RESIDENT MAGISTRATE'S COURT, LAWRENCE.

Tuapeka Times, Volume III, Issue 106, 19 February 1870, Page 5

RESIDENT MAGISTRATE'S COURT, LAWRENCE.

Monday, February 14. (Before W. L. Simpson, Esq., R.M.)

SLY GROG SELLING.

Robert Grieve was charged on remand with this offence. The female witness Jane Foster, to procure whose attendance the case was adjourned, was now in Court.

Mr. Inspector Percy appeared to prosecute, and Mr. Mouat and Mr. Keen defended.

Jane Foster was called, but beyond stating that liquor had been sold over the counter on the day named, nothing was elicited from her, Mr. Keen taking exception to every question bearing upon the quantity sold, urging that under the 9th section of the Justice of Peace Act, the witness would be committing herself.

This closed the case for the prosecution,

Mr. Mouafc addressed the Bench for the defendant. He recapitulated the various acts and ordinances which, from time to time, had been in force relative to the sale of liquor, and regretted that the act of the Legislative Council of Zealand, passed in 1842, was not to te obtained, as it was quite possible y mt certain unrepealed portions of it m i ff ]^ seriously effect the question at issue. jj c drew attention to the sth section t ] ie Goldficlds Act, 1866 (an act passed by a superior legislature), which atit nol^ ges the issue of "business" license^ an & a i so to the interpretation clause for the means of the word "business," that clause being as follows :—": — " The word business shall mean and include any vending or disposing of any goods, merchandise, or chattels, whether by hawking or in any other manner." lie believed that this point had never been raised before, and he was satisfied that so far as the goldfields were concerned, it must override the Licensing Ordinance. As regards the information, Mr Mouat proceeded to point out errors both in form and substance ; also that two offences were charged in the one information, or rather one offence in the alternative, citing various standard authorities in support of his argument, that this rendered the information bad ; also the 7th section o£ tke Justice o£ the Peace Act, 1866.

His Worship reserved judgment till Wednesday, the 16th, upon which day lie overruled all the objections taken, and fined the defendant £10, costs, and expenses.

Boulton v. the Executors of the late W. Griffin. (Rehearing.) In this case, a judgment had been given for plaintiff for £43, and subsequently it was ascertained that plaintiff owed the estate a contra account, which had previously been overlooked, and a rehearing had been granted. The items in the account were admitted by Boulton, who pleaded that he had paid the account under the following circumstances: — On the 3rd June, 1869, W. Griffin came to him (Boulton), and asked him to draft a £40 bill for his (Griffin's) accommodation, which he did. Griffin then left and discounted the bill. Before it came due, Griffin died, and he (Boulton) paid it.

J,. C. Arbuckle, sworn, deposed — That in' June last he was in business in Lawrence. About the 3rd of June, Mr. Boulton came to him with the acceptance now produced. He discounted it and handed Boulton the proceeds. Did not know Griffin in the matter save that he was the drawer of the bill.

Cross-examined by Mr. Keen — It is quite a common practice for the person who is to receive the accommodation to be the acceptor of the bill. I understood the bill was for Boulton's accommodation.

Mr. Mouat wished to recall Mr, Boulton.

His Worship objected to such a course, but finally consented.

Mr. Boulton now stated that on the 3rd June last, he went to Mr. Griffin's. [His Worship here commented severely upon the discrepency between this and Mr. Boulton's former statement ; his attention being called to it by Mr. Keen.] Mr. Griffin was ill in bed. He asked Griffin to square amounts with him. Griffin said there was not much difference between them, but he could make out the account then. He then told Boulton that he was pushed for money, and asked for the £40 bill as an accommodation. He gave it to him and left. Later in the day he heard from Griffin that without another name he could not get it discounted. He had endeavoured to do so and failed. He (Boulton) then took the bill and got John M'Coll's name to it. He then discounted it with Mr. Arbuckle, and took the money to Griffin. His Worship reserved judgment.

Thursday, February 17. (Before the same Magistrate.)

Smith v. Hayes. — Information for assault. Mr, Keen appeared for complainant. It appeared from the evidence that some misunderstanding had taken place between the parties, in the store of Messrs. Herbert and Co., on the Bth inst., regarding the price which defendant was to pay for some Phoenix shares, and plaintiff told defendant that "he was no man," whereupon defendant struck him on the back of the head. Harder words then followed, and another blow (which was described as a compromise between a slap and a push) was inflicted. The defendant, addressing the Bench, contended that the words used by Mr. Smith — a very young man — were exceedingly

insulting, particularly so to a man so much older than the plaintiff. He admitted having slapped the plaintiff under severe provocation. His Worship considered that there had been provocation, but he also considered that Mr. Hayes should have controlled himself. To make his disapproval of the affair, he should inflict a nominal fine— ss. and costs.

The Corporation of Lawrence v. Keen. — Mr. Mouat appeared for the plaintiffs, the defendant in person. This was an action by which the Corporation of Lawrence sought to recover from J . L. S. Keen the sum of LlO, inflicted upon the defendant by the Council in consequence of the defendant having resigned his seat for Middle Ward prior to the expiry of his term of office. The defendant pleaded the general issue. Mr. Mouat quoted the sections of the ordinance empowering the Council to inflict a fine of L 25 under such circumstances, or any less sum they might think proper. He stated that Mr. Keen had consented to admit his election to the office, his having signed the declaration, and the fact of his having resigned.

Mr. Keen : "No, I beg pardon, I do not admit the latter fact. Ido not admit that I resigned. I have reasons for demanding that that be proved."

Mr. Mouat then called Mr. Hayes, who deposed that on the JOth of November last a "resignation from Mr. Keen was presented to the Council. He had not the resignation with him. The defendant here handed an impressed copy of the resignation to the witness, and it was read by the Bench. The Council by resolution refused to receive it. Witness here produced the minute book with the entry of the resolution referred to. On the 25th December a resolution was tabled asking the Mayor to call a special meeting of the Council, in accordance with Standing Order 23, to enable the Council to rescind the former resolution, and to accept Cr. Keen's resignation. The special meeting took place in January, and Cr. Keen's resignation was then accepted.

Cross-examined by defendant : The Council, on the 10th November, refused to accept your resignation. There was some talk amongst the Councillors that you would resume your duties, and I believe you were still considered a member. As your resignation was not received, you, of course, remained a member of the Council. I gave all the members notice of the special meeting in accordance with the Standing Orders. I did not give you notice. I did not think it necessary. If you were still a member yoti were certainly entitled to notice. I do not know what the Council intends doing with the LlO, if it is recovered from you. I never heard that they intended treating themselves to a swell champagne supper at your expense. I never heard that Councillor Coverlid had promised to supply the ginger pop.

This was the case for the plaintiffs.

The defendant, addressing the Bench, submitted that the plaintiffs had failed to make oub any case. His defence was short, simple, and easily to be understood. The Standing Orders adopted by the Council were framed for their guidance by tliPTnsolv<w» T fclio Ordinance, and. one of these Standing Orders, No. 23, provided, "That no resolution, the effect of which would be to rescind any former resolution, should be entertained during the same municipal year, unless a special call of the whole Council be made for that purpose." Now, on the 10th November, the Council had passed a resolution refusing to accept his (the,* defendant's) resignation, and he had -consequently continued to be a member of the Council. Yet, in January, the remaining Councillors were called together, and rescinded their former resolution. He (the defendant) had received no notice of that meeting, which he contended was consequently illegal, and the business transacted at it

bad. His Worship reserved his decision. Bathcjate v. M'lntosh. — This case was again adjourned for a week.