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Thames Star, Volume XI, Issue 3451, 16 January 1880, Page 2

It is well known that there is no army in the world to compare with the British, in perfection of appearance, dash, luxury of equipment, and we may add drill. This is satisfactory, because all these things are signs of discipline. But the Horse Guards should also give due attention and encouragement to not only the volunteers and auxiliaries of the British Isles, but also of her important Indian and Colonial possessions. In JNew Zealand we cannot maintain a large, permanent organisation, but there is no "reason whatever why we should not have our volunteer force, organized into battalions and divisions, its commanders and staff appointed, every arrangement for its completion of men, horses, stores, and transport made at leisure, so that in a.few days from the issue of the order to concentrate, the whole force might be ready to perform the duties which might be required of it. If the organization, is suffered to remain a paper organization as afc present, and BOt brought to the test of practice, it will surely collapse in the day of trial. Whether we have or hare not a commissariat, staff, op horses, or »ny

means for taking the field is beside the question. If we have nothing at all let us know it as soon as possible ; but if wo have any force to use, be- it only a battalion, we urge that the work—which must be undertaken when war threatens us—should be undertaken and tested at leisure. Because there is no responsibility and no motive for exertion, because the routine of peace duty does not tend to prepare for war, that is no reason why most important duties should be neglected ; ior unless an army is taught to be ever ready to move and to fight it will be found wanting in the day of trial. It is because of this neglect of the most important portion of the soldier's education that there is discontent in our volunteer force, and it is an honorable discontent. The rate of speed at which an army is in. the habit of marching without over fatigue, depends greatly on the health, strength, and ages of the men composing it, and on the degree in which their powers of marching have been exercised by constant training. Napoleon said that if two armies were equal in all things except numbers and rates of marching power, their relative values would be found, not by comparing their numbers, but the products, ie., rates of capabilities. It was his opinion that an army of 5,000 me", which could average twenty miles a day, would produce as great an effect on the success of a campaign, as one of 10,000, which only marched ten miles a day. Napier relates how the British light division, on the morning of the battle of Talavera, arrived on the field in splendid order, after having marched sixty two miles in 26 hours, in the hot season. Each man in thoee days carried upwards of fifty-six lbs. Those men were soldiers trained to some purpose. Why should not our volunteers emulate them ? Our colonists have not degenerated in courage, nor in thews and sinews. All our soldiers mho are in health should be in constant training, in the, sporting sense of the word, so that in the event of their services being required, and circumstances rendering unusual exertions necessary, their powers might not be overtaxed. The regular soldier is kept in cons'ant training, with the volunteers on the contrary their spare time is so restricted that drill takes up much of the time which might be advantageously devoted to more active physical trainiug. Such occasions as are afforded by Easter or other holidays should be turned to account, to test and practice our men in marching. By all means let us have reviews and shamn'ghts, but the movements executed in rapid succession, and not in the «low and dawdling manner we sometimes witness. The salety of an army in a belligerent's country materially depends on the manner in which the outpost duties are performed. The outposts, picquets, and advanced sentries are the watch dogs of the army, whose business is to detect and give timely warning of the stealthy approach of the foe. Officers of volunteer corps would do well to practice parties of their men in the very necessary duties of outlying picquets, patrols, and guards, so that a spirit of responsibility may become imbued in each individual member ot their corps. The advance guard of a column on the inarch serves the same purpose for that column as the outposts serve for'an army in position. The basis of all excellence in bringing an army into action is drill, and until the volunteers have more time to devote to military exercises, the probability is that driil pure and simple will supersede more arduous physical training. It is not to be supposed that in the smoke and turmoil of a battle movements can be executed with the same regularity as at a review, but a closer approximation will be made to that desirable object, the better the men and officers are drilled. The skill of the soldier in the use of his weapon is a vital ingredient of success in warfare. The great modern improvements in small arms render it probable that the fire of the infantry will in future form the most important element in the decision of a campaign., Until the last ten years the nfl • practice of our regular army had been a farce. The improvement which has taken place is due to the feats of skill exhibittd by British volunteers. The toregqing remarks present a tew of the material agents lor success in war. The moral agents we have' not touched upon, the most urgent are, knowledge of human nature, and skill in influencing the passions and interests of men. They cannot be better described than in the following words of Napoleon, which will form a fitting termination to our article: " Achilles was the son of a goddess and a mortal. It is the emblem of the genius ot war. 'ibe divine part of the art is all that which is* derived from moral considerations of the character, talent, and interest of your adversary ; of the opinion and spirit of the soldier, who is strong and victorious, or feeble and vanquished, according as he believes himself to be either; the earthly part consists in the arms, entrenchments, positions, orders of battle, everything in short which relies to the combination of material 'engines."