Our Merchant Marine and War Risks.

Thames Star, Volume VIII, Issue 2933, 10 July 1878, Page 2

Our Merchant Marine and War Risks.

(from the times.)

Among the many subjects which force themselves on public attention at a time like the present, few are more important than the'position of our mercantile navy in the event of war. It is now. a vast navy, with a carrying capacity twice what it was in 1850, and trading over every part of the world. Including our Indian and colonial shipping, the British Empire has nearly aa large a tonnage as all the rest of the world put together, and our ■ea^oing steameis exceed in carrying capacity that of all other countries by many thousand tons. Progress has been made elsewhere, no doubt; but almost always at a rate much" within tLat made by ourselves; and in Grc~-t Britain alone the tonnage of steam vessels was larger in 1850 than that of any country in the world in 1876, save Germany, Prance, and the United States. In 1850 we had a steam tonnage of 167.0C0 tons, and in 1870 of 2,136,000 tons, while France lied in 1850 only 14,000 tons, and in 1876 only 218,000. The progress of the Unted States has not been so marked even as that of France, if we exclude the river steamers, their oversea steam tonnage having been but 198,000 in 1876, as compared with 45.CC3 in 1850. On the whole, perhaps, the new German Empire has made most progress; J>ut still its steam tonnage, leaving out Bremen and Hamburg, was only 181,000 tons in 1876. Our supremacy in steam vessels is, perhaps, a little more marked than in sailers, but only a little. Not only does this country maintain the lead of all others nations but in some instances these go backward while we go 1 forward. The total merchant tonnage of France, for example, was less than one-seventh of that of Great Britain in 1876, and had been declining stcidHy since 1872. The United States also, in spite of subsidies and every expedient except the sensible one of free trade, have never been able to regain the position as over-sea carriers which they held in 1860. In the trade of Great Britain itself the abolition of the navigation laws has left home shipping almost as supreme as ever it was. No foreign competition appears to disturb the proportion between the home and foreign tonnage entering and clearing at British ports, which is about two-thirds to home vessels and one-third to foreign. With other leading countries matters are not so happy. Germany.in spiteof the growth of rher mercantile Davy, has not of late been able to maintain in the hands of home shipping trade the average proportion of about 42 per cent, which she received between 1871 and 1873. In 1876 she only managed to keep 38 per cent. The bulk of the trade of Holland is done in foreign bottoms,and so<s that of France,, Italy, and the United States, Among these countries, too, Italy alone is gaining giound; the others are either stationary or showiDg signs of yielding before foreign competition. Holland keeps but little mo»e than a quarter of the trade of her ports in her own hands; but the United States offer the most melancholy example of all. In 1860 they carried nearly 71 per cent, of their foreign trade in their own ships, or nearly as much as the United Kingdom itself; but in 1870 this proportion had fallen to 38 per cent., and fast year it had sunk to 27 per cent. No doubt this melancholy declension is in part to be attributed to the rash fiscal .policy pursued since the war, whereby the cheapest maintained shipping was given, as it were, a premium to drive all others out of the field; but the war i self was the chief and first cause of the ruin. Nothing is, indeed, more vulnerable than a merchant navy in a time of strife, and our supreme position as sea carriers makes us, perhaps, in this respect, the most vulnerable nation tbat ever existed, should we ever have the ill luck to be pitted; against a maritime Power capable of waylaying our ships on the high seas.; Not all our mighty fleet twice told could then save us from much loss. ■

