Crisis at Stalingrad

Taranaki Daily News, 28 August 1942, Page 2

Crisis at Stalingrad

The statement that "the situation before Stalingrad is grave" has become a somewhat hackneyed phrase in war commentaries in recent weeks. But there can be no doubt at all that every implication of the words is fully merited at the present juncture. By Russian admissions the enemy has effected a break-through by cutting a junction between Soviet forces and in one sector is almost within artillery range of the great Russian steel city. By Moscow estimates no fewer than 750,000 men, including 25 armoured divisions, are driving on Stalingrad from the north-west, west and south. The inescapable conclusion is that the capture of Stalingrad is intended by the Germans to be the climacteric of their effort in Russia this year, and to win the prize they are prepared to pay any price that the Russian defenders demand. * * * The pattern of this year's campaign in Russia as envisaged by the Nazi High Command is not so much a battle against men, but a fight for resources and communications. With Stalingrad in their hands the Nazis believe that they will have reached a turning point in their war against Russia in that Soviet ability to fight will be severely curtailed because main sources of many strategical materiais will be denied to the Red armies and, equally importantly, means of transit o'f the life-blood of Russia's mechanised armies will be broken. An additional attraction from the German viewpoint is that the food from vast producing areas will not be available to masses of people in the interior of Russia and this it is calculated will impose not only hardship but also a severe test of the Russian will to fight on. The Germans are very near. indeed to being in a position holding all these important advantages.

* » * The question of the moment is, have the Germans miscalculated? They have not yet captured Stalingrad, and it must be ever-present in German memories that the cup of expectation has • been dashed from their lips before two other great cities of the Soviet — Moscow and Leningrad. As the perimeter of defence of Stalingrad decreases the concentration of guns, minefields and human material .will be greater than anything the Germans have met since Moscow, and Stalingrad in eiege may be as hard a nut to crack as the two other great cities. But even if Stalingrad does fall, will the event bring all the benefits to the Nazis that they imagine it will? The answer depends.upon so many unresolved factors that it cannot be given. Nevertheless, there -could be such a thing that before Stalingrad | the Nazis would pay/ -too heavy a ■ price and that the capture -of the ' city would be one of those victories • that do not bring about victory. | The point has particular interest at ' the moment because of the eleventh ; hour ofEensive that the Russians are ■ ' undertaking in the central sector. Throughout the whole course of the battles in South Russia it has 'been , evident that Stalin's expenditure of « human material, though sufficient I for the purpose as he judged it, has ■ been carried out with studied ! eeonomy. It would be an insane ; conception of strategy to suggest ! that Stalin has sacrificed so much in [ the material sense merely to save « men. Yet it is not impossible that [ Stalin saw this method as the only » basis for eventual victory. The ! offensive from the Russian side that ' is working up in the central sector ! will answer many questions and it 1 may teach the Germans that Stalin- ! grad is not the turning point to vic- . tory in Russia, but merely one phase in a stubborn and bitter struggle that lies ahead for them.