National Security and the Rush to Arms!
The Nation that would enjoy peace must possess the power to uphold it. Its tranquility may be disturbed from within as well as from without. It is necessary therefore in the first place to niiaintain an armed force sufficient to quell any internal disturbance* to protect its ruling power and to be the final arbiter in the enforcement of its laws. But a jealous eye must also be kept on its neighbours, for if one neighbour or a combination of neighbours threatens to create a force that could overwhelm the national defence it becomes a duty to increase the strength of that defence. That a weak nation invites attack has been proved by the present conflict in Abyssinia for had Abyssinia been adequately armed Italy would not have attacked it. The first reason for armament then is national defence and in turn each of the great countries of to-day made it their excuse for creating a. large fighting force. But, apart from the maintenance of internal order, national defence presupposes an agressor and it is this fear of agression that is the fundamental cause of the huge armies of to-day. If one nation starts to arm excessively all within its sphere of influence must follow suit. It was this principle -which the League of Nations perceived and sought to combat, first of all by limiting armaments and then by instituting collective action against an agressor. The first of the League's aims failed by reason of Germany's rearmament, the second is put to its final test by the aggression of Italy in Abyssinia. It "is not too much to say that Germany's present army was conceived by the needs of her dictator, just as Italy's army was conceived by the needs of Mussolini. A dictator must build about himself a force on which he can rely first to defend his person and secondly to compel the acceptance of his measures. Having succeeded in establishing this force it is profitable for him to enlarge it as much as possible for every individual he places under military discipline and control becomes a unit
in the expression of his, the dictator's, will. The army thus fulfills an important part of its obligations as an instrument of national defence. Would that such armies stopped at that, but the danger of them is perfectly demonstrated in Italy. Mussolini, a man of tremendous ambition, a student of war, a worshipper of the ancient prowess of Roman arms, a patriot burdened with the memory of Rome's past great Empire and the knowledge of her present limited possessions, created such an army. He watched and directed its growth, trained and fostered its morale, equipped it with every modern arm and made of it a very perfect machine. He created a navy no less perfect. Imagine a man of his temperament, no dreamer but a man of vigorous action, with the whole nation hanging on the crook of his finger, imagine him in possession of such an instrument of war. How he must have itched to use it. He was a great man, he had done great things for the nation, he had saved it from slipping into degeneration and raised it to the highest position in the respect of the world. He himself participated in this universal respect, and then he fell. He had modernised Italy but had failed to modernise his own soul. Wrapped up in the history of Rome's past greatness he had failed to see that her ancient method of conquest "was out of keeping with the trend of modern civilization. By conforming to this present era's conception for the settling of disputes through the League of Nations he could have gained more for his country than he is ever likely to obtain now. But the temptation was too great, he looked at his army and navy and they pleased him, he looked at himself and was satisfied, and then closing his eyes to "world wide opinion he plunged his country into an unjust war, a war of bloody conquest. At that moment he lost the admiration of the whole world, a great man had failed to show how great a man can be. This, then, is the danger of huge armies, an urge towards aggression and for this reason no country can safely permit another nation to become stronger than herself. Hence the rnad rush to arms.—G.A.T.
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Upper Hutt Weekly Review, Volume I, Issue 5, 17 January 1936, Page 1
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739National Security and the Rush to Arms! Upper Hutt Weekly Review, Volume I, Issue 5, 17 January 1936, Page 1
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