The Daily News. SATURDAY, MAY 20, 1922. SYMPATHETIC VERDICTS.

Taranaki Daily News, 20 May 1922, Page 4

The Daily News. SATURDAY, MAY 20, 1922. SYMPATHETIC VERDICTS.

The homily delivered by Mr. Justice Reed, in the course of his summing up in the case of alleged bookmaking, at the Supreme Court sitting at New Plymouth, on Wednesday, was evidently intended to impress the jury on two vital points, the first being that the administration of the criminal law in British communities was such a high example to the world that its standard should not be lowered by juries bringing the administration of justice into contempt by giving sympathetic verdicts against the evidence; the second point being that juries should fully realise their responsibility and abstain from violating their oath by being actuated by anything but the evidence before them, and without being in any way influenced by their opinions as to the propriety or otherwise of the law governing the cases on which they have to give their verdict. His Honor traversed the subject with commendable thoroughness, and candidly admitted that he had been prompted to make the pronouncement because “it had been said that in most cases of this sort in New Zealand, juries will not convict. even though they have the clearest evidence of guilt before them.’ The Judge was careful to emphasise that his remarks had no speial reference to the jury he was addressing, also to proclaim that, in his experience, juries honestly tried to do their duty 'by returning verdicts upon f he evidence. At the same time it is somewhat a reflection on the community that a Supreme Court Judge should deem it his duty to impress on a jury the imperative duty of being honest in arriving at a decision. It must be remembered that the jury’s personnel is arrived at by a process of selection and rejection, counsel on both sides having the right of challenge. Presumably this right is founded and exercised in order that the needs of justice shall be fairly met, but its existence signifies a want of confidence in either the judicial fairness or freedom from bias of some citizens who, in other respects, may be men of good repute, sound judgment and strict integrity. It may be asserted with confidence that no man exists who has not a bias on one or more subjects, hence it is gratifying to learn from Mr. Justice Reed that “the opinion of a jury, which has honestly considered the matter, is of more value than that, of a Judge.” That is a point which may possibly have been a factor which influenced 1 Parliament, when legislating in 1920 to abolish bookmakers, to give any person charged under the Act the right to be tried by a jury. There can be no contesting the Judge’s dictum that “giving sympathetic verdicts against the evidence brings the whole law into contempt.” The whole point of his argument, therefore, depends on the view the jury take of the evidence submitted, and therein lays the responsibility of each juryman. Not only must the evidence be clear, but it must be clean, reliable and convincing. Admittedly it is extremely difficult in such cases to obtain the right kind of evidence that will be free from all taint, both as to its substance and

the methods by which it was obtained. Possibly the Judge may place a far different value on any given evidence than that which commends itself to the jury as the result of honest consideration, and each and every citizen can have his or her view as to which party is right. A 11 sympathetic verdict” is quite another matter, for it takes no account of the evidence, and while it may be acclaimed on sentimental grounds is certainly opposed to the ethics of justice. Where, however, a jury agrees on a verdict —one way or the other —it must be presumed they have good grounds for their decision, while a disagreement may indicate bias or some other influence that should not exist. On the whole Mr. Justice Reed accomplished a difficult self-imposed task with much tact, skill, and judicial restraint. His fear of the introduction of the thin end of the wedge that may lead to the door of justice being forced open so as to admit maladministration is quite comprehensible, but so long as the jury system lasts, each jury must be trusted to perform its duty conscientiously, and trial by jury is the main bulwark of British justice, sympathetic verdicts notwithstanding.