WAR DAY BY DAY

Taranaki Daily News, 11 September 1940, Page 6

WAR DAY BY DAY

By Our Special Observer.

COMMENT ON THE NEWS READING HITLER'S MIND TIME FOR ACTIVE MOVE

Judging from the most recent cables, the old sport of trying to read Hitler's mind is as popular as it ever was among theorists in military and air tactics. It will be a grand day when somebody in high office decides that the day has come to turn the tables and to ' give the Nazi leader some cause for active tactical speculation. One day in mid-June a little ray of glory lightened the gloom of that dreadful time. Who recalls the little tip and run raid on the German occupied coastline? The episode was shrouded in secrecy. Why it was ordered nobody has explained, but whoever initiated it has effectively withdrawn again into his shell. The military merit of the exploit may have been small. but it did show an pffensive spirit. Frequently the glorious name of Drake has been used in the form of an inspiration in the dark days of threatened invasion. Drake dealt with one potential invadei' of England. But if a Drake complex is desirable it is worth remembering that Drake did not build hie reputation as a thwarter of invasions. Drake was the greatest exponent of naval guerrilla tactics of all time. The spirit cropped up when Bristowe slid into Dakar harbour and placed his depth charges under the Richelieu's propellers. How good it would be to see more of the spirit working on the coastline from Norway to the Pyrenees! Cencepts of "Inspiration." It is argued that the Royal Air Force raids on Germany are offensive tactics. But Mr. Churchill calls them "hammerblows at the hideous apparatus of aggression." What many people would like to see would be the aggressor, rather than his apparatus, receiving the hamber blows. A few weeks ago British Ministers vied with each other in promises of attack, "much sooner than expected," said one of them. The British people must be waiting anxiously for the promises to show some signs of fulfillment. Under the stress of the bombardment they are receiving they must be getting rather tired of the "but you've seen nothing yet," theme their leaders hand them ' in the form of inspiration. There have been some curious forms of "inspiration," from our side during this war. One could never quite see the strength one was expected to see in the reiterated assurance that Marshal Gamelin knew by heart every order that was ever issued by Napoleon. After all, Napoleon was a remarkably unsuccessful general. His merit was that circumstances enabled him to "come again" after reverses that would have daunted a lesser man. ■ Interception of Night Bomber. / It is pointed out by some experts that the problem of the interception of the night bbmber is not yet solved and that London and other centres of highly concentrated population must face the certainty of a continuation of night bombing. One thought that occurs is that it might not be a bad idea to let Hitler assist in the solving of the problem. Concentrated raids on Berlin would certainly cause him to direct some brain -power to that end, and some tips might be picked up from him. There is the point, too, that oil dumps and railway marshalling-yards are not able, even under the most intense punishment to cry, "Enough, Mein Fuehxer," ■but if the Berliners were hit hard they might become vociferous enough to solve the problem, in another way, for the Londoners. Using up the Fighters. Another view is that of a high authority, who suggests, still playing Hitler's game of trying to read his mind, that the "reprisal" attacks are an endeavour to cause Britain to use up her fighters, thereby paving the way for unlimited bombing attacks as a prelude to invasion. This is rather curious. We know that Hitler has somebody who listens to the B.B.C. for him— Lord Haw Haw has told us that. Then, did he not hear a couple of weeks ago Lord Beaverbrook say that the accretion to the fighter strength by far outstrips the losses? Further, when commenting on the increasing number of fighter pilots "baling out" from their machines, the B.B.C. commentator George Slocombe gave this very reasonable explanation. He said that such was the inflow of fighter machines to the squadrons that pilots had been ordered not to try to save their aircraft at the expense of their lives. Rather than push the machines to the limit as they had been doing, the daring young men of the fighter squadrons were, by official decree, spared that necessity. Which was grand news, but news which it is hard to recoiicile with the view of the "high authority." Convoys in Mare Nostrum. The sinking of three Italian supply ships in the Mediterranean draws attention to the fact that Italy, as well as Britain, has her vital lines of communication in the Mediterranean. A point that is worth remembering is that Italy has a need to supply not only munitions and food to her bases on the North African littoral, but to most of them she must also transport .. water. Places like Tobruk must be kept . supplied with water if the troops are to live. Tripoli can barely support its peacetime population with its own water reserves. In the last decade Italy has built a large number of "nava cisterna per aqua," or ' water carriers. From this arises the certainty that the' Italians will have to provide convoy for both water carriers and oil tankers if the overseas bases are to be kept supplied. From that followa the chance of forcing the Italian fleet into action. Italian Naval Strategy. But the evidence of last week's audacious sweep of the Royal Navy and a convoy through the "length of the Italians' "Mare Nostrum" tends to point to Ihe fact that Italian naval tactics have not changed very materially since the last war. Then the Italian main fleet averaged about 100 hours a month outside the protection of its harbours. This is not a mere piece of airy detision; it is based on the official figures of the Italian Naval History, compiled by the Rome Admiralty. The truth about Italian naval strategy in the Mediterranean appears to be that the Duce's naval staff is obsessed with the theory that aircraft, high-speed small craft, and submarines can lift the pressure of superior British sea power. Dunkirk showed Hitler that 1500 aircraft could not sink more than 12 per cent. of 332 ships under conditions ideal to the aircraft. The flaunting of the white ensign from one end of the Mediterranean to the other may have raised som« queries about the efficacy of his naval tactics in the Duce's mind.