War Day by Day

Taranaki Daily News, 27 September 1940, Page 6

War Day by Day

(By Our Special Observer.)

Comment on the News Dakar Now Major Issue Observers in Quandary

The irresistible conblusion to be drawn from the present state of affairs on the .West African coast is that Dakar is now removed from being ' a small spot 'on the main panorama of the war to the position of an important object. A minor problem has now become a major issue, and one that must be solved soon or later, and fpom all points of view the sooner the better. Bristling as it does with fine distinctions between what was permissible and what was not permissible, the statement on the operations by the Ministry of Information will find a mind not appreciative of legal technicalities in something of a quandary. It is now obvious that the three French warships whose mission aroused much speculation last week were sent to forestall General de Gaulle at Dakar. The explanation that these ships were permitted transit between two "Vichy" ports, and refused transit between a. "Vichy" and a "non-Vichy" port is difficult to follow. Even granting that at Toulon the armistice conditions are being scrupulously observed, it is patent that at Dakar the reverse was the case. Therefore the difference between Dakar and say, Boulogne, as legitimate "Vichy" ports is only a matter of geography; Sad Blow to Prestige. It would be futile to argue anything else but that the whole unfortunate affair represents a blow to British prestige. Discussing altogether the statements of Vichy, Berlin and Rome, the fact remains that, however forcefully and however soundly the Ministry of Inforjnation presents the issue as one between Frenchmen, neutral opinion insists on regarding, and calling, the force a "British expedition." Most serious of the repercussions may be the effect on Spain. Not only the result of the action, but the immunity of the French aeroplanes which bombed Gibraltar may prove at a most awkward time a direct encouragement to the Spaniards. The wobbly Government of Egypt yvill see reason to continue its vacillating policy, and the difficulties of General Smuts in combating the proGerman element in the Union of South Africa will be added to. « Whether the Italians and Germans will be permitted to establish themselves further at Dakar is a point that will have to be settled. Whether a Government established in metropolitan France can order an attack on a British fort and itself remain immune from reprisals is an angle of the problem that must be considered carefully. Meanwhile the French officers at Dakar and in Morocco must sit back and reflect "how very clever we have been." But have they? When their feelings of spleen have evaporated they will look at their choked warehouses and wharves, and then out to the sea which holds the commerce of colonial and metropolitan France in thrall, and come to the conclusion that they were not so clever. after all. Features on Credit Side. On the credit side of the operation are some very material factors. They are the lessons that will have been learned. Some people in high office may fall. General de Gaulle may fall from the leadership of the free Frenchmen. His mistake appears to have been" a misreading of the situation in Senegal. However far-fetched as may appear the suggestion, it may be that General de Gaulle's power was becoming so strong that he was encouraged to form a false judgment from spurious signs provided by the very subtle eneniy propagandists. Recriminations between Britain and the free French authorities are the very last thing to be desired as the outcome of an unfortunate episode in which blame may attach to both sides. TTie person who will have learned the most potent lesson Dakar has taught is Adolf Hitler. Sea power permitted the movement of troops for invasion, but even so the invading force was unable to overcom'e the land defences. Hitler commences with the disadvantage of lack of sea control, and faces in Britain a far more powerful organised deferice than was available at Dakar. Small wonder then that, despite the German move into Finland and the stories emanating from Norway of barges with wheels attached, observers are looking to an Axis move elsewhere than at Britain, while a British army of 3,000,000 men remains, perforce, immobilised.

Feature of German Defeatism. The recognition the Nazi propaganda machine appears to be according to the danger to the German morale by be-' littling the enemy finds a striking parallel in a recently published book. Commander A. O. Campbell, R.N., in his book "The Battle of the Plate," brings out well one feature of defeatism. After the Graf Spee had sought refuges in the neutral waters at Montevideo and been ordered by the Government of Uruguay to proceed to sea in 72 hours, or accept internment for the period of the war, Captain Langsdorff did his utmost to persuade his sailors to go out and accept whatever was coming to them. But his exhortations and those of his officers had no effect. The young Nazi sailors had had enough of the hammering they had endured under the gunfire of the British cruisers. The men in smaller vessels of the Royal Navy, cspecially those in the Exeter, had themselves been roughly handled, but they were ready and willing to fight, but the Germans were not. Where was the difference? Was it in the calibre of the men, or was it what the men had been taught? German Propaganda Rebounds. Commander Campbell's reading of the position provides the explanation that the first alternative was a contributing factor, but that the second was the major one. He says: "The revolt was not entirely unexpected, because the revulsion of the young men to the deaths and injuries of battle had not been hidden. Apart from their inexperience of warfare, the crew had been so steeped in Langsdorff's assurances that they would never be called upon to fight that the horrors of battle had been doubly shocking. Many of the British captains who were released at Montevideo were struck by the low state of the crew of the German raider and of the physical breakdown of many of the young men. They responded at first to the distraction of urgent labour in harbour, but when they realised the intention of the captain, and as zero hour approached, they no longer hid their feelings." So they refused to take the Graf Spee into battle. and Hitler decreed the ship should be scuttled. Then the propaganda with which the Nazi sailors had been seeped rebounded with telling effect. The jeers of Goebbels at the Royal Air Force, and the boasts of Goering of the power of his Luftwaffe and his air defences have, it seems clear, already set up a colossus of security which is now. proved to havs feet of day.