SUPREME COURT.

Tuapeka Times, Volume V, Issue 244, 3 October 1872, Page 6

SUPREME COURT.

IN BANCO.

(Before Mr Justice Chapman.)

September 25. THE POLICE STRIKE.

Coneys v. WELDOxf.— This was an argu- I ment on demurrer. Mr Barton, with whom was Mr Hagytt, in support ; Mr Macassey contra. The plaintiff in the action is Robert Coneys, late sergeant in the police force ; and thedefendaut, Thomas King Weldon Commissioner of Police, The declaration states that by Ordinance of the Provincial Council passed in 1862, entitled the Police Regulation Ordinance provision was made for the management of a police force ; and by another Ordinance called the Police Regulation Ordinance Amendment Ordinance, 1864, certain provisions contained in the first mentioned Ordinance were repealed, and other provisions made ; that in 1862 the plaintiff was in the service of the Provincial Government under the Ordinance of 1862 as a police constable, and remained in its service as constable until August 7, 1871, when he was promoted to the rank of sergeant, and continued to hold that office until May 29 last ; that from the time he entered the Government service down to May 29 he was paid out of the public revenues of the Province \ specially appropriated by the Provincial Council ; that on May 29 the defendant, who then was and still is Commissioner of Police within the meaning of the Ordinances cited above, charged the plaintiff, two oth»r sergeants, and sixteen constables with concerted insubordination to the authority of him (the Commissioner) and the Provincial Government ; that the accusation was made by the defendant to the plaintiff in his own person, and not in the presence of the Superintendent and Executive Council. Four of the remaining paragraphs of the declaration state the wrongs of the plaintiff as follow : That in making that charge the defendant wrongfully, knowingly, and without justification, cause or excuse, abstained from informing plaintiff that he had given notice of such charge to the Superintendent; whereby plaintiff was ignorant of that fact; neither was he permitted nor allowed to appeal to the Superintendent and Executive before dismissal and discharge ; that on May 30, in consequence of the said charge, and in breach of duty enjoined on him by section 2 of the Ordinance of 1862, the defendant, well knowing all the matters, circumstances, and thing, dismissed the plaintiff, to the latter's damage, wherefore he claims L 250. The defendant demurs to the declaration on the grounds that it does not appear by the declaration that the defendant contracted, with the plaintiff, nor that there had been any violation of contract or breach of duty on the part of the former ; that it did not appear that the damages had resulted from a breach of contract or duty ; that it did not appear it was the duty of the defendant to inform the plaintiff that he had given notice to the Superintendent of the charge of concerted insubordination preferred against him that it did not appear that defendant had contracted so to inform, or to permit an appeal ; that in none of the circumstance set forth would an actiou be against the defendant ; and lastly, that the contract was still in force, because the defendant had no power and could not wrongfully dismiss the plaintiff as alleged in the declaration. The arguments had not concluded when the Court rose.