THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE TRIPLE ENTENTE.

Wairarapa Age, Volume XXXII, Issue 9693, 18 January 1910, Page 4

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE TRIPLE ENTENTE.

M. Cheradame contributes to the "Quarterly Review" an elaborate article, illustrated by two maps, discussing the comparative strength of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. M. Cheradame professes a cheerful confidence in the "means that are at the disposal of the Triple Entente for resistance to the threatening development o£ the Triplice, and for preventing attempts dangerous to the peace of Europe.'' He admits that Russia is crippled, but England must come to the rescue. In case of war "the immediate appearance of from 100,000 to 150,000 British troops by the side of the French is absolutely essential, for many reasons:" for this among others, that if our troops are not fighting in the field side by side with the French, our allies will distrust us. Germany builds all her hopes upon i the success of the first blow. The Tripb ententers, in M; Cheradame's opinion, "must do thair utmost to meet the first shock with firmness; then they must spin out the war as long as possible, while sparing their own forces; for the dependence of Germany on the foreigner for all nee essary food stuffs, and her general want of financial means, lead to the deliberate conviction that she is absolutely incapable of supporting a long war. The Powers of the Triple Entente have an obvious and essential interest in forwarding the political maturity of the Slav population of Austria-Hung iry by evsry means in.their power. Observe that in Aus-tria-Hungary the Germans number 11,740,000; the Magyars 8,640,000; the Slavs, 23,140,000. To sura up, the Triple Entente has at its command two main courses of action for protecting itself against the violence and the possible dangers of German policy. The firsst is to combine for the effective maintenance of a force adequate to prevent Germany from taking advantage of any accident she might deem favourable; the second is to exert concerted diplomatic action, and to hasten the political ripening of the Slavs of Central Europe and of the Balkans.