His Excellency the Governor on Colonial Defences.

Thames Star, Volume XV, Issue 4912, 7 October 1884, Page 2

His Excellency the Governor on Colonial Defences.

Wellington, Saturday.

Afc the annual meeting of the New Zealand Institute this evening. His Excellency the Governor delivered an address on " The Defences of New Zealand," to the following effect:—The defence of New Zealand should be regarded from an Irn perial and Australasian as well as from a local point of view. The first line of defence of this as of every part of the British Empjre is on the line of maritime communication. If the steamers and sailing vessels that carry exports and imports to and fro along ocaan highways were liable to be captured and destroyed by hostile ships, our commerce would bo stopped, and the result to the colonies would be disastrous; to Great Britain ifc would be starvation. The commerce of New Zealand alons is upwards of fifteen millions sterling per annum, whilst (hat of Australasia is over £1.00,000,000, about equal to that of the whole of South Anferica and Mexico combined. Naval ] squadrons are maintained by Great Britain throughout the seas of her possessions. These are charged with the defence of British interests, and in case of war would bo largely supplemented by ships of the mercantile marine. Bases for naval defence of the Empire are maintained and fortified by Great Britain, not only afc Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham, Sheerness, Pembroke, Cork, and other places in the United Kingdom, but also at numerous places throughout the world, in positions advantageous for coaling, victualling, and refitting vessels of war charged with (he defence of our commerce. Along the iiue from England to New Zealand by the Cape of Good Hope, are the islands of Ascension and St. Helena; at the' Cape, Table Bay aad Simon's Bay; on the route by the Suez Canal are Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Perim, and Ceylon. Then going between Ceylon and Australasia, via Torres Straits, is Singapore. Prcceediug by the westward route the ship passes Ascension and Falkland Islands, or if when the canal is completed by the Panama route Bermuda, Jamaica, and the islands of Fiji. It is a matter of interest to observe that in most of the British possessions, as in Australia and New Zealand, there is a local supply of coal available for marine and naval purposes. Australia and New Zealand are intimately concerned in the defence of the British naval stations, and in the efficiency of the squadrons which operate therefrom. It is of paramount importance that these stations should be rendered thoroughly secure, and the repairing establishments they contain protected. It has been said that the defence of these stations should be dependant on our fleet, but this view will not bear examination. The admiral on station requires his ships for the defence of our commerce at sea, and he cannot detach them for the purpose of guarding particular ports- They must be for* tified and garrisoned. If so defended, we are enabled to hold them absolutely for the use of ourselves and our allies, and our war cruisers thus supported, and acting on the maritime routes of our commerce, can afford effective protection to that commerce. If unfortified, the de pots would, during the absence of our squadrons, be as much the property of our enemies as of ourselves, and w wou!d supply to hostile vessels the means' of attacking our commerce.

His Excellency then pointed out how the United States mercantile marine suffered during the American war, owing to the want of vigilance of the United States naval authorities. How her shipping was destroyed by the wellremembered Alabama cruising about until she was sunk by the Kearsage. In considering the question from an Australasian point of view, security against the attack of certain ports in Australasia is an essential part of the maritime defence of this portion of the empire. For instance all ships approaching Australia by the Cape or Bed Sea routes must pass com paratively near to King George's Sound. If, therefore, this harbour were held by an enemy, his warships, acting therefrom, might cut off our steam and merchant vessels If secured to us, our men ofwar cruisers could use that port as a base for the defence of our commercial marine. Again, you will see that the Derwent, on which is the town of Hobart, occupies a central position, whence, attacks might bo directed against Australia and New Zealand. The defence of an anchorago in Torres straits, and of a harbour ia the Fiji Islands, is also of common interest both to this colony and to'the Eastern Australian colonies. New Zealand is, as it were, an advanced shield to the southeastern part of Australia, and this is tho more important in view of the probability of cjnal communication being opened by the Isthmus of Panama. Harbors (o the northward, southward, and centre of this colony are advantageously situated as centres for naval defence of Australasia. If unprotected, however, they become bases for attack upon Tasmania, Victoria, or New South Wales. The defence of these harbors is, therefore, not only of import* auce to the places themselves, and (o the colony to which they belong, but has considerable bearing upon the defence of Australasia, There is perhaps no harbor iv Australasia more suitable as a centre of naval defence than Auckland. It will be understood that it is most desirable that all the Australian colonies should unite to carry out the defence in which all are interested. There are matters relating to the whole of Australasia which would be best dealt with by combined action. So far as defence is concerned, New Zealand is probably more interested than any other Australasian colony ia the question of federation. In the absence of such organisation, each colony must do what is necessary for its own defence, taking cure that, as far as possible, its separate action shall harmonise with any future joint concert with its neighbours which may arise.

