RUSSIAN VIEWS ON PEACE AND WAR.

Thames Star, Volume VIIi, Issue 2825, 5 March 1878, Page 3

RUSSIAN VIEWS ON PEACE AND WAR.

(WlOil THK TIMES)

Good news continues to pour in from Asia Minor. Mukbtar Pasha, after effecting a junction with Ismail, has been again defeated and lias abandoned his strong position in front of Erzeionui. The siege of Kara has begun, and already one of the forts has been stormed. According to the latest intelligence the garrisons of these two important fortresses hare neither the means nor the desire to offer a vigorous resistance, so that we may expect to hear footi tlmtthey hare capitulated. Hard pressed io Europe, the Turks cannot create a new army for Mukhtar, and consequently the campaign in Asia Minor may be regarded as virtually at an end. ' The advantages which the Russians expect to derive from the possession of Erzeroum may be summed up thus :— "1. The capture of the fortress will produce a profound improssion on the Turkish Government and people, and will undermine the moral force of the Turkish armies io Bulgaria. . " 2. As Erzeroum is the richest city in Asia*"sfinor, it may be made to pay a contribution sufficient to indemnify not only the Armenian peasantry who had to flee from their homes, but also the Russian population near the frontier and on the coast of the Black Sea, for the losses they have suffered at the hands of the barbarous Turks. " 3. If our troops should be compelled to abandon the town, we can annihilate its significance as a fortress by destroying the. fortifications and artillery. " 4... We Bball capture a great quantity of guns, ammunition, and provisions. " 5. If it be decided to retain the town, the troops will have comfortable winter quarters in a district capable of furnishing abundant supplies. " G. On the capture of Erzeroum, Knri will very soon capitulate, and then nearly the whole of Turkiak Armenia will be in our possession. 5' All this, of course, very pleasant intelligence, bat, strange to say, it has not awakened much public enthusiasm in St. Petersburg. This is partly to be explained by the fact that the campaign in Asia Minor is regarded as of secondary importance. If you ask a Bussian why lie seems so indifferent to the good news, he will probably reply, " What he wants' is not victories, but practical results. The taking of J rzcroum brings us only a very little way nearer to peace, for the campaign must be decided in Adrianople or, perhaps, in Stamboul." But there is another and a deeper cause of this apparent apathy, So much enthusiasm was expended at the beginning of the campaign that the supply is, as it were, nearly exhausted. The whole tone of public feeling is now pitched in a much lower key. We now hear little about "great memorable epochs," "sacred historical missions," " degrees of Providence]" and " the will of God." The 11 crusade for the emancipation of the suffering Orthodox Slavs " has sunk to 11 another struggle with our hereditary enemy the Turk." This change was graphically described to me the other day by means of the following comparison:—

" Imagine a rich, influential man of generous character who hears that some distant relatives are in extreme difficulties from no fault of their own, and that their only hope is in his assistance. Believing that he can easily save them from ruin and starvation, he immediately sets to work ; but he aoon discovers that the task he has undertaken is by no means so easy as he imagined. Unforeseen difficulties arise, till at last .he becomes so entangled that his own fortune and social position are seriously endangered. As he has staked his reputation on the result, he cannot withdraw, but his conception of the whole thing undergoes a radical change. Other motives besides benevolent feelings come into play, and perhaps, the benevolence is replaced by an opposite sentiment. Well, we Russians are in a similar position. We began the work from .purely benevolent motives and imagined that we could quickly accomplish it with very little difficulty j but we have unexpectedly become involved to such an extent that we have to think chiefly of our own interests; Idyllic dreams have been dispelled by hard, disagreeable facts, and in the minds of some of us there is a feeling of resentment against those who, in a certain sense, led us into these complications. We cannot, however, abandon them, though cur sentiments towards them may be changed. Our .own reputation demands that we should succeed in ameliorating their condition."

