Japan's Remaining Naval Power Is Hard To Assess

Taranaki Daily News, 29 August 1942, Page 3

Japan's Remaining Naval Power Is Hard To Assess

By Our Special Observer.

Building mystery influences cautious present outlook.

All commentators on the Solomons battle emphasise the bearing it will have upon the naval position in the Pacific, but in most quarters there is evident a tendency to take an exceedingly cautious view of the general naval situation. The principal reason fof this is that it is difficult to assess Japan's initial naval strength. Since Pearl Harbour the Japanese navy has fared none too well. Aside from battleship strength, its fighting ships have been used unsparingly to support various sea-borne expeditionary forces. At times these forces seem to have been recklessly exposed to carry out Japan's well-known determination to see a project through regardless of lo: • 3.

Data When War Began. In a recently arrived mail the naval correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor attempts an approximate Japanese naval balance sheet. The gist of it is that since Japan abrogated the Washington 5,-5-3 treaty in 1936, there has been no trustworthy information concerning the strength of its navy. Various rumours have been circulated that large battleships and cruisers armed with 12-inch guns having been laid down, but as the Navy Department once admitted to a Congressional committee, authentic information is hard to obtain. According to the best available data when the war began, Japan was credited with 10 battleships in operation, 4 to 8 building; 7 to 9 carriers built and 7 to 9 building; 126 destroyers built, and 138 building; 70 submarines built, and 80 building. Estimates on Losses. In contrast with this the U.S. Navy Department totalled its communiques on its score against Japan's navy after the Midway battle. It shows four Japanese battleships damaged, but the total put out of action may run to sixTen Japanese aircraft carriers appear to be out of operation, six of them sunk. You can take your choice as to whether the total of Japanese cruisers out of action is the 35 reported by the Navy or a total of 49 which some estimates gave for this category of ships that have been rendered unfit for immediate combat duty. The U.S. Navy says that seven Japanese submarines have been1 sunk since Pearl Harbour. Some estimates from

scanning the reports of individual sea actions raise the total to 13, with an additional five damaged. To these must be added eight submarines officially disclosed as sunk around Australia. Estimates in the number of destroyers sunk agree at somewhere around 30. These losses represent a considerabie reduction in Japan's naval strength, especially when the fact is taken into consideration that its building facilities for turning out replacements are limited, and essential materials must come from stock piles that have been laboriously amassed in recent years and which cannot begin to supply the yawning maW of war. If the United States, whose output of steel exceeds that of the rest of the world, must carefully. allocate this commodity, there is no doubt that Japan's inability to get steel replacements is at least more hard felt.

Faith in Air Power. It is now only too apparent that Japan took a leaf out of Germany's book and put its faith in the striking force of air power. All previous estimates of Japan's air strength, both afloat and ashore, are now seen to have been erroneous. It is now believed that instead of having seven to nine carriers available for use. the number was perhaps 18. Not all were adequate for use as allpurpose carriers, as many were converted from merchant vessels and fast tankers, in - which Japan has specialised' for some years. However. they served the purpose of transporting planes to areas where they could admixustex crushing blows. Another point to be observed is the relatively slight loss in battleships suffered by Japan. This fact seems to be due to the comparatively irifrequfnt exposure of this class of ship to attack_ and leads to two surmises based on widely varying premises. Either Japari has lost faith in their usefulness or is husbanding its meegre store against a day when its fleet will set out in full strength in ah all -out attempt to obtain mastery of the Pacific. Strength Only Blunted. Taking such information as has been a matter of official report from Washington as beihg on the conservative side —there is no question but that Japan's naval strength has been seriously affected, whereas that of the United States, - despite spme losses, is on the upward trend. But the Japaijese are not through. Their losses have only blunted their strength. Ships reported damaged :n earlier actions may be back; in servke and, added to the factor of Japan's unloiown pre-war strengthf commor.ssn:e supports a cautious outlook on the Pacific naval position. /