BARRIER WRECK.

Taranaki Daily News, 22 June 1922, Page 5

BARRIER WRECK.

LOSS OF THE WILTSHIRE. CAPTAIN DESCRIBES WRECK. WARNING TOO LATE LIGHT NOT PICKED UP. By Telegraph.—Press Association. Auckland, June 21. At the Wiltshire inquiry Bertram George Hayward, captain of the Wiltshire, said he got sights for longitude at 8 a.m. on May 31, and for latitude at midday. The ship was then in the position he expected her to be in. The Wiltshire was a good steering ship, the compasses were good, and the quartermasters were all reliable. He altered the course daily on making sights. On May 29 he altered the course to South 58 West compass, or South 77 West true. On May 31 he altered it to South 54 West compass, or South 77J West true.

The latter alteration was made after conference with the second and third officers. Personally he had. never before made this particular landfall, but the second, third and chief officers had been through that channel frequently. He always conferred with his officers on the course. The observations lie got the day previous to the wreck did not reveal any set to westward. He did not remember if they showed any set to the northward. The average speed of the ship on the run was 12.8 knots. As near ks he could recollect, he went on the bridge at 6.30 p.m., stayed there till 8 p.m., went below till 8.30 and then returned to the bridge. About 10 p.m. the weather was clear enough for him to expect to see the Cuvier Light at about the extreme range. He was looking for it. The log was read at 10 p.m. He could not recollect the figures, but there was nothing alarming. The weather conditions then were rain, moderate north-west wind, smooth sea. There was heavy rain at times, with no intervals of clear sky. He did not think the visibility of the Cuvier Light at that time was more than 12 miles. He discussed matters with the chief officer and arranged to cast the lead at 10.30 p.m. He had steered the couts-- he intended to take the vessel within about five miles of Cuvier, r!/? expected to be abeam at midnight. He discussed the position with the officers and arranged that if they did not see the light at 11.30 they should turn round.

CLOSE WATCH FOR LIGHT. THOUGHT OF TURNING ROUND. SEVERAL SOUNDINGS MADE. Auckland, Last Night. At the Wiltshire inquiry this afternoon Captain Hayward continued his evidence. He said the weather conditions at 1 p.m. were rain, a moderate north-east wind and smooth sea. The rain was heavy at times, the showers lasting perhaps 2 minutes. He got no intervals of a clear sky where he could see a few stars. He thought that at ten o’clock in view of the conditions Cuvier light would not be visible more than 12 miles. He discussed the question of picking up land with the third officer, whom he ordered to prepare for a east of the lead. At 10.30 p.m. he had wirelessed that he would be in at daylight on the following morning. He steered a course which would take him within five miles of Cuvier light and expected, on the ship’s running, to get the light abeam after midnight, ac the vessel was 153 miles off at mid-day. He discussed the position with the chief officer and later with the third officer and decided that if he did not see Cuvier at 11.30 p.m. he would turn round. The ship’s average speed in the Pacific was 12.28 knots. Describing the conditions after 10 p.m. witness said the wind increased and the showers got heavier and longer, until about 11 p.m.. when it was blowing quite fresh. The wind increased if anything up to the time of striking, but despite this he felt perfectly confident. The chief officer’s log (produced) contained a correct record of the vessel’s position from day to day. He had never intended going south of Cuvier Island and altered his course at mid-day on May 30 to clear Cuvier five miles to the north. He did not remember whether he got two wireless weather warnings sent out from Awanui on May 30 and May 31. but they would not have made any difference in th? manner of his approaching New Zealand, as he considered they were purely local. He got at least one time signal wireless before reaching the coast. These signals were very helpful in the matter of longitude. The scrap log was the most important book on the ship, the occurrences of each watch being entered by the officer concerned. In such a casualty as this it would be of the utmost importance. While they were waiting to be rescued he asked the third officer to endeavour to secure the scrap log if possible. The book was kept in the chart room, on the damaged portion of the vessel, and eventually it was secured and taken ashore on the Great Barrier, but had since gone astray. They had made every effort to find it and had three search parties out for that purpose, but without success. He thought that perhaps some person on the island bad secured the book as a souvenir and he had considered the advisaiWity of offering a reward for it. Witness was as anxious to secure the book as anyone.

Dealing with the question of soundings, witness said he took the first cast at 10.30 p.m., getting bottom at 48 fathoms. A second sounding at 11 p.m. was doubtful, as it showed no trace of mud or shell, but it w r as thought the depth was 48 fathoms. He immediately ordered another cast and received a message at W'hat he thought would be about 11.15 or 11.18 p.m. that the water was shoaling rapidly. He immediately gave the order “hard aport,” and the vessel had turned about four or five points when she stranded. After they got ashore the third officer told him the depth recorded at the last cast was 38 fathoms. Witness said he kept a very close watch for Cuvier light, refraining from going into the lighted chart house, so that his sight would not be affected. The inquiry was adjourned.