SUBMARINES

Taranaki Daily News, 27 December 1921, Page 5

SUBMARINES

NO ABOLITION. BRITISH PLAN DEFEATED. FRANCE STANDS OUT. ITALY SUPPORTS HER. By Telegraph.—Press Assn.—Copyright. Received Dec. 25, d. 5 pjn. Washington, Dec. 23. Italian papers profess to see difficulties ahead in. the discussion of the cubmarine issue, caused by the wide divergence in the British and French views. The Italian delegation has suggested that another conference be held in the future should any small nations now not represented attempt to build up menacing navies or add to their submarine fleets. The British are putting up a great fight for their contention for the abolition of the submarine.

To-day’s committee meeting was entirely devoted to a further discussion of the subject. After Admiral de Bon had put the French case for retention, Mr. Balfour developed, the British case in what the American spokesman characterised as a very lurid and strong argument. Mr. Balfour was in his best form, and was most impressive, showing by an extraordinary set of figures how the fishing population of Britain and the auxiliary craft of the Navy saved not only Britain, but al«o France and Italy, during the war. It waa in those countries’ interests to acquiesce in abolition, instead of insisting on retention, and thereby forcing other nations to build and keep up submarine navies and have them as a continual menace to their linen of communication and food supplies It is evident the British consider their arguments likely to fak cn most fertile earth. FRENCH ADMIRAL’S SPEECH. At this evening’s Press Conference, Lord Lee. in answer to Admiral de Bon'a suggestion that ninety thousand tons of submarines should be the minimum of all nations’ requirements, claimed that without an agreeent the conference could accept no restrictions. At the meeting of the joint commiton the limitation of armaments, Adniral de Bon : France > opened the discuslion. After reviewing the 1 arguments uivaueed by Lord I>ee. he said he was against the suggestion that submarines were useless against warships. France iad lost battleships and cruisers, and so did Italy. The defective measures against submarines had necessarily weakened the general force* engaged but the submarine was not useless for defence. Germany could not have protected her coasts or laid mines without ' ;hem. In the Adriatic the submarine ara« one of the mast powerful means of I action of the enemy, while in the Darianelles the Allies felt the force of sub- ; marines, which hampered their ships From Lombardi ng. Submarines were also ; useful a* scouts or observation posts in j wireless communication The submar- i ne had shown itself to be specially eminent against the merchant marine. The horror which was inspired by Germany’s action was due to attacks on neutrals —steamers loaded with non-belli- , gerent«. It had always been admissible to attack the enemy*.’ merchant marine, ; which was one of the most effective methods of crippling the enemy. In an ex- I treme case it might be considered pos- | »ible to bring an adversary to the point >f yielding by this process. with •ruelty than the direct application of Force. If this kind of war was allowed ?t must be confined within the limits of the laws of humanity. Therein lay all the . charges brought against the Germans ■ who misused to excess all their weapons, not only submarines. It followed, from | the German deeds, that the activities of submarines should be confined within limits rendering their use legitimate, and . within such rules submarine activity merchantmen might be very effeciv? especially for nations not having I powerful navy.