We must not, however, forget another aspect of the subject. If tha fact that England is the greatest ocean-carrier of the,world has its dangers, it has also ad. vantages of no ordinary kind. Were we to have to take' a war upon our hands in the East, or any distant region, our enormous resources should make it comparatively easy for us to transport our troops aud to maintain them during a caimj-aign or campaigns. In all ways we may say that England is better provided now with the means of levelling a blow at an adversary at a point of her own choosing than ever she was before. Tasre is' almost enough idle shipping in our ports," owing to the present dull state of frade, to maintain the transport service of a considerable army. Of steamers alone we had last year an unemployed tonnage almost as large as the entire merchant steamship tonnage of the kingdom in 1850, while the Government itself is better, provided with transports than ,at any period in the history of the^ country. The regularly appointed ships belonging, to the Navy available for the transport of troops are the Orontes, 5,600 tons; the Tamaf, "2,812 tons; the Simoon, I,SiBO tons; the Himalaya, 3,453 tons; and the A ssistance; 2,038 tons. In add ition tor these, there are the magnificent Indian trooper^—viz.,- Crocodile, 4173 tons; Euphrates, 41f3i Jumuay4l73 ; Malabar, 4173; and Serapis, ,Al7'S. Since the present war fever the Government have purchased several transports on the Tyne, the Clyde, and elsewhere; and it must be; understood that besides the regular troopers whose names are here given; there are a number of jworn-out:men-of-war, such as the Immbrtalite (3,059 tons) and the Koyal Alfred (4,068), which, should there be any urgency, would be yressed into the transport service. Taking all resources into account, we believe there is no exaggeration in the statement that this country could without difficulty find transport for an army of 60,000. men with all its baggage, artillery, and appointment, or that by a little strain twice that number could be put in the field and maintained there. We could get steamships of Ja/ge carrying capacity many quarters. Our American trade could spare some, and perhaps the India and China trade also. And of sailing vessels the supply would be practically unlimited, so that on the* ground of mere carrying capacity there would be no difficulty.

It is, however, another matter when we come to consider what effects might be produced by the diversion of large quantities cf shipping for a considerable length of time from their ordinary trading pur- ! pose to purposes of war. For one thing, ! of course, there would be an immediate rise in freights, and that would produce two results : it would check commerca to some extent, and it night also tend to

throw pa\ (•• of bar carrying trade into oilier hands. The mere fact that we were at war might itself powerfully conduce to this latter result. In order to avoid war risks and the charges consequent on war risks, shippers would try to ship in vessels sailing under neutral flags, and it is therefore not improbable that the European Powers who remained neutral in any struggle entered upon by England would make great guides in competition with us. The United States would also have a magnificent opportunity for regaining a portion of the carrying trade they lost in ths Civil War, and would probably keenly avail themselves of it. English ships might l-lii's come to be trarsferred to foreign reglsl from which they would neve? aga^n be removed; the cen. ties of commercial acilvitj rright to some degree be chr.nged, nnd at the cad of the war we should find that while we bad p3;hrps trade no progress, rivals one7ery side b A been creeping abead. it is, indeed, common enough to hear it said that unless W3 were at war with a maritime Power there would be few daai?e.s. Cur war fleets and cruise/s are so powerful and numerous that they could be depended upon to protect our shipping against a few stray marauders, and this may be true. At the same time; xd such a case it is not so much what actually happens which produces the result as the apprehensions of what might happen. We have but to look at the excitement caused by the statements about the fitting out of Eussian cruisers in the United States to learn what effect actual war between Russia and England might have on our shipping. We might blockade the Baltic and seal up the Black Sea, but could not thereby prevent the people from becoming frightened. -Eussia touches the ocsan, moreover, at other points than these, and has means be* sides of transporting sailors through neutral territory, such as would probably suf. ffice to produce the dread and excitement would which almost alone do the damage required. And were a few prowling swift cruisers to get away in the direction of our southern colonies or into the Indian Seas they could probably do actiiul mischief in spite of every precaution. Our high capacity for offence and our supreme position as a maritime power should not blind us, therefore, tolherleks and dangers which war would probably bring up >n us.' We nray be able to avoid all the transport deficiencies asd blunders which disgraced as in the Crimean War, we may have an enormous reserve of naval power, and be able to spare from our mercantile marine vessals enough to transport and provision a corps d'arme'e with no difficulty in the world, and yet suffer most severely from, apprehensions alone.