War Day by Day

Taranaki Daily News, 25 September 1940, Page 6

War Day by Day

(By Our Special Observer.)

Comment on the News Dakar Bombardment Strategic Naval Base

On the profile of Africa a great riose juts out into the Atlantic Ocean. On the tip of this nose is a pimple represented by Cape Verde, and on the cape is situated the port of Dakar. Fifteen degrees north of the Equator, this stearning spot holds a unique position in the history of this war up to the present time. Whereas in other parts it has remained the prerogative of the enemy to assume the offensive, Dakar has twice now seen British sea-power demonstrating that it, too, can strike. While it is particularly unfortunate that on both occasions a former ally should receive the blows, the importance of Dakar is such that the British Government would indeed be foolish to allow any considerations of sentiment to override those of necessity. Dakar has a considerable value on both strategic and economic grounds. It is the site 6f a naval base which, in enemy hands, could harry— if not com- , mand— the shipping r.outes of the South Atlantic and the west coast of Africa, and could be an aerial base of immense significance in the event of German and Italian penetration into South America. From the economic point of view Dakar is the outlet of the not inconsiderable resources of French West Africa. Move That Suited Both Sides. It was obvious that the movement of three French cruisers from their base at Toulon to the Atlantic last week portended a new move in the strategy of the war. So interesting is the development of the move that- the whole of it fairly bubbles with the froth of speculative query. The first point that strikes one Is that for reasons as yet unknown the passage of the warships suited both sides of belligerents. Since the ships are reported to be fighting it is clear that their crews did not take them from port with the idea of deserting the Vichy Government. It must therefore be presumed that they left Toulon with the connivance of the Axis powers, and warships of potential value to the strength of the German and Italian navies were sent into a sphere into which the arm of Axis protection does not extend. That they passed the blockading squadron of the Royal Navy at Gibraltar indicates that their transit into the Atlantic suited the British authorities also. > Whether the move was intended to be a diversion which would attract British naval forces from other waters only the Germans and Italians know. However, if that was the purpose, that the challenge has been accepted indicates that the Royal Navy has the strength available to cope with the diversion. German Ambitions in Africa. All sorts of possibilities arise from the - action. As far as Dakar itself is concerned, it will be awaited with keen interest to »see if it is the intention to foliow the naval action with a landing of troops. Npt altogether to be dismissed as a fantasy is the theory advanced that, blocked by Britain in the west and by Russia in the east, 'Germany might seek to develop a new front in Africa. The obstacle, of course, would be the lack of sea power, but it has been thou-'.it that Hitler might place reliance upon internal air courses. From Italy it is but a short hop to North Africa, and, French armistice conditions swept aside, the air routes and aerodromes in the French Sahara would be a ready-made track into the heart of Africa. Some well-informed observers have thought that it is in this area that the 3000 troop-carrying aeroplanes the Germans are reputed to have could be used to the best advantage. With a large number of German troops established in West Africa their nuisance value as a striking force in diverse directions yiould be most hampering to British troop dispositions. However, the main difficulty to the establishment and maintenance of such a force would be the problem the Axisi' Powers are finding to be of paramount importance elsewhere — that of petrol. To control Africa from the air would absorb quantities of that prime essential probably far beyond the capacity to supply, or beyond the value of the enterprise. Peace in France Suits Axis. That M. Paul Baudouin, the Vichy Foreign Minister, does not see the firing on French warships as a reason ' for declaring war on Britain is not surprising. To accomplish very much as a belligerent it is quite a requirement to have some arms and munitions with which to fight, and the war materials of the French army are under control of ^ the armistice commission. The next essential is to have some men willing to fight. It is highly improbable that either Vichy or ■ the Axis Governments have sufficient confidence to be sure that a French army, complete with arms, might not turn upon themselves as the obiects of attack. That Vichy should remain at peace with Britain serves both itself and Germany very well indeed. The towns of France provide bases for German troops which are conveniently near to England and which are immune from attack from the air. M. Baudouin is Not Shining. The extraordinary position which has developed in French Indo-China is one which is tying M. Paul Baudouin into knots. The Vichy Foreign .Minister has a particular interest in that part of the French Colonial Empire, having married into a family having a large interest in the Bank of Indo-China. M. Baudouin himself rose to prominence through the bank, having gone to Saigon in a humble capacity and in a period of five years achieved a meteoric rise to the general managership. One is coming to the conclusion that, however able M. Baudouin may be in the world of finance, the world of diplo. macy is not one upon which he shines with outstanding brightness. He ha* stated that the agreement he has com« to, through his representatives on the spot, with the Japanese negotiators is one that has the approval of the United States. But as a matter of fact Mrt Cordell Hull denies this. Mr. Hull has himself ah interest in Indo-China, but he is also interested in something which interests M. Baudouin at least as much as does the . colony which is so remote from him in the present circumstances. The financier in the Vichy diplomat must always be scheming for ways and means by which he can obtain possession of the very large gold reserve of France, which is "frozen" — like that of other German-occupied countries— in the vaults of the United States. On the face of it the Vichy-Japanese agreement does not appear to be a masterpiece "of diplomacy, for not only does Mr. Hull iiOt agree with it, but also "the French and Japanese soldiers appear to Ls having differences of opinion on the mitter. With these complications and the added fact that little Thailand is throwing out its chest at once mighty rrance, the path of the successor of the diplomats of the Quai D'Orsay is far from being strewn with either roses at gold.