THE Thames Guardian AND MINING RECORD. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1871.

Thames Guardian and Mining Record, Volume I, Issue 65, 21 December 1871, Page 2

THE Thames Guardian AND MINING RECORD. THURSDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1871.

.V controversy lias arisen in England, in which tho House of Peers are on the one side, and (he great body of the Liberal constituencies on the other. According’ to the “ Saturday Review,” the House of Lords stands in the way of the progress of liberal ideas, and refuses to pass more than one liberal measure in a year. This is too slow for the advancing stride of Liberalism. Several liberal measures were introduced last year by the Liberal Ministry, but after passing through llie House of Commons they were rejected by the hereditary chamber. In so doing, the Lords exercised their constitutional rights. It is not pretended that they did wrong ; but the eontention is that the constitutional cheek of the House of Lords should either he done away with, or materially weakened. The Saturday Review ” thus puts the ease :

This is not the fault of the Peers. It is the result springing out of the condition in which, under the existing constitution, they are placed. P-ut it makes the constituencies much less powerful than they ought to be. and must necessarily be a source of constant irritation. The two Houses are co-ordinate, and are yet constructed on different principles, and pervaded by different opinions. They check each other so effectively that they prolong the work of legislation beyond measure.

We do not. propose to discuss the merits of this important constitutional question, so far as it affects directly the Rritish constituencies. It is important to us, as an illustration of what lias taken place in our own legislature, the constitution of which has been modelled on the Imperial Parliament. And to throw a still stronger light on the point, we shall quote from a Melbourne newspaper, the " Leader,” on a passage from an article, in which a preciselv analagous difficulty has arisen in Victoria as was encountered at V cllington a few weeks ago, and which still remains for adjustment. • Lnder

tlie heading “ the Antics of the Council,” the “ Leader ” says :

Since the time of its last act of sagacity, the passing of the Customs Duties Bill, the Council has run riot in mischief, and appears bent on consummating the Japanese ceremony of the happy despatch. The presentation of a bill before it, over which the Lower House has expended any special pains, has the same effect upon it as a red flag flaunted before the eyes of au enraged bull, and were it as powerful for evil as the animal in question, the consequences would be very disastrous. As it is, its vagaries arc rather irritating than fatal, and suicide comprises the extent of the havoc it is capable of perpetrating. Although there cannot be a doubt of the will of the majority of this community ultimately having the amplest satisfaction in all descriptions of legislation upon which i is fixed, the unnecessary delays “caused by the waywardness of the Council arc intolerably vexatious. The members of that body are now interfering with measures dealing with subjects which unmistakably belong to the representatives of the people to regulate and control. As the representatives of vested interests they are taking liberties with the course of legislation which would not have been tolerated in the House of Lords thirty years back. Tt was an impertinence on their part to declare that the country should not be accommodated with cheaper postage after the assembly had passed a measure for that purpose. It was a monstrous interference with the rights and privileges of the Lower House for them to prevent the popular constituencies from being emancipated from ridiculous disabilities which the Assembly had agreed to remove. It was to the last degree presumptuous of them to undertake tc dictate to the country what lines of railway should be constructed and what with-lield. Moreover the contempt with which they treat the labors of private members of the Legislative Assembly is on a par with their behaviour towards a government to which the majority of them arc confessedly opposed. The Permissive Bill, which had been to Mr Casey and his friends the work of a session, was thrown aside like so much waste paper, and the wishes and anticipations of thousands of intelligent citizens were shattered without a moment’s thought. Itesponsibility weighs not on the minds of even oppressed like the House of Lords with these ten-year tenure gentlemen. They are not any fears for the safety of their order. They arc pitchforked together in such a heterogeneous fashion that they belong to no order, and possess nothing for the sanctity of which they need tremble. Never before, perhaps, in the history of the world was a community saddled with such an extraordinary incubus, a chamber of legislation which is neither aristocratic, oligarchic, plutocratic nor intellectual ; which boasts of a property qualification, and yet accepts payment from the public ; professes to be conservative, and yet almost invariably acts so as to ensure, sooner or later, a democratic outburst.

Anyone reading the foregoing extract who is familiar with what took place during the last session in Wellington, will perceive how identical almost have been the subjects on which the Upper House of Victoria, or Council, proved effectual obstructives, with those subjects on which the Legislative Council of New Zealand became obstructives. In both cases, the Council set themselves against the progress of measures to which the popular branch of the Legislature attached the utmost importance. In both eases, the wishes of the representatives of the people were set at nought, the labours of private members were rendered valueless, and the amount and disposition of the public burdens determined by a branch of the Legislature which, under the Constitution of the two Colonies, it was not contemplated should have any such power. A (lead-lock is at anv moment imminent in this Colony, as it is imminent in Victoria ; but with us, we have the greater grievance. The Council, in

Victoria, is an elected body. It represents property. In New Zealand, the Legislative Council is nominated by the Crown ; and although there are several rich men in the Upper House, it by no means represents the wealth of the country; although there are several clever men amongst its members, it cannot be said to represent the intelligence of New Zealand. It is a motley Assembly, pitchforked together by the Minister of the day, either as a reward of past political services, or as a solace to disappointed ambition, on the part of men who failed to secure the confidence of any constituency. This body, which has no claim to tbe confidence or respect of the public, “and yet accepts payment from tbe public,” stands in the way of all useful reform.

The case which is now pending, relative to the powers of the two Houses of the General Assembly, will result in one of two things: either a withdrawal by the Council from their aggressive and obstructive policy, founded on a slip in the Privileges Act, ISGG, which grants to both Houses co-ordi-nate powers, or they must submit to such a modification of the Constitution as must reduce them to a cypher, or sweep them away altogether. Things cannot go on as at present. The power of the purse must remain with the people ami their representatives, and not with nominees of the Crown. That is the real point of the case. Representative institutions would simply be reduced to a farce were such pretensions to be tolerated ; and we hope the Lower House will stand up effectually for its rights and privileges. But the question remains, would it be wise to constitute an Upper House on the Victorian model, representing property, and elected for ten years ? AYc think not. The experience of Arictoria is against it. The thing appears very well in theory ; in practise it has not worked smoothly. The remaining proposal, namely, to abolish the Legislative Chamber altogether, commends itself for its simplicity. AVc confess that the experience we have had of the legislative machine in this Colony has not prejudiced us in its favour. It is too cumbrous and complex. It assumes that there are two distinct orders in the country, represented by the two Houses of Assembly, as in England, and the same forms are preserved, which long usage in England has made necessary and familiar, for communicating between the two Houses. But the thing is ridiculous. AYe have no hereditary legislative body, against whose encroachments the popular body are bound to be always on their guard. . The form for instance, which requires that two | messages shall pass between the Houses j before a Conference can take place, is \ intelligible enough in England, it is not intelligible here, where it involves delay of public business, and seldom leads to any satisfactory result.

On the Avhole, we prefer a single Legislative chamber. We think the work of the country would be as well done ; it certainly would be much more economically and speedily done by a single chamber than it is by the existing system.