INVASION OF EGYPT

Taranaki Daily News, 18 September 1940, Page 6

INVASION OF EGYPT

Although the "battle of London' continues to hold first place in the news of the war, the Italian violation of Egyptian territory is the preface to operations of vital moment to the British Empire. The Italian forces "in three fairly long eolumns, with a certain amount of armoured fighting vehicles" have come out from Libya and occupied the frontier Egyptian village of E1 Sollum which was evacuated by the British some weeks ago. According to a dispatch from Cairo last week, the Italians would find that E1 Sollum, which they have dpscribed as a military and a naval base, and which they have bombed and shelled unmercifully since June is nothing more or less than a deserted half-ruined village with water supplies quite inadequate for the requirements of a large army. Latest messages indicate that E1 Sollum has been used as a rallying point and that the enemy is pressing on towards Mersa » Matruh, the strongly fortified railhead of the line to Alexandria. * # # *■ So far the enemy has met with none of the main British forces. Nor has the Government of Egypt announced whether or not it will fight alongside its British ally, although unofficial reports have reiterated the former statement by the Egyptian Prime Minister that this would follow any invasion of Egyptian territory. There is particular interest for the Dominion in the Italian campaign for it carries with it the probability that before long New Zealand troops will be engaged in active fighting. The safe arrival in Egypt last week of heavy reinforcements, in men and material, from Great Britain was proof not only that the Royal Navy is still master in the Mediterranean, but also that the importance of the conflict in Egypt is fully appreciated by the Imperial authorities. The Italians are seeking rich booty. If they could conquer Egygt they would have control of the Suez Canal and they would dominate a country which, largely by British enterprise in providing irrigation, is ighly. productive in commodities such as cotton' and grain which would be of enormous value to Italian resources. « # # # But between E1 Sollum and Cairo there are 350 miles to cross, and before Mersa Matruh can be attacked there are 150 miles of desert country to be traversed unless the coast road is used. This road as the Ital'ins have learned to their cost, is open to bombardment by the British navy as well as from the air. If the Italian eolumns leave the road to meet the British forces they will be stretched out over a barren desert open to attacks by land and air and necessitating constant supplies of food, water and fuel being brought long distances. The further the advance the more vulnerable wii be the lines of supply, and should they succeed in approaching the fortress of Mersa Matruh they will face a position in which the advantages lie with the defenders. All of which is well known to the Italian military leaders. Marshal Graziani, who commands the Libyan armies, has had wide experience in desert warfare and it must be assumed that the cost of the invasion has been assessed before it was undertaken. It is true that the Marshal's experience has been gained in fighting against native tribes. Their valour was undoubted, but their lack of modern fighting equipment made them an easy prey to' the well equipped, well disciplined Italian troops. # # * # The invasion of Egypt must be regarded seriously. Not only would Italian success "break the British Empire in half" — to quote the boasting at Rome — by closing the Suez Canal route from Britain to the East, but its effect upon the Moslem peoples in Africa and Asia would be enprmous. Hitherto the Arab attitude in- the Middle East appears to be that "all foreign control is ' accursed, but if any is to be exercised in Moslem countries the British is the least objectionable." Signor Mussolini's efforts to assume the titi e of protector of Moslems have been treated with contempt, and his invasion of a Moslem country is not likely to improve his relations with other Mahommedans. All the possibilities are well known to the Imperial authorities. Mr. Winston Churchill's warning that heavy fighting must be expected in the Middle East was accompanied by the assurance that "the situation was well in hand." The Prime Minister of Britain 'is not inclined to prophesy smooth things, and his assurance that the British forces are ready for any contingency can be accepted as a statement of the actual position. There may be little opposition to the Italian advance over the first few miles of the coastal plain they must traverse. But when active fighting begins there will be no need to fear the outcome of the conflict.