Mass Bombing Raids Call For Miracles In Organisation

Taranaki Daily News, 25 August 1942, Page 2

Mass Bombing Raids Call For Miracles In

Organisation

rriHIS is a story how the Royal Air -*■ Force performs the miracle of organisation necessary to put 10 planes a minute, every minute, for an hour and a-half, over a target hundreds of miles away. The Cologne-type 1000-bomber raid by the R.A.F. is, in my opinion, only a curtain-raiser to what will happen when the R.A.F. and United States Army Air Corps operate in force together, writes John Hennessey Walker in P.M.'s Picture News. When that time comes— probably very soon — it seems to me entirely possible that a 10,000-ton bomb salvo will be dropped on Germany in a gingle, crowded, terrible hour. When 1000 bombers carry out an attack, 6000 pilots, navigators, radiomen and gunners fly with them, at least 120,000 people are working in ground crews— 20 men on the ground for every one in the air. The most important single ground job is that of the meteorologist. His judgment can overrule the commands of the air-marshal himself. The R.A.F. has learned that sending planes into bad weather boosts the percentage of losses much too high. The "Appreciation." Preparation for a heavy R.A.F. raid may begin months in advance. The first step usually is taken when an army expert decides that a specific enemy taget should be bombed, and sets about cdllecting information on the matter. As soon as possible he flies a report into which he packs all the factual material and all the reasons for bombing this place that he can collect. This is a formal request for a bombing, . and Eomeone with a nice taste for words gave it the official name of "appreciation." A good "appreciation" doesn't merely state there's a truck engine factory at Gelsenkirchen, part of which is also being used as a tank repair shop. It reveals that the factory was built in 1923; is of brick and steel construction. which would not be greatly damaged by bombs of 250 pounds or less, but that 1000-pounders probably would produce a satisfactory reaction It says that the main buildings, on sandy ground, are surrounded by wooden storage sheds that are ripe for incendiary bombs. When the time comes to strike at a specific target, Bomber Command intelligence officers sift out of the available material information actually needed by the pilots and bombardiers who will do the job. This is mimeographed for distribution to crew men. A raiding squadron usually has an alternative obje'ctive to attack if an unforeseen factor. like freakish weather, makes it impossible to reach the original target. On the morning before a proposed raid Bombet Cflinmand headquarters gets an

elaborate report from the chief meteorological officer. If "Met's" report is favourable orders for the attack go out. Staff officers have received reports on the operational strength of squadrons throughout the British Isles. and they draw up the plans calling for so many planes to take part from each group. Elaborate timetables and schedules must be worked out for the Bomber Command as a whole, and for each of the 60 fields from which bombers will take off in the darkness at intervals of only a few seconds. The utmost precision is required for any such operation as the Cologne raid, which lasted 90 minutes. with British bombers arriving over the target at an average rate of better than 10 a minute. Some time. after 3 p.m., at each bomber squadron headquarters, the pilots and crews are called in for a "briefing" session. Orders for the night are given, information about the objective is distributed, and the whole operation is discussed fully with the commander and chief intelligence officer. Then there isn't anything to do until the time comes for the men to climb into their flying suits, and for sturdy little tractors to haul the huge bombers to the runways. Airfields are in total darkness, of course, but when all is ready for the take-off, a signal is given, flare paths light up all along the runways, and the big machines go roaring- into the black. In, its 1000-plane raids the R.A.F. has used as many as 13 types of planes, some of them experimental. British military experts in America believe that approximately equal numbers of two-motored and four-motored bombers were used. As for the bombs themselves, British

practice now calls for the heaviest calibres possible. It has been established that one 1000-pound bomb will do more damage than four 250's. The chief new bomb type used in the mass raids was a highly efficient incendiary missile of around 601b. to supplement the ordinary two-pound firesticks, and a monstrous demolition bomb of more than 44001b., the biggest ever dropped anywhere (although the Nazis tried out parachute land mines of about the same size). Everything about these raids is on a major scale. For example, British air officials in America estimate that the planes burned up 1,375,000 gallons. That's one-fourth the capacity of the newer United States tankers. In other words, every time a tanker is sunk, the gasoline lost would fuel four mass raids on Cologne. Just how far the R.A.F. can go in pressing a continuous air offensive on this scale is yet unknown. Not Inordinately Costly. The raids so far hav« not been inordinately costly. Losses in the Cologne show totalled 44 planes. or about four per cent. casualties, which is bearable. About 250 men were lost in the Cologne raid. The R.A.F. put about £92,000.000 worth of aircraft into the sky; those that did not return were worth £4,000,000. Most conservative military commentators are agreed that bombing alone, no matter how severe, cannot crush a major Power, nor end the war. But few would deny that this kind of mass bombing might make it relatively easy for other methods of attack to win the war — there could be no better preparation for an invasion of occupied Europe — and it is entirely possible that military historians may record this storm of air power gathering over Nazi Germany as the ; physical turning point of the war.