POWERS LIMITED. He thought no Government hereafter could risk incurring the responsibility »f ordering unrestricted submarine warare. It seemed to the French that the submarine had a right to figure as the integral part of the naval forces, though rom now on its power would be greatly jmited by methods which had been discovered during the war. Admiral de Bon compared the history of the torpedo boat to what might be’ the history of the submarine. Torpedo boats were once regarded in the same way as submarine* were—as threatening the supremacy of all sea arms—but now they had ceased to be an object of special dread, and the same thing might come to pegs in regard to the submarine. As regards the tonnage required, the French delegation thought ninety vessels, each of one thousand tons, would be the minimum submarine strength for a Power desirous of making use of this contriv- • ance. Admiral de Bon thought the sub- ' marine tonnage could not be limited i until a new weapon wan found. Mr. A. J. Balfour said he wished the ' advisory committee could have read ; Admiral de Bob's speech before drawing I up their report. The former had reach- j ed the conclusion that the destruction I of commerce was not the proper business i of the submarine, under the impr-udon | that this most inhuman employment could be regulated by law. But Admiral ! do Bon regarded the action of submarines against merchantmen as the most important use to which submarines could be put. Could any man doubt if submarines were once let loose, even under rule*, to deal with merchantmen, , that their powers could not be abused in the future as in the past? That was incredible. Admiral de Bon’a other arguments about the usefulness of submarines I as scouts ete.. were sound, but from 1 his speech it was clear that the main ob- i j«rt they would serve was the destine- j tion of commerce, and if the advisory j committee had thoroughly considered this it is doubtful whether they would not come to a conclusion the same as the British. Mr. Balfour said Admiral de Bon had | exaggerated the nse of the submarine for , genuine war purposes. He was in error | in supposing that the German coasts , were immune because of submarines; j neither did he believe submarines were of ’ ise as defence against attacks on coast ■ towns. which the Italian delegation ad- j voeated. The Belgian coasts were bom- . harried continuously by British ships, but ! German ships did not .’ink one submar- I jne. "«d in *he Dardanelles, when a sub-

marine was destroyed it was quite an insignificant matter. But the question before the Conference was whether they were going to encourage an instrument of war which, if encouraged, would undoubtedly be used illegitimately against commerce. Now, who was going to injure either Japan or the United States, which were both self contained and remote from any aggressor? But take the case of Italy, and remember the extreme difficulty Britain had in supplying her minimum coal needs and food.

Mr. Balflour added: 4 Ttaly has five maritime neighbors, each of which could blockade her coast and make her position untenable without one single surface ahip. Take the case of France. France is almost self-supporting. She has a great land frontier, giving access to all the markets of the world, and a position of great security on her sea side. M. Briand has eloquently told the Conference that she might need assistance to her large land army from overseas across the Atlantic. Why, then, this passionate declaration that it is almost criminal to interfere with the growth of submarines?” FISHING FOLK IN WAR. Answering Admiral de Bon’s argument that the personnel of an anti-submarine fleet could be drawn from the merchant and fishing fleets, Mr. Balfour pointed out that the British supplied antisubmarine auxiliary craft to the number of 3676, France 257 and Italy 288. The blockade of all military help would have succeeded had it not been for the fishing folk of Britain. It was British craft that did it, not Italian or French. Suppose a situation such as the late war reproduced itself. France’s Allies will be dependent for the very possibility of giving smallest assistance to France and keeping Italy alive upon the organisation of anti-submarine craft, which Italy and France now are compelling Britain to build.

“Admiral de Bon had said we could not stop the development of the submarine,” proceeded Mr. Balfour, “but I

say that this conference could not do better work for humanity than to stop it as far as it can be stopped. But if |it could not do it, let us realise that j permission to build submarines not only I increases taxation, but adds to the cost of navies, and adds largely to the num--1 ber of States able to adopt an aggressive I sea policy. Britain does not hope for {any important support round the table, • but earnestly trusts that the debates ■ might go beyond the limits of the room.” Finally Mr. Balfour contradicted an 1 impression that Britain was likely to ! suffer most from the continuance of the submarine. He did not deny that the l position was difficult, but we could overcome it. During the war the fight ! against the submarine had gradually [diminished the peril until everybody felt I secure against destruction. So it would ! be again, because we had this great naval population which no other country in Europe has. “Do not.’’ he said, i "let anybody suppose we will suffer most if it is decided submarines are to receive the sanction of the Conference. It will increase our difficulties and our cost enormously, but I do not believe it will imperil our security. Ido not know whether all mv friends round the table can speak with equal confidence.” ITALY’S VIEWS. Signor Scbanzer (Italy) said the Italian naval experts held a contrary view to Lord Lee and Mr. Balfour as to the utility of submarines for defensive purposes. It seemed impossible to-day to decide on the suppression of submarines. because many States were not represented at the Conference. The Italian delegation believed this problem must be examined again at a wider Conference.

