Experiment at Dieppe

Taranaki Daily News, 21 August 1942, Page 2

Experiment at Dieppe

The largest continental landing operation made since the fall of France has ended in withdrawal according to plan. It is quite obvious that withdrawal was the plan. However, as was inevitable, the Germans are conducting their propaganda about the episode on the assertion that a full-scale invasion attempt was repulsed and categorise the operation as one which "served political purposes, but defied all military reason." Consideration of this phrase provides a useful basis upon which to assess the value of the operation because in it there is a half-truth expressed — also an easily nailed lie. The raid will have served political purposes, but not in the manner implied by the Nazi propagandists. As the Germans would have it the operation was an invasion attempt forced by pressure of public opinion, and the implication is that because British troops have not succeeded in establishing themselves on the continent public opinion will now be satisfied that invasion is not a feasible proposition and that consequentially pressure on the Allied Governments will be eased. * # *

It may well be that vocal expressions of the British and American publics' desire for a second front in Europe will lessen as a result of the Dieppe raid, but not because of any pretended revelation of the impregnability of German defences on the continent. Instead, clamour is likely to die down because the operation at Dieppe is striking evidence that the Allied command is actively preparing for a second front. Britain and the -United States are pledged to an invasion of Europe at some time and at some place, with a stipiilation, however, voiced by Sir Stafford Cripps, that it shall be "carefully planned." The Dieppe raid may be seen, therefore, as an experiment designed to further that elementary cpndition of .sanity and as such something - - highly gratifying to public opinion. in the free countries. In the occupied territories of Europe political purposes will also be served by the operation and its value in the war of nerves will be underlined by the preliminary warning giv.en to the French people to avoid precipitate action which w^uld compromise their position with their Nazi masters. In long-term values the British intention to play fair with oppressed peoples will pay handsome dividends. tt * * If there is something in the German assertion that the raid "served political purposes," the same cannot be said about the claim that it "defied military reason." On the contrary in fact, it was founded on excellent military reasons. In the first place the operation provided combined air, sea and land tactical practice on a scale hitherto impossible for the British staffs. New weapons and methods of transport were tried out under conditions which would apply an acid test. Troops gained battle practice and won knowledge that will be priceless in the future. A sector that it would be assumed would be strongly held was chosen for the experiment, hence the test would be the harder and thus tend to arrive at exact conclusions about the strength of the Nazi defences. * * * If the suggestion is put forward that the Dieppe raid was by its very nature something of a disclosure of British plans and weapons and will result in strengthening of the German defences, this sequel would not detract from the value of the operation but would rather add to it. Germany is fighting on two fronts and it is the declared aim of Britain and America to create diversions to draw Nazi strength from Russia. The past weeks have given evidence that the threat alone of attack has brought additional German divisions to France and already the Luftwaffe employs its best types of new aircraft on Germany's western front. If the attack at Dieppe accelerates and intensifies German plans to defend France and the Low Countries then it will, on yet another score, have provided an excellent "military reason" to justify its unquestionably high value to the present and future plans of the United Nations.