The Defences of the Dardanelles.

Thames Star, Volume VIII, Issue 2872, 30 April 1878, Page 3

The Defences of the Dardanelles.

The news thai; the Porte, acting no doubt upon the orders of .Russia, has refused permissiou for the British fleet to pass the Dardanelles, has concentrated the interest of the situation upon that position. Very different is its aspect now from that which it wore when Admiral Duckworth forced it with the British fleet on the 19th February, 1803. Then its principal defences consisted of the old castles of Sestos and Abydos, now known as Seddul Bahr and Kuni Ktileh, standing one on either side of its entrance. These stand two miles apart, and may be almost disregarded by an entering fleet, for the real defences of the channel lie higher up at Kiiid. Bahr . and Chanak Kilissa, where -tlio shores are distant but a short mile from each other, From the entrance the European bank is the higher, rising abruptly, but not precipitously, from the water's edge to a height of from one to two hundred feet. At Kilid Bahs is a point. Here there is some low ground between the water and the hill behind, and on this low point are some batteries almost flush with the water. On these are some 37-ton or4Q-ton Kruop guns, some of which are mounted in earthworks, others en barbette. The latter fould not be worked when a fleet fighting Ais way up the channel approached, as the fire from the small arms and from the Galling guns in the tops would completely sweep them. The guns in the earthworks are better protected; but even these would • probably be s-ileneed by those of the "• fleet: Above, on the crost of the hill, some hundred feet above the water, are some very powerful batteries. These constitute the greatest danger to an advancing fleet, for from their elevation the shot of the fleet would pas 9 over them, while they would be able to play upon the decks the most vital part of ironclad ships, Immediately behind the point, tho. shore, falls away almost at a right angle, and this increases the difficulty of an ascending squadron, for the force of the stream runs across the" channel, and has a tendency to take the head of a vessel meeting it across towards Chanak. This is the course which merchant steamers going up the Dardanelles generally follow. From the entrance they pass along quite close, within fifty yards of the European shore, passing under the very mouths of the guns of Kilid Bahr. Thence they cross the stream in a direct line for Chanak, and then, swerving abruptly round .again, make for the European shore at a point called Degirmen Burun, a tmle and a half above Kilid Bhar. ; Here is another, but less formidable, fort. A fleet following this line ' would be met as it advanced by the fire of Kilid Bahr and Chanak; it would pass the guns of the former within pistol •hot as it crossed towards Chanak; it would be raked fore and aft by the guns of both forts, and as it left Chanak for Degirmen it would be similarly raked by these forts, receiving the fire of Kilid Bahr oe its broadside. Chanak is not so ■trong naturally as Kilid Bahr, but the fortifications are much stronger, the guns being for the most part in casemates. When it is remembered that, in addition to these very powerful forts there may be torpedoes in the harrow channel, it -will be seen that-the difficulties in the way of forcing the passage are enormous. The ■ true method, of procedure by a fleet determined -upon entering the Sea of Marmora would be to presage its passage by military operations and by 'landing a force in Besika Bay to march across and attack Chanak on the land side, while another force, landed at the back of the peninsula, near its extremity, where the shore is flat and the landing could be covered by the guns of the fleet, should advance and take Kilid Bahr, the most formidable of the obstacles, in reverse; Were the force landed superior td that stationed at Kalid Bahr, the matter would be an easy one, as the forts are quite open, or,'at any rate, but slighly defended at the back; At present we are in utter ignorance of the force guarding the Dardanelles— Russian or; Turkish. We are told that by the terms of the armistice the lines of Gallipoli as well as those of Constantinople were-to be delivered to the Russians, and there is no reason to doubt that they 'are masters of one as well as the other. The lines, however; are some distance above Gallipoli, and we may suppole that the Russians would not be able to arrive at Kilid Bahr until it had fallen into our hands. It is not known how large : is the Turkish force at this spot, but as a portion of Suleiman Pacha's army landed at Gallipoli, we may presume that two or three thousand men would be stationed at and around Kilid Bahr. The number being doubtful, we ~ cannot assume that the marines of the fleet could be safely landed for such an enterprise, but the addition of three or four thousand men from Malta should, unless the Russians advance in force, enable a- force to be landed capable of occupying the forts from the land side. Should the advance of the Russians render this impracticable an expedition might be attempted against Chanak, whose possession would enable an ascending fleet to keep over on the Asiatic side, and thus escapo the plunging fire of the batteries at Kilid .Bahr. We are far from affirming that w& the Turks, although formally refusing to assent our passage, would yet oppose it by force of arms; we are merely discussing the military possibilities of the case. It is evident that the passage by a fleet alone presents great difficulties and dangers. That it is possible for British sailors, we doubt not, but the hazard is great. If it be determined to force the passage, it .is in the highest degree desirable that the fleet should bo seconded by a land force. This need not necessarily be large, but it should bo at hand. If when the fleet approaches the castles at the entrance, these open fire, it will be ' evident that the passage will be opposed | to the utmost,' and the expeditionary force could then be landed either upon the European or Asiatic side, to advance pan passu with the fleet, seconded by its guns, and distracting and finally silencing the forts.—Standard.