THE Evening Star. PUBLISHED DAILY AT FOUR O'CLOCK P.M. Resurrexi. TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1879.

Thames Star, Volume X, Issue 3391, 4 November 1879, Page 2

THE Evening Star. PUBLISHED DAILY AT FOUR O'CLOCK P.M. Resurrexi. TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1879.

Infantry is the backbone of an army. Campaigns can bo carried ou without cavalry or artillerj-, but nothing serious can be effected without tho aid of men fighting on foot. At the end of a war it will be found that, patting sieges out of the question, the actual damage dono has been by infantry. It is its fire that kills and wounds, and its charges that win and defend positions. Tho ways in which British infantry hare been accustomed to fight are:—lst. As skirmishers, both in attack and defence. 2nd. In position in line, with their fire for defensive purposes. 3rd. An advance in lino to attack an enemy, such attack ending by a bayonet

charge and victory, -llli. In square !o j receive eavulry. Sp omlly inslruoto-t meu were formerly required For skinnhh- j iug, but no* no iiifan! ry is of any value in | the field unless it can skirmish well. It j was a noble trade thai of tho li«» infantry soldier, and an nrmy tlmt.hnd n-a!!y good light troops uas indued happy; it. could sleep at night in security, and could march at its ease, safe from surprise at all limes. In action tho enemy's sharpshooters were kept by it at a respectful distance, while ; his gunners were harrassed at their guns, J their horses shot, and the weak places ■ thoroughly probed by a searching fire. A line of skirmishers is used in action to clear tho way for tho attacking lines or columns in its rear. Skirmishers must now learn to forgot the old lessons they were taught as to their special fuuclions in battle; they must rely to a great extent upon themselves to ca pi tire positions, aud not to look entirely to a formed line in their rear to do so. The days when a stiff line of nit-n, shoulder to shoulder, full as they are of glorious memories for our army, can never como again, and the officer who would dare at'empt such an operation under the fire of breach-loaders, should be lodged iv a lunatic asylum. It behoves our volunteers, therefore, to study the new rules laid down for the guidance of infpntry in action. The noviinl formation of infantry used to bo for battle in three lines, the front being covered by a line of skirmishers, with supports and reserves, the first line, and the second being of equal strength. Henceforth the first line, of the same relative strength, will be divided into at least throe formations—the front one being skirmishers, that behind it being supports tobr- sent fonnu-d to reiuforee the skirmishers from time to time, and the third being the main body of the first line, in order to prevent uoniusion, it is most desirable- that, when (ho supports have been blended into the skirmishing line, battalions, aud even companies should be as little mixed as possible. This is a tactical problem to bo worked out by those skilled in drill. A certain amount of confusion must over be attendant upon an operation of this nature. In reading of the advar.ee in line of English infantry during our celebrated battles, we Lear much of its steadiness, and nothing of its great disorder that accompanied it; but all soldiers who have taken part in such an operation know well that disorder is inseparable from it when under fire. In confessing that disorder will ueempany the manoeuvre by which alone it is contended we can in future successfully assail an enemy's position, we do not therefore admit any new element in the {operation, although commanders may have to deal with it under somewhat less advantageous circumstances than formerly. In an army, the less there is of harmony existing between its regulation tactics and the tactical requirements of the age the greater will be the confusion attending its infantry attacks. * [Recognising that disorder will be tho never-failing attendant upon an attack made by skirmishers, let us set to work to practise our men in the operation until we have reduced that disorder to a well understood system, until order is evolved from disorder. T> practise men in nothing but " steady drill," where noise and confusion is impossible, is not the best way to prepare them for the disorder in which they will most certainly find themselves, even after the most successful charge that is made under fire. Men who have been drilled only in charges made with mathematical precision and death-like silence are prone to bo appalled by the din, uproar, aud confusion of a real onslaught. Never having been taught to coutend against it, or even to realise it, they are dismayed by its unexpected presence. A ringing cheer is inseparable from charging. It is impossible to get a British line in action to charge iv silence ; and were it possible the General who would deprire himself of the moral assistance it gives the assailants must be ignorant of human nature. It encourages, lends nerve and confidence to our lads. Its very clamour makes men feel their strength as they realise the numbers that are charging with them. Nothing serves more to strike terror into a force that is charged than a good ringing cheer, bespeaking confidence. As it is impossible to charge in action without noise, the mimic charges cannot have too noisy an accompaniment, for they would then be ell the better practice for officers and men to reform in good order amidst great confusion. The introduction of breech-loading rifles, and of rifled artillery firing shrapnel at great ranges, have altered the tactical formations of infantry, especially for offensive operations; so much so, that for any army to attempt what we did at the Alma would bs to ensure its annihilation. No final instructions for the guidance of our infantry in action having yet been iseue:!, it is assumed that the lighting iaelins of Frederick the Groat are obsolete. In hia day the fire of the individual .soldier was not a facto? of importance in the problem to be worked out— the effect of men fighting in a formed body, shoulder to shoulder, was alone considered of value; $ud the tendency of drill and tactical instruction was to make men rely upon their united strength as a highly disciplined body. How, the great object of military teething is to develop the power of each brcech-iojidiujj rifle, nnd the independent action of tho sollier who curries it to tho fullest possible extent. The formation of battalion squares to resist cavalry may be almost regarded as a tiling of the past, for with the long ranging armrf of the present day, to put a battalion into such a formation would be to give ifc orer to destruction. Small company squares, or groups of meu standing shoulder to shoulder, and availing themselves of any hedges, trees, or any other obstacle there may be at hand, can now hold th«ir own well against any number of cavalry. Our battalions on war strength are henceforward to be over 1000 bayonets—our existing system of drill is uot applicable to those cf more than 500, or at most 600 men, as ifc is baaed on the idea that the commanding officers' voice can be heard by every man iv the battalion when deployed. Apart from the fact that it is physically impossible for one man's voice to command 1000 men in Iks bustle of the action, the rigidity and slowness of all moveaients effected by our system of drill when applied to battalions of such strength renders it inapplicable to warfare under it? newly-assumed, phase. The one great idea of commanding officers hag been, hitherto, to keep their men well in hand, and that all companies should move off'at the same moment by word of command from tho Colonel. It uaed to bo said of

us that we went ihi 1 only nation that eoui'i tight in a !«■<• liecp lint.-. In such a iWiutttion we eli;tfg."-i uv.d overthrow Napoleon's liiu««t *roi>ps. We have now to go n slop furlhe) 1, and to leach our men to t:h:rge with <!><• bayonet in skirmishing order, trusting that Sho .suate pluck which enabled us during jusmy consreutivo wars to annihilate by our linn charges tiio best Kuropean troops, may enable us henceforth i<t do the same by means of our superior skill aa marksmen, and by tho irresistible dash of our skirmishers.