THE Wairarapa Age MORNING DAILY. WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 25. 1909. THE STATE OF THE NAVY.

Wairarapa Age, Volume XXXII, Issue 9577, 25 August 1909, Page 4

THE Wairarapa Age MORNING DAILY. WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 25. 1909. THE STATE OF THE NAVY.

It cannot be said that the report of the Cabinet sub-committee appointed •to inquire into Lord Charles Beres•ford's allegations of inefficiency in t'.eßritLh Navy is thoroughly reassuring. It is true that the report seta forth that no danger resulted to* the country, within the period covered by the allegations, through the Admiralty's arrangements for war. The sub-committee, however, adJsthtt arrangements whic'i were "quite defjnsible though not ideally perfect" were hampered by the lack of cordial relations between the Board of Admiralty—virtually Sir John Fisher—anrl the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Charles Bereaftrd. It

proceeds to blame both of these distinguished officers—Sir John Fisher for having kept Lord Charles Beresford in ignorance of the reason for the dispositions which were objected to, and Lord Charles Beresford Tor having failed to recognise the paramount authority of Sir John Fisher. If war preparations which were "not ideally perfect" were "seriously hampered" from any cause whatever, the efficiency of the Navy could hardly have been all that the country thought;it. And though the sub-commit(ee has virtually censured Lord Charles Beresford for having failed to recognise the paramount j authority of the Board of Admiralty, it admits that he ought to have been made acquainted with the reason of the Admiralty's dispositions. Lord Charles Beresford is understood to have alleged that the safely of the United Kingdom was imperilled owing to the fact that the Home Fleet with its Ncre division, Portsmouth division, and Devonport division, was kept entirely distinct from the Channel Fleet, of which ha was Commander-in-Chief, and that he was given no opportunity of manoeuvring in peace time the combined fleets which he would have had to command in the event St war. The gravamen of his charge was that the naval strength was split up into a number of separate divisions, which were exercised apart, each under its own commander, and which in the event of war might have been attacked in detail by the enemy. That was at any rate the view of the ex-Comtmnder-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet, and it has been hammered in by his supporters in the Opposition press, who alleged that Sir John Fisher was so jealous of Lord Charles Beresforl that lie would never allow

him to command more than tthe I relatively small numoer of battle- I Bhips. with the cruiser squadron and the destroyer flotilla attached, which formed the Channel Fleet. No doubt the Admiralty has reasons—and possibly good ones—for breaking up the available naval strength into indepndent fleets and divisions. The sub-committee suggests that the Admiralty ought to have disclosed those reasons to Lord Charles Beresford. It did.not disclose them to him for the reason apparently that Sir John Fi3her was not on speaking terms with Lurd Charles Berasford. And lhat was i\ very bad reason indeed in the interests of the British j Empire. It was, of course, very right ' and proper that the Admiralty should not be called upon to publish to the whole world th" reasons which actuated it in making its dispositions. The Admiralty is responsible for the arrangements for war, and tha key to its plans must in the interests ot the Empire be kept secret just as rigorously as the mobilisation plans of any great military Power. Sir John Fisher is' responsible to Mr IW'Kenna, tb.3 First Lord, and Mr M'Kenna, as one of the members of the Cabinet, is responsible to the Government and Parliament. The preparedness of the nation for war . by sea or land is a matter of which the Government alone knows Tall the details, nor is any good purpose to be served by distinguished officials taking part in the public discussion of questions of naval strategy. In that matter Sir John . Fisher occupies safe ground, but it is obvious that he has laid himself open to the reproof which the sub-committee has now bestowed upon him in its report, for having failed to acquaint the Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet-who had to carry out the plans of the Admiralty—with the reasons upon which those plans were based. It seems quite clear from the sub-committee's report that there has been serious personal friction between the Board of Admiralty and Lord Charles Beresford. It is deplorable that this should been so, but at any late one result of . this unhappy feud may be to hurry ■ on the formation of the Naval General Staff, which is one of the most - vital reforms demanded by the pre- - sent situation. Seeing that the subcommittee consists entirely of members of Mr Asquith's* Cabinet, it was hardly likely that the rjport would have justified Lord Charles Beresfcrd's allegations of naval inefficiency and of consequent danger to the security of the United Kingdom. The sub-committee has cleared the Board of Admiralty of the : gravest charges brought against it. But the best proof that Mr Asquith and hid colleagues are not altogether satisfied with the existing arrangement is that the committee with confidence to the further development of a Naval General Staff."