THE BRITISH SAILOR AND THE BRITISH NAVY.

Waikato Argus, Volume IV, Issue 258, 12 March 1898, Page 2 (Supplement)

THE BRITISH SAILOR AND THE BRITISH NAVY .

It has been a favourite occupation with philosophic speculators to discuss the proa and cons of the condition which would or might obtain did we become engaged in a dispute with some powerful maritime State. The usual form which this mental problem takes is whether or no the Brit'sh Fleet would be sufficient to protect our commerce, and also if the vessels themselves were adequate to the task could we obtain the requisite men to place the Navy on a thoroughly efficient war footing. Now, such brainsearching as this is not only interesting, it is useful, for it accustoms the public mind to grasp hypothetical situations which some day or other m*y be converted into stern reabty. The rtturn recently issued by the Registrar General of Shipping throws an important sidelight on the number and occupatitn of the men engaged in the British Mercantile Marine, and from this data a writer in the United Service Magazine proceeds to discuss the extent to which these crews would be available for the British Fleet in case of emergency. From the return above mentioned it is calculated that there would be employed, or available for employment, in the British Merchant Service between the ages of 16 and 45 a total of 125,800 officers and men. In case of a naval war, however, all merchant shipping would not lie up. We would still be dependent upon over-sea supplies of food and raw materials, and foreign customers would still continue to purchase our manufactures and coals. There would, obviously, be a very serious interference with the transaction of this commerce, and the foreign-going sailing vessels particularly would perforce be compelled to lie snugly in port. This means that two and a-quarter million tons of sail would remain in enforced idlenesss until peace was restored. With regard to steam tonnage, too, the slow vessels would necessarily cease running, and thus the calculation is made that were we engaged, let us say, with France and Russia, something like three million tons of British shipping would cease to earn freights, while France and Russia would each reduce their sea going tonnage by 250,000 tons. Assuming, therefore, that the withdrawal from the active list would be what we have stated, there would be available, after the wants of the merchant tonnage were supplied, a paper reserve for warships of 6000 officers and 30,C00 men. But such figures as this must be accepted guardedly, for granted that a section of our mercantile fleet continued, or attempted to continue, its work, it is obvious that more hands would be carried, and aho that the enhanced remunerative offering would ensure that the pick of the merchant sailors would still be employed on merchant vessels.

The next question, of course, which comes up for settlement is whether this reserve is adequate, i.e. is it equal to the combined forces of France and Russia ? The French navy is credited with a personnel of 40,000, and in addition has & reserve of 90,000 to fall back upon, while Russia can boast 36,000 men. plus a reserve of 10,000, Great Britain, to meet these possibly hostile forces, has -100,000 men in her navy and a reserve force of 26,000. That total, it is held, should be increased to at least 70,000. This, of course, could not be done with the fr«e bands from the Mercanti'e Marine. There would be almost sufficient seamen, hut the engineering and artisan departments of the short-handed war vessels would show a great shortage. These calculations, however interesting they may be, and serving the useful purpose of approximately indicating the Srobable extent to which the Royal [avy might in case of an emergency recruit itself from the ranks of merchant seamen, are not altogether profitable or logical. It is one thing to reckon that in case of war a certain number of British sailors would be available for service on. war vessels, but it is quite another thing to guarantee that such service, even if engaged upon, would be worth the paying for, save and except a probationary period of special training were insisted upon. The average British tar is—with sorrow be it said—not so much of a sailor as his name would seem to imply. Something more than temporary sojourn in the forecastle is needed to warrant the honest bestowal of the title. —Syren.