THE Wairarapa Age MORNING DAILY. MONDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1906. THE NEXT DUMA.

Wairarapa Age, Volume XXIX, Issue 8322, 31 December 1906, Page 4

THE Wairarapa Age MORNING DAILY. MONDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1906. THE NEXT DUMA.

The chances that M. Stolypin might secure the support of any unbpught moderate party in the next Duma have gone by, and if he fails to carry the, next Duma he must either retire or govern permanently by coercion. There were only t\vo other possibilities. He might have used the Black Hundreds, the loyalist "Union of Russian Men," which claims to have the Czar for its secret president, and made it by subsidies and gerrymandering a strong official party. That is, perhaps, the Court policy, and the Union is still the only party which is'allowed to hold public meetings. Despitethe fact that it has declared for unlimited autocracy, it is also the only party which officials are permitted to join. But M. Stolypin has also to think of the financial situation, and he knows that if*»the Black Hundreds were allowed to carry on massacres,the last hope of a foreign loan would be gone. The second possibility was to bribe the peasant vote by large concessions of land. But here again there were difficulties. Any legislation while the Duma is closed would be unconstitutional. Any generous and adequate legislation would have driven the landowners and the Court into opposition. M. Stolypin tried, for example, to induce the Czar to give the Imperial appendages in a large and generous way to the peasants. He only succeeded in inducing him to sell. Such halting and halfhearted measures may whet the appetites of the landless peasants; they cannot satisfy them or wean them from their discontent. In the end the utmost that M. Stolypin can hope for will be to obtain some representation in the Duma for reaction. The landowners are on his side, he has disfranchised the land-

less peasants, the railway men, and

all town workmen who are not employed in large factories. . He has voted to himself for his campaign a fund of £1,000,000. He is doing his utmost to eliminate the cadets. He may by these means secure a right wing of tame] peasants, violent Anti-Semites, and reactionary landlords elected jby corruption, gerrymandering, or pressure. But he will have no moderate and enlightened party on his side. If the cadets can really be eliminated (and the probabilities are that their sufferings have won for them more sympathy than their mistakes have alienated), the chances are that their place will be taken by declared Socialists, who will make no compromises. A violent, angry, and divided Duma may be the result. It will not assist him to carry out the sort of moderate programme of reform which he contemplates. It will be less unanimous, but not more practical than the last, and in the end M. Stolypin, if he still retains the Czar's confidence, will be forced to dissolve it. That would mean a frank return to absolutism, with the alternative of open revolution. If it was any part of M. Stolypin's policy to win over the moderates, to build up a governmental party, to rule with some appearance of consent, then he has failed, and failed completely. So far as he seems to succeed, it is only because he still has the army, and does not yet require another foreign loan.

The perpetual tension between Turkey and Bulgaria invests with a good deal of interest an article in the "Pall Mall Gaeztte" on the Bulgarian Army, by a British officer who made a study of it while on leave. What living in the powder-magazine of Europe entails in the way of preparation for war may be gathered from the statistics of the Bulgarian Army. A population of 3,500,000 people supports an army of 48,000 on ' a peace footing, and 300,000 on a war footing. At this rate Great Britain would have a war army of over 3,000,000. The Bulgarians have reached a high standard of military efficiency. The officers are essentially stolid and plodding, but they work very hard and exhibit in their military studies the characteristics of their race —a stubborn persistence. Class distinctions do not exist, for Bulgaria is essentially democratic. Pay is poor—a general receiving less than £6OO a year—and officers' messes, with their tendency towards extravagance are unknown." The rank and file are sturdy, docile men, ready to learn, splendid marchers and fighters, but possibly not capable of the intelligence demanded- of the lowest unit on the modern battlefield. The subjection of Bulgaria to Turkey for 500 years had its good effects. It stiffened the national character and taught the Bulgars the virtue of sobriety. The Bulgarian soldier is extraordinarily sober, and drunkenness is almost unknown. In one regiment the colonel declared that he had had only one case in five years. Few of the men smoke. Their recreations are dominoes, backgammon and gymnastics. Unfortunately this critic cannot think that Bulgaria would have much chance against Turkey if it came to war. Turkey has at hand more than double the number of men Bulgaria could put into the field, and her artillery and cavalry would be vastly superior. The disparity might be negligible if the Bulgar were a match for two or three Turks, but it is doubtful if he is a match for even one Turk. Consequently the present Bulgarian policy of Turkophobia seems an act of suicidal fanaticism.