THE THEORY OF FREE WILL.

Temuka Leader, Issue 916, 11 February 1882, Page 3

THE THEORY OF FREE WILL.

The Secretary of the Philosophical Society of Great Britain has sent us the following with a request to publish it. It would be too bad to refuse a request sent to us all the way from Loudon, but we certainly do not attach much interest to it ; At the December meeting of the Victoria Philosophical Institute of England, which took place at its house, 7 Adelphi Terrace, London, the Secretary, Captain F. Petrie, announced that this Society, founded to investigate philosophical and scientific questions, especially those said to militate against the truth of Revelation, had enrolled 122 members during the year, of which 53 were resident in America and the colonies, the total number of its members was now 940 ; it was further stated that this year many of its American members had combined and founded an “American Institute of Christian Philosophy,” a society to carry out the same objects and organization in America, and for that purpose it bad adopted the same objects and whole scheme, but that while taking this step its founders had decided to keep up their individual connection with the Institute in England. After this a paper was read on Mr H rbert Spencer’s “ Theory of the Will.” . The author showed that Mr Spencer’s philosophy denied all freedom of will, and made deliberation to be the obly mental aspect of the commingling of nerve-molecules. In the time of indecision these were colliding one against another, but when a decision had been reached the strongest nerve-stream had made head against all the rest, and was flowing unobstructed on its way. Such, according to Mr Spencer, was the passage of deliberation into decision, of hesitaucy into volition. Manifestly this set aside all freedom of will, made the whole process merely mechanical, and as Mr Spencer allowed, was the negation of moral obligation. The paper criticised Mr Spencer’s argument, and maintained that Mi Spencer, from first to last, had only made one bold assertion, and had repeated it many times, but had not given one iota of proof. Thirleen of his arguments —all he had presented—were carefully examined, and shown to be nothing more than confident assertion. They were classified and replied to as follows First, Mr Spencer said that “ the yeal proposition involved in the dogma of tree-will ” is “ that everyone is at liberty to desire or not to desire.” Against this Kant ami Hamilton were quoted, as admitting that we must desire, but holding that free-will can restrain desire. The martyrs could not but desire to avoid the flames, but their sublime will held in control their lower nature and compelled it to obey the law of righteousness. Secondly, Mr Spencer simply assumed that the will had no control or power of free choice which was the very thing he was bound to prove. He next called it “ an allusion” to think u that at. each moment the ego is something more than the aggregate of feelings and ideas actual and nascent which then exists.” Evidently this was confounding substance with phenomena, between which elsewhere he carefully discriminated, and it was making the ego. only a succession of states, and denying all substance of mind, which was going contrary to o|>e of the structural doctrines of his philosophy. . Mr Herbert Spencer had frequently stated that the ego was nothing else than the state of consciousness passing at the moment, but this statement was never sought to be proved, i indeed he contradicted himself, inasmuch

as he spoke of “ ttie subject of such physical changes.” Now “ subject” is that which underlie; p’ enomena, but he had said the ego was only phenomena, so that this subject was only an hypoatatized zero. He next suggested that the will seems to be free because its action is incalculable. This was shown to b« only an ad captandum argument, for the flight of a bird through the air seems to the untrained intelligence to be free, but the student of science saw that every move* ment of its wings was according to law. Mr Spencer lastly urged that if physical changes conformed to law there could not be such a thing as free-will. In reply to this, it was shown that the will might make its own law, to which physisal changes would conform and yet be free, and that the will would i n this way> adumbrate its own moral nature. Taking for a moment the Theistic position: surely God was free, and yet He perfectly conformed to His own law, so also man might be free, purposely made so by God m order that, being free, be might acquire the true valour of righteousness. Thug all Mr Spencer’s arguments had seemed to fail when examined thoroughly, and the’matter stood where it was. Finally, it was contended that the freedom of the will was theunassailable citadal fi'om which alone the doctrine of moral responsibility could be defended, and as such it was a question appealing powerfully to all, and having in it the gravest moral issues. With the free will, conscience was seated on the throne, and life was a great moral test of fitness for an eternity of righteousness.