Explanation Of Royal Air Force's View About Dive Bombers

Taranaki Daily News, 29 August 1942, Page 2

Explanation Of Royal Air Force's View About Dive Bombers

FOR many months the dive bomber has been the subject of acrimonious dispute and never was opinion more sharply divided, says the English journal the Aeroplane. Of the two camps, the supporters of the Stuka and. its relatives are the more vocal, and the more they think of Poland, Belgium, France, Greece, Crete, Malaya, and Singapore, the louder grow their voices and the more fervent their advocacy. And they are apt to be intolerant of those who assess the dive bomber at a value lower than theirs. Glibly they invest the weapon with qualities it never had and can never possess. They admit of no other order of bombers, and offer it as the sovereign remedy for all the Allies' ills. In their view, no genii of the lamp can perform greater wonders. They contend that had we armed the Royal Air Force with dive 'bombers we should have held Norway, France, the Balkans, Malaya. Singapore, and all other lost territories. They will not admit that the Germans might now have won the war had they equipped the Luf twaffe with more big bombers and better fighters and given it fewer dive bombers. Yet historians of a future generation may well conclude that the Nazis' over-reliance on the dive bomber was paid for in defeat. Mnren the decisive struggle came — the Battle Of Britain— the dive bomber failed and the Luftwaffe's wings were weak-^ ened.

Defeat Over Britain. The Stuka squadrons — the shock troops of the Luftwaffe — suffered a momentous defeat over Britain. Their Junkers 87's, originally designed as fighter-dive bombers, proved too old to fight when only fighting qualities could have saved them- Their ranks were smashed and within two days they were taken out of the fight. Their disaster was shared by their escorts. The Messerschmitt fighters, which should have overpowered all opposition and swept a path through the defences for the Stukas, were themselves overwhelmed. They were mown down by the hail of bullets from eight-gun Hurricanes and Spitfires which triumphed not by virtue of superior numbers, but by virtue of superior merits. Never had the" Stukas and their escorts been so maltreated. In Poland/ the Ju. 87 had removed all opposition and was hailed as the symbol of German might. It was cast for the leading role in Nazi propaganda films, and the factories turned it out in ever-growing numbers. It repeated its Polish triumphs in Holland and Belgium, France, the Balkans, and Citete. Over all these countries it was opposed by little more than the dauntless courage of a few pilots whose noblest deeds and highest valour could do nothing to stem the tide of aerial invasion. The Stukas swept back and forth in undulating flight delivering their bombs and rarely falling victim to enemy flre. Never had theory and practice been in close r accord. Yet a few months later Stukas perished by the score over England. Theory and practice diverged. Targets could not be reached: formations were broken; escorts fled. That happened because neither the gun crews nor the ftghter Dilots defending England were unnerved bv the screaming dives that had spread terror in other countries. and they took a terrible toll. It was the Stuka's turn to panicIn defeat, the Stuka was exposed as a sparrow masquerading in eagle's feathers. Of what use was it to a nation sorely tested to hold the mastery of its

own air, and incapable of invading the enemy's? How could it serve a nation debarred, by a shortage of weapons, from initiating a land campaign? The dive bomber is essentially a weapon of offence, not defence. Was it remarkable, then, that Britain ignored it and cultivated. the fastest of hard-hitting fighters and the most capacious of big bombers? The Air Ministry knew that the dive bomber was effective in certain conditions, but it could not see when Britain would enjoy those conditions. Her han-

dicaps were legion, and she had to arm herself with weapons that would serve her more immediate needs. In some ways, Britain had been forced to follow the German lead. She had had to tram parachute troops, make use of air-borne mfantry, and of gliders — but she had been convinced that these things were essential to modern war. In any case, she was too late to enter the race with dive bombers, and needed a newer, less costly and more effective weapon — something that would supersede and not merely match it. But there was less urgency about that than there was about fighters and bombers. , Dive bombers are not easy to design. If they were, the Luftwaffe would have replaced the Stuka with something newer and better. Its replacement was to have been the Ju. 88, but that is no more successful than its predecessor. The object of dive bombing is to give direction, not speed to. a bomb, and the heavy twin-motor Ju. 88 falls fast in spite of its dive-brakes, and its aim is uncertain. Its dive is long, and it often comes within the range of light antiaircraft gunfire, with fatal consequences to itself. Malta has taken as heavy a toll of Ju. 88's as it has of Ju. 87's, and the Luftwaffe still has no proof that the Ju. 83 is an improvement on its 12-year-old Ju. 87— as a dive bomber. The Ju. 88 has the advantage that it can also be used for level bombing, but it could probably carry more bombs were it not stressed for diving. Our first need was for versatility and power in defence and we could not afford to waste time and materials on a weapon that liad no gveat turn of speed,

had to be conducted to and from its target t>y powerful fighter forces whenever opposition faced it, and was helpless to defend itself. , . . _ . . . The sweeps made by the Royal Atr Force over France since early in 1941, with small forces of bombers and large flights of fighters, cannot be compared with the Luftwaffe's use of dive bombers in Poland, the Low Countries, France and the Balkans, or the Japanese use of them in the Far East. The raids over France began as a "wearing-down process, an expedient to make the enemy fight when he would have preferred mPCLater, when Russia was invaded, these sweeps served to bind the enemy still closer to the Low Countries and Northern France under the threat of losmg the fruits of his conquests. The threat still exists; almost daily, fighter-escorted bombers fly from bases in England to targets in France, Belgium or Holland, and photographs show that the bombers can bomb with an accuracy that equals the best the dive bomber can do. Hurricane bombers, whether diving on their targets or bombing from low level. seldom miss. Bombs gone, they become venomous fighters again, with a good chance of shooting their way out if accosted by enemy interceptors. The Bostons have a nice turn of speed, as well as good armament, to see them to safety should an enemy fighter elude the guards and attack. If the Boston and the Hurricane bombers are not the Royal Air Force's answer to the German Stuka, they at least work in precisely those conditions demanded for the successful operation of the Stuka. The Spitfires clear a passage for them to the target and safeguard them while they are within the range Qf enemy fighters. By the same methods, still iarger bombers could be — and, indeed, have been — conducted to and from the same targets. Thus, there arises the prospect that one day the Royal _ Air Force may use four-motor StirlingS, Halifaxes. and Lancasters for work once performed by the notorious Stuka— with 10 times the bomb-load and formidable powers of self-defence. Intermediate Weapon. But there must first come an intermediate weapon. Its function and specification are clear. It must be able to burst open tanks, wreck gun posts, create havoc on supply lines, blast bases, and destroy encampments. It must have the hitting power of a bomber and the speed of a fighter. It must be heavily armoured, and easy to build, to fly, and to eervice. It will need fighter cover, but will itself be no mean adversary in conibat. In this war, the British aircraft industry has built all the best bombers and fighters that have gone into action. In peace and war its designers have always met the demands made upon them, and if some of their creations in the past have had curious shapes and undistinguished performances, that has been less their fault than that of their customers. The "intermediate weapon" may prove a test of skill and ingenuity, but no one need doubt the ability of one or other of the industry's leading designers to produce a type that will supersede the dive bomber. Had the Air Ministry not turned a deaf ear to the clamour for dive bombers, time, materials and labour— three of our most precious commodities— would have been diverted from the making of those verv fighters and bombers which turned back the Nazi invaders of 1940 and are now themselves invading the enemy's lands in veritable armadas. To divert them now would be to reduce the scale of invasion and draw no compensating advantage