RUSSIAN AGGRESSION.

Temuka Leader, Issue 1312, 7 March 1885, Page 3

RUSSIAN AGGRESSION.

Loudon, March 3.

In the House of Lords to-day Earl ijranyille stated that the Government Dad - received information that the Russians in Central Asia have occupied Zulfika Pass, of the Hindoo-Khoosh mountains, and advanced within a few miles of Panjdeb, in Afghanistan, and that Sir Peter Lumsden, .the British Commissioner on the frontier question, had advised the Afghans to resist any further advance on the part of the Russians. His Lordship added that the Government have urged the Russian Government to order its commanders to halt and make no further encroachments on Afghan territory. Later. England has warned Russia that she will resist the absorption of Afghan territory. March 4, The Russian troops have ceased from further encroachments in Afghanistan** and have been directed to avoid any , conflicts with the natives, Earl Granville has approved of the action of Sir Peter Lumsden, British Commissioner, iu advising the Afghans to resist the Russian advance. Russia professes a pacific attitude in the matter. Bombay, March 4. A formal reception, by the Viceroy of the Ameer of Afghanistan will take place at flassan Abdool, in the Punjaub, where 20,000 troops will be encamped for tbe occasion. The ceremony will be •Headed with much splendour and eclat.

The following extracts will throw Home light on the above telegrams The Civil and Military Gazette remarks “ Panjdeh, an important strategical position north ot Herat, was only saved, the other day, from Russian occupation by timely-reinforcements sent by the Afghan General atßalaMurghhab. Although the Journal de St. Petersburg may deprecate the misconstruction of the English Press with regard to Russian policy in Central Asia, we may safely assume that Russia will annex, more or less formally and completely, every inch of ground in Central Asia not defended and safeguarded by England. Whether she will next attack India must depend on the facilities which we leave open for such an attack. These facilities willbe'greater or less in proportion to our foresight in laying down the line beyond which Russia may not advance without our declaring war, and to the strength of our measures for defending this line. Let us first take lhings as they ure, and assume that the Delimitation Committee lays down' a line of frontier following the course of the Oxus, from its c high mountain cradle m Parnere ’ to Khodja Saleh, and from Khodja Saleh to Serrakbs, or some point on the Tejend south of Terrakhs. Let us suppose, _ again, that the British Government claims that this is the line beyond which Russian influence must not advance. What will happen when Russia conceives that the time has come fdr breaking through this barrier, with a view to embarrassing us, while she was playing her game, in Asia Minor or European Turkey? We may be sure that some time would be chosen when we had troubles in baud elsewhere, say in the Soudan or in China. What would Russia’s power of offence ho then 1 To begin with, unless English officers were stationed in north-west Afghanistan, Russia could, under favorable circumstances, occupy Herat before we knew anything of the move, save perhaps for jffncertain rumors. Merv and Serrakhs Vtpvere occupied with the secret celerity. But the news that it had come to pass reached us only after the fact had been accomplished ; and very much the same thing might happen in the case of Herat. From Serrakhs the Russians could reach Herat, marching in force, within little over a fortnight. Simultaneous movements might he made on Balkh and Chitral, both of which positions might, like Herat, be seized before a British force could even be placed in Kandahar. These movements are perfectly feasible. With . HeVat, Russia’s communication could he quickly perfected by pushing on the trans-Uaspian railway. Fmm Balkh an army could advance on Cabul, reaching the Ameer’s capital in less than six weeks. From Chitral Russia would in-

trigue with Kashmir and th*e tribes directly on our north-west fromier. Holding then these two positions, she would be able to insist on a rectification of the Afghan frontier, and England would have to recognise Herat, ahd probably Afghan Turkestan, as a Russian province. However much we might confide*in the good will and fair promises of Holy Russia, it is obvious that if Herat is allowed to become a Russian province our defences must be made stronger than they are now. Would it be better to wa>t till our Russian friends get near to ps 1 Competent authorities reckon that if Russia gets Herat the European army in India must be increased by one-fourth, and the native army strengthened proportionately. It would be found necessary to occupy Kandahar. Even a Liberal Government, we firmly believe, would be driven to occupy. Kandahar, were the Russians in Herat, if not Qhunzi and Cabul to boot. We should want 10,000 men at least to hold Kandahar; and a large force would have to.be kept in readiness to meet a possible advance from Herat via Eiirrah. Apd while we were watching the Kandahar gate to India we may be sure that Russia would be threatening; ns, with more or less real purpose, from the direction of Cabul and Chilral. That an active policy is needed, we fully believe. Every effort should bs made to render it impossible for Russia to reach Herat, and to put a stop, once for all, to her intrigues in Afghanistan. It should be generally recognised that a Russian occupation of Herat, and of

Balkh and Chitral, would be a serious blow *to our prestige and influence in the East; and it is high time to slate clearly and emphatically England’s determination that the States of Afghan, Turkestan, Usbeg, though they may be, ought never to be allowed to fail under the dominion of Russia.