Vague hopes that the campaign may, after all, be finished this year seem still to be entertained, for during the last few days the exchange has risen a little. These hopes are founded partly on the belief that a winter campaign is impossible and partly on the conviction that the Turkish resistance is about to collapse. In view of this contingency, some people have begun to consider the terms on which Russia should consent to make peace. Last mghtwMn influential personage read to me aUHmpublished article on the subject. In his opinion, one of the chief conditions of peace should be the cetSen of the Turkish Fleet. This view he supported by the following considerations:—

"The Bussian Government has solemnly promised to annex no territory in Europe, and will probably be obliged to recognise the independence of lioumani*. As Boon as Roumania becomes: an independent State Russia is completely shut out from the Balkan Peninsula, and can no longer exercise the influence she ought to possess among the Southern Slavs. The only way in which she.can effectually recover'this influence is by gaining the command of the Black Sea, which is at present in the hands of the Turks. If she possessed the command of the Black Pea, not merely in virtue of diplomatic documents, but also by the material guarantee of a powerful fleet, she might abandon her intention of demanding the free passage of the Dardanelles. In this arrangement there is nothing in* ppnsistent with the received principles of International Law. The victor has always the right to demand compensation for war expenses,, and Turkey cannot possibly pay a large" sum of money. The fleet would be for us what the five milliards were for the Germans after th.c Franco-Prussian War." Sjjch isthe essence of the article in quesiio'nV whether the proposition will find favor in the eyes of the Government I do not venture to predict. One thing, however, is quite certain : according to the conceptions both of the Russian people and of the Eussian Government, there is no logical or moral ip.coftsistency between

purely disinterested, benevolent motives and material recompense for services rendered. What is chi< fly feared is that this imilerinl rccoinpinse n»av bo unduly curtailed by tb- iniprvention of foreign Powers. Though the Press has of late assumed a very conGdent tone with regard to the possibility of foreign interference, there are ninny people here who perceive clearly the dnngi-r of the situation. That Lord Beaeonsfieid wishes to ud-^pt an aggressive policy oil are convinced, but he is prevented from doing so. it is suppnspd. partly by the Peace Party in I nglami and partly by tho refusal of Austria to form an 'ofl'onsivc allinnco. If Austria placed a larye army on llic Transylvanian frontier, Russia would bo obliged to evacuate the valley of the Danube, as she had to do in the Crimean War. And why does Austria not act in this way P .Certainly not from any lore of. Russia or sympathy with the cause of Slavonic emancipation, but simply because she is threatened in the rear by Germany. And why does Germany prevent Austria from opposing her great rival in the Slavonic world ? Because phc has a debt of gratitude to pa> for the neutrality of Russia in the wnr of 1870-71. Thus the whole success of the present undertaking, according to this generally accepted view of the" case, depends on the gratitude of the Berlin Cabinet, or rather of the Emperor William, for no one believer in the disinterested gratitude of Prince Bismarck. The Russians have political intelligence enough to understand that this is a very unstable foundation to build on, but for the present they have no choice, and consider it well to conceal as far as possible their justifiable apprehensions. The efforts at concealment, however, are not very successful. While proclaiming loudly that England is powerless and Austria deaf to the voice of the charmer, the Press often speaks of supposed " political intrigues " in a tone of passionate invective, which is scarcely consistent with well grounded confidence and perfect tranquillity of mind. At such moments of trepidation we hear a great deal about tho millions of pounds and the hundreds of officers Fngland sends to Turkey and about the imaginary English spies in Turkish pay. Unfortunately, as we learn from a writer in the Golos itself, the Turks do not appreciate the wonderful services which we render themi The Turkish prisoners, in their conversations with Russian Correspondents, speak of England in a by no means friendly tone. Omer Paslia, for instance, who was recently taken prisoner, and is now in Tiflis, enunciate the following opinion i-^r " Whatever the result of the struggle may be, Turkey can easily concentrate herself in Asia and become there a powerState. The losses which she may have to bear in Europs depend on chance; but her real enemy is England. Under the pretence of friendship, Great Britain drags. Turkey into all sorts of European complications, and at the same time advances imperceptibly towards the centre of the Turkish.power, Mecca and Medina. But as soon as her plans are unmasked she will suffer from it. She will at once lose her Indian possessions; for the Turks have merely to give the signal and the whole Mussulman population will rise against their Christian rulers."