In strength the Boers of the Transvaal number about 67,000, against 90,000 Uitlanders, of whom 80 per cent are British subjects. In the Orange Free State there is a population of 110,000, of whom 80,000 are white ; of these only about 10 per cent, are English, the remainder Boers. In Cape Colony, out of a population exceeding a million and ahalf, about 400,000 are whites, 75 per cent, of these being English. These figures show that in the whole of South Africa, not including the native settlements, the Boers number roughly 240,000. This, of course, does not represent the fighting force, as many of these include better educated Boers than one meets with in the Transvaal, who might not care to sacrifice their interests on behalf on their less fortunate brethren. Again, it has yet to be determined as to what stand will be adopted by the Free Staters and Cape Colonists. There is still another consideration, too, and that is, what would be the result in the Transvaal alone if the half-million natives that are registered as having paid the hut tax there were to run riot and join in the fray. This is independently of the strife being taken up outside the Transvaal. If rumour does not lie, ard General Joubert's plan is to storm Kimberley, destroy the Cape to Buluwayo and the Port Elizabeth to Bloemfontein railway, finishing up at the end of " a fortnight " by taking Capetown, then, indeed, he would need the co-operation of every Boer in the whole of South Africa, and even with this force at his back, such an accomplishment would drive into insignificance any Napoleonic achievement ever dreamt of.

Many a time I have been asked whether it is a fact that the Boers are such good marksmen, and in order to give you an idea of their power, and to substantiate my previous ideas as to their methods of fighting, I will repeat to you a few historical facts that have earned for the Boers a reputation of being such good shots. When in 1877 the British seized the Transvaal and suppressed the Boer Government, there was naturally a great deal of discontent amongst the people, who wanted their liberty restored. This smouldered for some time until it was fanned into a flame in 1880, when the Boers resohed to rise in rebellion against British supremacy. They massed together at Krugersdorp (32 miles from where Johannesburg now stands), and one fine morning marched to meet the English troopp, 246 men of the 94th Regiment, in command of a colonel. The first battle was fought. It lasted ten minutes with the result—British loss, more thau 150 officers and men (out of 246), surrender of the remnant ; Boer loss, none. They were all behind a rock.

General Sir Geo. Colley, then Lieut.Governor and Commander-in-Chief in Natal, proceeded with 1000 men and some artillery to the field of action. He found the Boers encamped in a Btrong aud sheltered position behind a rock. Early morning, January 21st, 1881, he moved to the attack with the 58th Regiment, a mounted squadron of 70 men, the 60th Rifles and Artillery. He shelled the Boers for twenty minutes, and then commenced to ascend the slope in solid column. The battle was soon over. Result—British loss 73 ; Boer loss trifling. Every officer above the rank of lieutenant was killed.

On February 7th General Colley marched out across the Ingogo river, with 270 men, and on the heights there fought a battle that lasted from noon till nightfall. Result British loss, 150 ; Boer loss, 8 killed, 9 wounded.

Then followed that memorable battle of Majnba Bill, where General Colley lost his life, with 22G men out of a force of 400 engaged, the Boers having lost but 1 killed and 5 wounded. Thus ended the war, and commenced the Republic that is now commanding attention. You will see that out of four battles fought, the British loss was 700 men and the Beer loss 23 men. This cannot but tend to serious reflection on our part, leaving its imprint upon our characters for future guidance. There is no doubt that the Boers &re fine marksmen. From the cradle up they Jive an outdoor life, and they handle a gun with the same eaae as we would a walking stick. They love their liberty, their coffee and their Bible, and with their knowledge of the country, would give you no chance of a fight in the open, unless forced to it. It is a somewhat strange circumstance that the irony of fate has produced, when we reflect that in ISBI the Boers were fighting for their liberty at the hands of the British, and they got it. Now we are fighting for our liberty at the hands of the Buers —it is to be hoped we shall get it. Throughout South Africa every little village has its rifle club, and even where Englishmen abound, you will invariably find the competitions won by the Boers, very often by small boys of 15 or 16. 1 remember on one occasion having a

dibputo with a Boer over some trifling matter, and I called upon him to put up his fists and fight the matter out. " Allcmachter, no, maD," lie replied, " I'd sooner shoot you," meaning that he preferred weapons to fists, I've seen Boers out hunting springbok and never known them to miss anything witl ,; n a possible range. Not only will they .lit it, but will do so almost every time in the shoulder, the only vital part (with the exception ot the train) that will bring them clown instanter. We must not forget that the result of Majuba Hill (and recently the Jameson raid) to the arrogant nature of the Boer, is auflicieut to increase his thirst for further victories. The rising generation are beginning to lose sight of the old troublous days of the Kaffir and Zulu wars, but they must not forget that civilization has advanced during the lifetime of their Republic, and that our methods now are so totally dissimilar to our methods of twenty years ago, that it is hardly conceivable to foreshadow the awfulness of a big battle to-day, which for both our sakes it 13 to be hoped, will be averted—but not at th? expense of our liberty.