THE MEDITERRANEAN PROBLEM

Wairarapa Age, Volume XXXII, Issue 10711, 16 September 1912, Page 4

THE MEDITERRANEAN PROBLEM

Ono of the most momentous steps ta- / kon by the Imperial Governments in recent years iii regard to naval po 1 - •cy was the decision to withdraw a •onsidorable portion of the British squadron from the Mediterranean (says the Auckland Star). At the , time this policy was subjected. to severe criticism, even in. the modified form in which it was finally adopted. But it was only fair to the Imperial authorities to assume that they were fully a wave of the risks they were taking and of the means bv which they might be met. A strong argument in justification of this policy has now been furnished by the j announcement that a strong section | of the French navy is now to be concentrated in the Mediterranean. In any case, we might diaw the obvious inference that France would be prepared to defend the interests of the "Entente" in Southern Europe if eve.-they-were menaced there. But the Temps has spired us the trouble of conjecture by stating definitely thn f "it may be assumed that the British. Russian and French Fleets are mutaally agreed as to their respective duties and spheres of action " W'lnt +-h*> Temps implies, is that tbo "Triple Entente" between these three Posvc:s now so closely resembles an alliance that thoy arc making their naval arrangements. in consort. Russia : f to hold the Baltic, and keep the German North Sea fleet in chock. wlni>' France, if need be, can deal effictivoly with Italy and the nevr Australia navy in '{he Mediterranean. It may be premature to interpret all this literally. But there certainly seems to be sufficient basis of truth in it - +r. warrant the conviction that En gland's foreign policy has taken several rapid and decisive forward steps ■'recently, find that there is less likelihood than Over that if we were called upon to face any sudden international emergency in the Mediterranean, the Near East, the Middle East, or the F.v East, we would have to face it alone.