Conditions of Peace.

Thames Star, Volume VIII, Issue 2820, 27 February 1878, Page 2

Conditions of Peace.

(FHOSt T«E TIVKS.)

An article iii the Golos on peace and itg conditions has excited some attention ; appearing as it does in one of the most influential organs of public opinion in Bnssiii. It begins by saying that however important it may deem the general Slav problem in the Balkan Peninsula, i the progress of the great Russian family 'I of 80,0C0,C:K) is still dearer to it. This 11 national development, it thinks, however, 1 ■ will be impossible if, after the conclusion ' i of an unstable peace, all the strength of | i the State is be expended in preparation • I for a new struggle. Not a thought could then be given to new political reforms, or to the completion of those already introduced, or to all those administrative and financial renovations the urgency of which has become self-evident by late events at the seat of war. The Golos wishes for peace as noon as possible, but for a durable peace; and to arrive at this it is better, it thinks, to continue the war e?3n at the greatest sacrifices. Thta, after pointing oat tiinf in the present state of affairs at tl c s.\-t of wear and in face of the attitude of England, it would be pnmatare to lay down defhite conditions of peace, only a general outline of which could bo given, the Golos discusses the accomplish- 1 ment of ihe task put forward as the aim of the waf—to wit, primarily, the amelioration, political and social, of the condition of the Christian populations of Turkey. If the complete abolition of Turkish rule be impossible, energetic steps, at least, mast be taken in this direction, and in a way indicated by history— namely, by giving political freedom to one people after another, transforming the vassal into independent Slai.es, and the provinces hitherto directly under Turkish sway into feudatorias. The complete independence of Boumania and Servia ana territorial enlargement of Montenegro must be followed up by an autonomic and non-Mussulman adminis* tration in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Balgaria, including the Balkan part of it—an administration of such a kind as to prepare these provinces for full political independence. Such a scheme was already brought into prominence during the two previous years of fruitless diplomatic action. In case the complete separation of Bulgaria from Turkey could not be effected, it would have to be sternly stipulated that this result sheuldnot depend on Turkish promises and paper engagements. The agrarian question — that is, the relatior n between the Mahomedan landlords and the rural Christian population —is closely connected with this object, and, without having attained it in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria, the Russun Army cannot recross the Danube. For the protection of the Russian administrative officers, a local armed forca could be organised under their direction. As for compensation, a question which the Golos thinks unavoidable, the hue indemnity to Russia would consist in the introduction of such a state of things in the Balkan Peninsula as would enable the populations there, kindred to her in race and creed, to grow strong and devclope as becomes the natural allies of Russia. As to any direct material or cash compensation on the part of Turkey, the question, the Golos thinks, might remain an open one; but the best requital, it. saggests - would be the strengthening of Russia's defensive position towards her southern borders. Under this head comes full freedom, to provide for the defence of her coast by the development of her fleet, for which a free passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean is absolutely necessary, end the acquisition cf stronger territorial positions than Russia has hitherto had on the Ottoman frontier; for instance, Batoum, Kara, Ac. Without such a concession or its equivalent, Russia cannot end the war, this being necessary as a guarantea for the new state of thing introduced- in the Balkan Peninsula, and har protection against the miseries of another war with Turkey, No mention is made of territorial acquisition*, which the Golos does not advocate, only the strengthening of Russia's strategical position by land and sea. Finally, the .Golos : thinks care mast be taken that the conditions of pe-ce shall be settled by a Treaty between Russia and Turkey without the intervention of Europe. This is necessary to guarantee Russia against any future interference of England in her relations with Tartar. I have dwelt thus long on this article in the Golos because it throws light upon the views of those in Russia who pass for being rather • moderate. You will notice that the Golos gives expression to the idea of a separate peace with the Sultan, which has bc?n gaining more and more ground in Russia, the other notion put forward at the beginning of the war, that the Czir acted merely as the mandatory cf Europe, so to speck, being entirely forgotten, and the whole question considered as one which Russia, who has taken up aim? for it, is entitled to settle as she thinks fit. Nor can there be any doubt, on the other hand, that there are many people in Con* stantinople who, disappointed in their ex* pectationa of assistance on the part of Europe, have also adopted this plan as the most effectual way to emancipate Turkey from the tutelage of Europe. If, however, the general outline of conditions drawn by the Golos is to form the starting point for final negotiations of this *OCJj^ the other Powers may Icok on with great composure at the course they take. The Government of the Czar may be credited, with being better able to judge of 'the actual military and political state of Turkey than lo come forwaid with such proposals, which only a country utterly prostrate and exhausted could be expected even io discuss. Still, however clearly the Russian Government might see that a separate arrangement with Turkey could only succeed if the conditions offered were far more lenient than those Turkey could expect tLrough the intervention of the Powers, there are certain limits to this leniency beyond which Russia cannot well go, and, on the other hand, these are so far removed from th«toark winch th? Porte itself, in face of public feeling, will not overstep, that any attempt of the two to oome to an understanding by themselves may be regat led with little apprehension on the part of Europe, as it would in all likelihood very soon convince both parties, of the utter hopelessness of the task in hand. There is some reason, however, to think that the first opportunity will be seized by Russia to make the attempt In the, meantime, according tq a telegram ©,f {he; Wjener Tijgblatt from St. Petersburg, the Russian papers' have betn forbidden. to discuss the conditions of peace as likely to be prejudicial to State interests. .. *