With respect to the attacks to which these colonies are liable, there is no probability, of an expedition en any exten- ; site scale being despatched against Australia. In the improbable event of Great Britain ceasing to hold command of the sens, such an expedition might perhaps be undertaken with a view of subjugating the colonies, and finally annexing them. The very existence of the British Empire depends upon ber navel supremacy, If an enemy of Great Britain sent his fleet, or aoy portion of it, on an expediton to the Australasian colonies, a sufficient part of our Home fleet would in turn be set free to intercept, and our squadrons in the Pacific, on China, the Australasian and Indian stations -might, if necessary, be concentrated to oppose it. But the bulk of the enemy's naval forces would be occupied in the immediate scene of action in Europe or America. The lecturer then pointed out how one or more cruisers might

descend npoa Australasian ports, which, i if insufficiemly protected, would offvr templing 5 objects of attack. They might capture merchant vessels in harbor, or under threat of bombardment, obtain | paymentof aioifey from towns if stepswere aoc taken to meet such a contingency. The more Australia is defended the more New Zaaland is open to attack, and owing to the position that New Zealand occupies aa enemy from the eastward would most probably first direct attack upon her. Scarcely any steps hate been taken for placing the colony in a condition to resist external aggression. Four tor pedo vessels have been recently-provided, and a few years ago some guns with ammunition and other app'.iar.cas were ordered, but as yet no arrangements have bnen made fur placing them in position at the ports for the protection of which they were intended. Of all I lie colonies New -Zealand, owing to her extensive seaboard and numerous harbors, is most in need of local protection. The principle on which the defence of the colony must be based is that, whilst the general protection of its commerce and seaboard is provided for by naval means, the chief cities and ports should be rendered secure by land batteries, submarine mines, and other local, defences. The main general plan should be to fortify Auckland Harbor, Port Nicholson, Port Lyttelton, Port Chalmers, and Bluff Harbor, thus setting free Itn perial cruisers and any naval force we rn'iy possess, and thereby greatly strengthening our power of general maritime defence. la fact, the fortification of these fine ports is part and parcel of the naval defence of the Golony.

It is impossible to fortify all the harbors of New Zealand. There- are clusters of ports at the North, the centre, and the South. In the North, besides Auckland, there are other fiua harbors in Hauraki Gulf. Again, there are Whaugarei Harbor aud the Bay of Islands (in both of which there are coal mines), Wnngaroa Harbor, and Doubtless Bay. In the centre, besides Wellington, there are other ports of anchorage. To the southward of the Bluff there are, in Stewart's Island, the grand harbors of Patterson's Inlet and Port Pegasus. In the south west of the Middle Island there are numerous harbors at the Sounds. Protection of these, as also other places, must be provided for by local naval forces acting as auxiliaries to Her Majesty's cruisers.

Submarine mines should, when practN cable, be employed, in order to stop an enemy's ship, and detain them under fire of batteries.

Hia Excellency then particularised the various kinds of mines, their characteristics and use, and how their action' could be destroyed by an enemy. Auckland is the naval centre from which the Northern harbours must be defended. Both of its channels are well commanded from the North Head, and on that point batteries should be established. It would be advis able to place a battery on Takapuna Head. These should be supported by a central work on Mount Victoria (Flagstaff Hill). Some guns facing the entrance should be placed on t':e south shore at Resolution Point. The field of submarine mines should be laid across the harbour in the most convenient situation to prevent an enemy running at full speed past the batteries and up the harbour to a position out of range of our guns, from whence he could firs into Auckland. Against a force landed as it might be in Tamaki Strait, this can only be met by a field force. There is a favorable spot for a battery near Onehunga. The waters of the Waitemata with the citadel on Mount Victoria and its outworks at Takapuna Head commanding the neck near it wiil fully protect Auckland from land attack on the north side. His Excellency then described the forts required at Wellington, Lyttelton, Dunedin, Port Chalmers, and (he Bluff, and said: The most pactijal suggestion that I can bow make with regard to colonial vessels of war is to make arrangements for utilising certain vessels of the Uniou Steamship Company as auxiliary cruisers for local defence. I find that five ships, viz. : Botomahana, Tarawera, Waihora, Hauroto, and Rotorua, can be rendered capable of comply* ing with the conditions to qualify them as armed cruisers. The Aorangi, ftuapebu, and the Tongariro, belonging to the New Zealand Shipping Company, and two ships of the Shaw, Saville, and Albion Company, would be available as cruisers. Several measures which I havo recommended will be of no avail without efficient land and sea forces. There is abundance of military and naval spirit in this country^ but efficient organisation is essential in order that it may be turned to the best account. The whole proposals could be carried out for a sum of £400,000. The extra annual cost of maintenance and men's pay could not be estimated, but it would not be much. Not to mention the amount of local commerce of the colony, the value of the cities is probably about thirty millions sterling. The loss which woutd be occasioned by one attack would far exceed the outlay which would

have prevented it, and ths degradation to which it would subject the country is beyond my power to estimate. New Zealand should not rest content in her present unprotected condition. Some say that there is no chance of New Zealand ever being attacked. "If this be s,T), for what purpose do Volunteer forces exist. The " mother country '* cannot do everything. Australasia must do her part. Neighbouring colonies are doing their duty in the matter, and I hare no doubt this Briton of the South will do the same.

At the conclusion of ths lecture Mr W. T. L. Travers moved, and the Hon. E. Stout seconded, a hearty vote of thaDks to His Excellency for his exceedingly interesting lecture. Tha room was crowded to excess, and numbers had to be refused admittance.