THE POLICY OF RUSSIA.

Temuka Leader, Issue 245, 20 March 1880, Page 3

THE POLICY OF RUSSIA.

With reference to the reported advance of Russia on Merv, the Pall Mali |Gbzette says :—“As to the Russian f : we note that in Asia th ■ [XJtar’ advisers, have r esulved on a speedy [anjd'rcsolut • prosecution o‘ their design's. •This concerns ourselves, and it concerns £us deeply. It appears certain now that is preparing to make a carapaig Against Merv in the spring. General 'iKaufmann himself will conduct the expedition, ‘ which this time will not start from the. Caspian Sea, but from Samarcand ; a second expedition under General Tergukassoff will at the same time advance from Tschilischl.’ The Khan »f Khiva and the Ameer of Bokhara are to take part in the campaign; and the 1 escape of Abdur Rahman from Russian surveillance, ’ with a good supply of Russian money and Russian promises, precedes the expedition. It is more 1 significant than at first sight appears . th|i the.correspondent of the Daily Nows. ' has hitherto enjoyed •he exceptional ■privilege of accompanying the Russian dyirmy in Centra l Asia,has at this juncture p.beon warned off. He was ordered away |pat the briefest possible notice ; and the conclusion he drew from his explusion is » that ‘ the preparations for the campaign in the spring are of such a nature that absolute secrecy is necessary.’ ” The i - Standard farther adds • —“ Fresh con- ; fi rotation is given to the announcements wliieh have from time to time appeared that a new expedition against Merv has been resolved upon by Russia, and that . preparations for it are already being made. It is no doubt in anticipation of such an event that the Khan of Merv has decided to. send a mission to the Government of In, ia. It is necessary seriously to ask ourselves whether the indifference shown in the past to the Khans of Central Asia represents the policy we should follow on the present occasion with jegard to Merv. There is an overwhelming balance of evidence to prove that nothing short of an occupsHerat would secure for us an equivalent for a Russian seizure of Merv. Our interest in the matter is represented by the tact that Merv and the Turkoman country east of the Tejend are stragetical points of prime importance, winch—unless we could take corresponding steps to deprive them of the value—could never be permitted to fall into the hands of a military Power whose policy, if it has not been one of hostility, has beeeh constantly aggressive. ”