Replying to Mr. Balfour, Admiral de ! Bon insisted that he never wished to support the theory that submarines had a right to destroy merchantmen after saving the crews. Mr. Balfour assurer! Admiral de Bon that what he attempted to show was that submarines could only play the great role which Admiral de Bon outlined by resorting to extreme methods. It would be futile to expect submarines to make a practice of stopping merchant ships and placing prize crews on board. Sir John Salmond (New Zealand) expressed himself as most impressed and delighted with Mr. Balfour’s speech, which was a masterly exposition of the British case, and it undoubtedly had a great effect on the minds at the Conference.

ALTERNATIVE SCHEME. FIVE-POWER NAVAL TREATY. Received Dec. 26, 5.5 p.m. Washington. r>ec. 25. i Regarding the restriction of submarl ines, some commentators consider the | projected five Power naval treaty (if 1 applied only to the scrapping of bat- ■ tieships, maintaining the agreed ratio, observing a naval holiday, and providing ’ conditional limitation on auxiliary 1 ertft) would be more anvantageous than ! a definite agreement regarding sub- ; marines. It would firstly open the door .to Britain’- advocacy of abolition, j which would gather weight with all the I nation*. Secondly, the prospect of fut- ! ure abolition might deter the nations • now insisting on a submarine navy from ' building more than they own at preI sent. Thirdly, if the nations were given a free hand in the m...ter it is ■ unlikely they would build beyond their • financial ability, instead of feeling conI strained to build up to the limit specified. COMMENT IN PARIS. WILL FRANCE REDUCE? Received Dec. 26, 8.55 p.m. New York, Dec. 25. I The New York Times’ Paris correspondent discounts the possibility of M Briand acceding to Mr. Hughes’ request that France should reduce the 90,000 tons submarine quota. M. Briand today spent the major part of his time in framing instructions to the French delegation at Washington and conferring with members of the Cabinet on the matter. The newspapers express surprise at Hughes’ attitude, declaring he is playing the British game. This is suggested by the Five Power Treaty concerning the safeguarding of Atlantic and Mediterranean water*. PLAZA TOOTH PASTE. A BETTBE PASTE THAN YOU’VE EVER USED BEFORE. Plaza Tooth Paste is an exquisite dental cream for cleansing and beautifying the teeth, makes the gums healthy and pink, and the mouth just as you want it to feel—clean -nd wholesome. Plaza Tooth Paste is an absolutely new form of tooth paste that is truly delightful. Sold in large tubes- Price Is 9d. Obtainable everywhere

THE FINAL DEBATE. THE FINAL DEBATE. BRITAIN’S PROPOSALS LOST. QUESTION OF LIMITATION. RESTRICTING THE TONNAGE. Received Dee. 5.5 p.m. Washington, Dec. 24. At the meeting of the joint naval committee to-day M. Sarraut (France) continued the French arguments. He emphasised the fact that the apprehensions of France were directed towards Powers not represented at the Conference, and the views expressed by his delegation were not only France’s, but were shared by others. Should the right to build submarines be denied to smaller nations, either by force or moral constraint? They would have no choice when they saw other nations maintaining costly fleets. If even moral constraint were used in relation to such nations antagonisms would immediately be aroused. Hence, though the Conference was unable to come to a decrsic-i regarding they had agreed to reductions, and means of defence might be left to the consideration of the countries themselves. He might suggest a general Conference, in which all countries would be represented who were interested in submarines, and effective decisions might be

Mr. Balfour pointed out that M. Briand’s declaration that France’s fears came from the land side had caused the abandonment of all idea of discussing land disarmament at this Conference. France, having ended that chance, proceeds to develop her sea policy, embracing a vast submarine fleet. If the danger from these two positions was as great as indicated, it must mean that Germany had revived not only her army, but her navy also, both contrary to the Versailles Treaty. France could not deal with an attacking submarine navy with her submarine fleet, however large. Britain alone could supply the sea-faring population with which submarines could be controlled. How was that consistent with the building of a huge submarine fleet ? Mr. Balfour urged finally that if the Conference unanimously decided to condemn submarines as a weapon inconsistent with civilisation it would have a great moral effect, even on nations not represented there.

