THE Evening Star. PUBLISHED DAILY AT FOUR O'CLOCK P.M. Resurrexi. SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1878.

Thames Star, Volume IX, Issue 3050, 23 November 1878, Page 2

THE Evening Star. PUBLISHED DAILY AT FOUR O'CLOCK P.M. Resurrexi. SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1878.

The ' following telegram, received to-day in answer to one sent by the heads of the, local bodies, has been handed to us for publication. It will be .seen that the Minister for Public Works has instructed the Engineer in charge to prepare for proceeding with a portion of the "Thames line," so we may assume that the com-, mencement will be at this end, and the Hon. Mr Sheehan must hare been cognizant of his-colleague's intentions when he gave that promise which the County Chairman has so tenaciously held to, that the work should be begun here immediately after the session was over:—

".4424.—Engineer in charge of North Island Works baring been absent on business, could not reply to your telegram before. The Minister, before leaving for the South, left, instructions that a portion of the Thames line was to be proceeded with, and the Engineer in charge has the necessary preliminaries in hand. Hon. Mr Macandrew hopes to be in the North shortly after his return from the. South, where he now is, and will be for the next fortnight or so, and will then arrange various other works in the Auckland Provincial district.—John Knowles, U.S.P.W."

. The refusal of the Ameer of Afghanistan to receive a British mission seemed too trifling a pretext for entering upon a war, so the Viceroy of India has found other reasons. There are difficulties over Jbe frontier, and the Ameer is arrainged for repeated insults and unfriendly acts towards the Empress of India. Whatever may be the result of the campaign now entered upon, it will not be popular with the masses of the people, who see nothing in it.but a phase of that aggressive policy for which Bussia is condemned, and against which England has repeatedly fought. The territory of Shere Ali has, however, been invaded, and so far without disaster, the border Chiefs remaining, passive. How long this state of things may be maintained we do not care to speculate upon. A writer in Truth on this topic contributes the following:—

'" The Afghan question is not a difficult one to understand. Our north-eastern frontier in India is 'defended by a range of lofty mountains with two or three passes in the hands of fierce, independent -tribes. Beyond* these mountains is Afghanistan, which is thus described by a competent authority :—* It is a land of rocks, sand, deserts, ice, and snow. Take a small fdree there and you are beaten* take a large one and you are starved.' Afghans are brave, warlike, and treacherous, and they have no intention

of becoming the feudatories either of us or of -Russia.' 1 Beyond Afghanistan are the. Kussians and Central Asia. To attack India a Russian army would start from Herat. It is no easy- task to get an army there, and to reach our frontier from thence the army would have to march above one hundred consecutive days, to traverse Afghanistan, and to force the defiles of the mountains. If the Afghans were anxious for annexation to us it might be to our advantage to occupy their country. But the reverse is the case, and if we were permanently, to occupy it we should have, after fighting for it, to garrison it as though }t were a hostile territory. Even, therefore, with Shere Ali,. the ruler of Afghanistan, playing fast and loose with us, annexation is a costly and questionable policy, and one which up to now has been deprecated by successive Indian Viceroys."

We say the war will not be popular. Some of the daily papers'approve'the policy of the Indian Government, but very strong protests have been made against entering upon such a war; and one of these emanates from Lord Lawrence, formerly Governor - General of India, from whose letor we make the following extract:— .'..'.,.■ •

" What are we to gain by going to war with the Ameer P Can we dethrone him without turning the mass of his country* men against us ? Can we follow the policy of 1838-39 without, in all probability, incurring similar results ? If we succeed in driving Shere Ali out of Cabul, who can we put yin his place P And how are we to insure the maintenance of our own creature on the throne, except by occupying the country P And when ia such an occupation to terminate P . "1 have no doubt that we can clear the defiles and valleys of Afghanistan from end to end of their defenders, and that no force of Afghans could stand against our troops when properly brought to bear against them: The country, however, consists of mountain ranges, for the most part broken up into rugged and 'difficult plateaux, where brave men standing on the defensive have considerable advantages; and when we force such positions we cannot continue to hold them.

" The cost of invading such ia country will prove very great, and. the means for so doing must be drawn from elsewhere. The country held by the Ameer can afford neither the money nor the transport, nor even the subsistence inadequate quantity for the support of the invading army. It is impossible to foresee the end of such a war, and in the meantime its prosecution would utterly ruin the finances of India.

" Such are the political and military considerations which lead me to protest against the present policy towards. Ameer Shere Ali. Are not moral considerations also very strong against such a war P Have not the Afghans a right to resist our forcing a Mission on them, hearing in mind to what such Missions often lead, and what Burnes' Mission in 1837 did actually bring upon them ?

" I have heard it contended that no nation has a right to isolate itself in this way and refuse to hare intercourse with its neighbours. This may be a reasonable objection among civilised nations, but ought not to apply, I submit, between civilised Governments on the one hand and .barbarous peoples on the other. " No doubt Ameer Shere Ali has aggravated his offence by the mode in which he has resisted our overtures, more particularly in the threat of his Mir Akhor at Ali Musjid to shoot Major Cavagnari if he did not turn back. ; But we should not bear top hardly on the Ameer on this account. I have no doubt that if we promise to give up forcing a Mission on him be would make ■ any apology that we could reasonably call for. I urge that we were wrong in the outset in pur policy to the Ameer in many instances which could be pointed out; and therefore ought ,not to be over hard on him in accepting his excuses. I insist that there will be no real dishonour to us in coming to terms with him; whereas, by pressing on him pur own policy, we may incur most serious difficulties, and' even disasters." ; ■