LORD WOLSELEY ON THE ABANDONMENT OF THE SOUDAN.

Temuka Leader, Issue 1377, 11 August 1885, Page 3

LORD WOLSELEY ON THE ABANDONMENT OF THE SOUDAN.

Further correspondence respecting military operations in Egypt has been issued. ; It con'nirs despatches relative to the recent operation* in the Soudan, as well : as maps of the positions near Suakimj In a letter dated April 16th, Lord says he does not think the reasons which make it almost imperative on us to destroy the Mahdi's power at Khartoum are a l , present fully grasped in England. His own experience leads him to hold that, both from a 'military and financial point of view, the growing power of the Mahdi mu6t be met, not by a purely defensive policy on the frontier, but by bis overthrow in the neighborhood of Khartoum. He goes on to point nut the value of the possession of the province of Dongola, and says : If we withdraw from Dongola the whole province will be given up to anarchy, its inhabitants will join the Mahdi, and the Ababdebs and olher influential tribes will become more or less actively hostile to up. All the assistance and support these tribes could give us will be handed over to our adversary, for whichever side appears to thim the stronger that they will join, not necessarily from sympathy, but from the instinct of solf-preserva, tion. . . . Every civil employee every functionary, will leave when our troops do. We must bring them away with us, for their lives would not be safe after our departure. We caß hardly tell them to remain behind ; we, who are deserting them, can hardly bid them face the storm we ourselves are afraid to meet ; and if wo did it would be of no avail. They would not stop. Who, then, will take over the management of the country ? Who will administer such laws as has hitherto been given to the people? Who will take chargo of the finances, the prisons, the Government offices, which exist and are now in full working order at Dongola itself—the centre of this important province ? What machinery of government will exist? Are we going contentedly to leave the country to absolute anarchy, and be satisfied that the only mark of our presence should be that the province had gone back from civilisation to barbarism ? Yet this must he the inevitable result of our departure ; there is no middle course.

The question of whether this war shall or shall not go on dues not, Lord Wolseley holds, rest with us, unless we are prepared to give up Egypt to the False Prophet. We shall not bring about a quiet state of affairs by adopting a defensive policy. The Mahdi has repeatedly declared it to be his full and settled intention to possess himself of Egypt, and his followers look upon themselves as engaged in a war the object of which is not to rest contented with the capture of Khartoum or Berber, but to drive the infidels into the sea.

The struggle with the Mahdi, or rather perhaps with Mahdi-isra, must come sooner or later. W T e can accept it now, and have done with it once and for all, or we can allow all the military reputation we have gained at the cost of so much toil and hard fighting, all the bloodshed, and all the expenditure of the past campaign, to go for nothing, aud try and stave the final struggle off for a few years. These years will be years of trouble and disturbance for Egypt, of burden and strain to our military resources, and the contest that will come in tbe end will be no less than that which is in front of us now. This is all we shall gain by a defensive policy. „___„„