M. Sarraut reiterated that France must have submarines to protect her transports and lines of communication in ease of war. She was not actuated by aspirations to become a great maritime Power, since she already had consented to a reduction of capital ships; she did not want submarines to attack. her neighbours. AGREEMENT IMPOSSIBLE. Mr. C. E. Hughes said he thought the committee had reached a point where it must be concluded that it was impossible to reach an agreement. He ex 1 - pressed a deep sense of obligation for the spirit of which the British proposition gave evidence, and which had been maintained against apparently hopeless odds. If the arguments of Mr. Balfour could be answered, Mr. Hughes thought that answer was yet to come. He was quite aware that in the United States there was a growing sentiment against the submarine, due to abhorrence of the uses to which it had been put. There was a feeling that the submarine should be outlawed, and this feeling was powerfully reinforced by what had been said at the Conference, but considering the difference of opinion expressed it was impossible to expect a result favorable to abolition. If at any time it was found feasible to take the matter of abolition up the United States would give it most serious attention.

Mr. Hughes hoped that what had been said would be provocative of thought throughout the world. He hoped the five Powers would agree to a denunciation of the illegal methods of submarine warfare in terms clearly understandable, and bind themselves to assure the application of the principles of international law in connection with submarine warfare. The committee should now consider the restriction of submarine tonnage, and he believed those favoring the arm should frankly tell the Conference what were their minimum requirements, and how far they were prepared to accept reductions and restrictions. Precise proposals would later be brought forward by the United States. Mr. Hughes then asked the opinions of the delegates on the subject of limitation. BRITAIN RECORDS ITS VIEWS.

At Mr. Balfour’s request the committee placed on record the following:— “The British Empire delegation desires formally to place on record its opinion that the use of submarines, while of small value for defensive purposes, leads inevitably to acts which are inconsistent with the laws of war and the dictates of humanity, and the delegation desires that united action oe taken by all nations to forbid their maintenance, construction, or employment.”

Mr. Hughes said the American delegation was entirely willing to accept, instead of the 90,000 tons proposed as the maximum, a limit of 60,000 tons, thus scrapping 35,000 tons of the existing submarine tonnage, on a basis that Britain should also accept 60.000 tons and scrap 22.464 tons. Then, in a desire to make whatever accommodation possible to meet the views of the other delegations, Mr. Hughes suggested that if the United States and Britain reduced, as indicated, France, Italy and Japan should retain the tonnage they have in accordance with the figures given the other day.

As soon as the afternoon session opened, Mr. Balfour announced that Britain accepted the American proposal. Signor Schanzer, after re-stating Italy's position, thought in view 7 of Italy’s special maritime position she could claim a greater proportion of light craft and submarine tonnage than was the case with capital ships. Italy’s present submarine fleet of about 21,000 tons was absolutely insufficient. jt. was found so during the war, and since the armistice they had scrapped thirty submarines. Although the experts consider a quota of 31,500 tons insufficient, Italy was ready to accept this figure under conditions of parity with France, about which they had precise categorical instructions from their Government. JAPAN IMPRESSED. M. Hanihara (Japan) said the Japanese were profoundly impressed by the powerful British arguments, but were unable to convince themselves that submarines were not an effective •weapon of defence. Japan, at the time of accept-

ing the capital ship ratio, was prepared to accept the same proportion for submarines. which was given at 54,000 tons. This, Japan considers, the minimum amount of tonnage adequate, and Japan could not accept the new proposals giving her 31,452 tons. She was constrained to insist upon the first, figure demand, being actuated solely by the considerations of defence.

M. Sarraut stated that in view of the considerable reduction proposed to 31,391 tons, the French delegation could not do otherwise than refer the latter to its Government and await instructions. Mr. Balfour pointed out that all nations had different systems of measurement, and it was eminently desirable to adopt a common system in order to avoid international misunderstandings. At the chairman’s suggestion a subcommittee of two naval experts from each delegation . was appointed to determine standard tons, and the meeting adjourned. —Special to Australian Press Axsa,