THE CAUSES OF THE FRENCH DEFEATS.

Tuapeka Times, Volume III, Issue 168, 27 April 1871, Page 7

THE CAUSES OF THE FRENCH DEFEATS.

Now that the Franco- Germ an war is ended, ib will be interesting to investigate the causes which led to the colossal reverses experienced by French arms. In this search we are much aided by the intelligent correspondents of the English and American press at the front; but in the main we have preferred to let the Empire speak for itself. The Imperial correspondence ascribes them to "excessive organisation" — the exEmperor's own words (vide his pamphlet published after Sedan) — to this he attributed his defeats. The army, like everything else iv France, was over administered, with results which are but too well known. In this issue the investigation is carried up to within, a short period before the fall of Metz ; on a future occasion we may enquire whether the Committee of Defence was able to inaugurate a better state of things.

It is placed beyond question that the fatal movement of M'Mahon was urged upon him from Paris in oppositon to his own clear judgement, and against the first instin.ct of the Emperor. On the 17th of August the Minister of War in the capital appeals to the Emperor to renounce the idea he had expressed of withdrawing the Army of Chalons on Paris, and suggests " a powerful diversion on the Prussian Ooips, already exhausted by several engagements." The next day the Emperor replies that he yields to the Minister's opinion, and on the 20th M'Mahon announces his departure for Rhoims. On the 27th, however, M'Mahon had satisfied himself that it was impossible to carry out the plan prescribed to him, and he predicts almost the very fate which over took his army:-— "Since the 2nd I have no news of Bazaine; if I attempt to meet him I should be attacked in the front by a. part of the first and second armies, which, favored by the woods, can deal with a force superior to the Crown Prince's army, cutting oft' all line of retreat." He abided, "I approach Messieres to-morrow, whence I shall continue my retreat." The reply of the Minister not only sealed the doom of M'Mahon's army, but will be held to justify the bitterest accusations brought by the Republicans against the Imperial Government. It commenced with tho fatal sentence: — "If you abandon B.izaine *he revolution is in Paris." Count Palikao assured the Marshal that the Crown Prince was not at Chalons ; he observed that the Marshal had at least thirty-six hours' start of his enemy, and he begged him, first in his, own name, and in a day or two afterwards in the name of the Council of Ministers and of the Privy Council, to auccour Bazaine. Even up to the 3,lst of August Count Palikao sesms to have cherished the delusion that the Frerch had the start of the Crown Prince, but on that very day M'Mahon had to- announce his disastrous retreat on Sedan, adding the curt statement "Up to the 31st of August the Emperor still commands." From these despatches it is clear that M'Mahon, from tho first acted with hesitation, and that Count Palikao, to whose urgency he yielded, had a very imperfect knowledge of the enemy's movements ; while it would seem that the Emperor, even, after Bizaiue had nominally been appointed to the commander-in-chief, exerted both at Metz and on the march to Sedan, i? distinct influence on the course of the campaign. Between generals on the spot who did not know their own minds, and generals at a distance who did not know the facts of the position, it would have been a miracle if the French Army had escaped the destruction which befel it.

This kind of confusion, however, has been, seen before in baffled Generals and defeated armies. But there is evidence of strange disorder, even in the staff arrangements before defeat was dreamt of. On the 21st of July General Michel telegraphs to the Minister of War :—": — " I have arrived at Belfort. I have not found my brigade. Have not found the General of Division. What must I 6s>l Do you know where are my regiments." At that moment every soldier in Germany knew perfectly where to fiud his place in the vast masses which were moving on the Rhine. But even this is surpassed by the helpless muddle of the subsidiary services. On the 18th of July, De Failly, at the head of 17battalious of iufantry, telegraphs from Bitsche for " money to enable our troops to live. No money in the public treasuries. No money in. the military chests." The reader may remember that in a letter published in our columns some time ago a French officer narrated how, while he was in full rotreat on Chalons, he received a parcelwhich had been, forwarded with great care, and which contained plans of fortresses in the Palatinate. This was no exceptional case. On the 21st July a General complains that " the depot is sending us great heaps of maps which are useless for the moment. We have not a map of the frontier of France." At this moment, again, every Prussian lieutenant was in possession of the information the French General wanted. That the Army of the Rhine should co long have lain inactive around Metz ceases to be surprising that on the 20th of July it was in want of the commonest food. On that day the Intendant-en-Chef, or Chief Officer cf Control complains that " the numerous troops outside Metz are obliged, in order to exist, to consume the

biscuit which would serve as a reserve, and which, moreover, comes in inadequate quantities." On the Sthof Au»u>fc the same officer makes a demand ou the camp of Chalons for 400,0: )(j rations of biscuit and campaign provisions, and his subordinate at tho camp has to telegraph to Paris for instructions, as he has " not a ration of biscuit nor field provisions, with the exception of sugar and coffee." At the same moment the General at Verdun sends word to Metz that there are wanting in the town as seige provisions, " wine, brandy, sugar, coffee, bacon, vegetables, and fresh meat." It seems necessary to stop and reflect that the places thus left destitute were not in the heart of an enemy's country which had been suddenly occupied, but were the chief stronghplds of the French army, in the most accessible districts of Prance. If food was deficient, material supplies were not likely to bo plentiful. Marshal Leboeuf himself announcing his presence with General de Failly's corps on the 26th of July, states that " the organisation in respect of accessories is very incomplete." The Minister of War writes from Paris that there are no revolvers in the arsenals, and the officers must buy them from private traders. The General of the 4th Corps, at Thionville on the 24th of July, had neither infirmiers, nor civil assistants, nor ambulance waggons, nor field ovens, nor train. Similarly | at the important fortress of Belfort, on the 4th of August, the 7th Corps was without train, or infirmiers, or artisans.. The intendant at Strasburg, on the 28th of July, had not received j a single soldier of the Train Corps nor a single workman. At Chalons ! twenty batteries had but a single j farrier between them. On the 19th of August, at the same great depot, Marshal Canrobert " continued " to ! have neither cooking pots nor platters, and the soldiers were " unprovided with_ anything." They had neither bedding nor enough shirts and boots. Even at Metz, on the 29th of July, soldiers arrived "in almost all cases " without camping material or cooking vessels. It is said that at a time when our army in tho Peuinsula were in great need of new boots, a largo sup ply arrived, but they proved to bo all for the right i'ooi. We usad to think, such blunders were essentially British ; but the story may be matched by two of these despatches. On the 28th of July the Minister of War is informed that, of 800 collars in the magazines at St. Otner, 500. have been found too small. A fortnight later it is again announced from St. Omer that "1200 sets of harness have, it is true, been sent to the fortress, but the complement of this harness has been omitted, without which the companies cannot be provided. The preparations have, therefore, been stopped from to day." In short, the French forces were everywhere at a standstill for want of food ami munitions of war. This extraordinary collapse has an interest for us, apart from the light ib throws on French defeats. The supply services of the English army have been organised in the French system our control department is an avowed imitation of their Intendance ; which a short time before the war was deemed perfect. But it utterly gave way on the first pressure. Our readers will remember the great sortee from Paris on the 4feh December. It is actually true that one of the reasons for the retirement of General Duerot's army from the position they had won at such a cost, was that the Intendance had omitted to provide them, with the warm clothing they so much needed. Their rugs and sheepskins were only five miles oft' in Paris, but it was too late to fetch them. The lamentable experience of France has had one result — it has caused John Bull to look to his own " fixing" —"Star"