ALLEGED MANSLAUGHTER.

Taranaki Daily News, 5 December 1921, Page 7

ALLEGED MANSLAUGHTER.

THE CASE AGAINST OFFICER. FINDING OF NOT GUILTY. A verdict of “Not guilty” on. the charge of manslaughter against. James A. Officer was brought in by the jury in the Supreme Court, New r Plymouth, on Saturday. The case was the subject of a good deal of evidence, and arose out of an accident on July 16, when a car driven by A. Barlow and a gig driven by the accused came into collision. A passenger in Barlow’s car named Sutton received injuries resulting in his death.

The evidence had been concluded on Friday, and in summing up Mr. Justice Reed dealt with the main features of the case and the questions of law. He commenced by remarking that manslaughter was a very wide and comprehensive term in the criminal law. Manslaughter might be a very serious crime, or could be a crime hardly worthy of punishment at all. There were cases of manslaughter which were only in a slight degree less than murder, such as where a man seized a weapon in the heat of the moment and killed someone. On the other hand the charge might be laid as the result of a thoughtless act, as, for instance, the turning out of a horse that was known to be a kicker into a public common, resulting in a child being kicked by the animal. That was manslaughter in a very ordinary degree. It was a breach of the duty that the individual owed to the public to assist, as far as possible, in the protection of life. His Honor proceeded to quote other instances from actual cases, and, said there were considerable degrees in what could be charged as being manslaughter, and the punishment was entirely guided by the circumstances of the case.

HINT OF AMENDED LAW. “I am mentioning this,” said His Honor, “because it is very often said that juries are frightened of the term manslaughter, and although they think a person may be guilty of an offence which has caused loss of life, the term has been one which made them reluctant to bring in a verdict of ‘Guilty’.” So much had this been the case that an amendment of the law was under consideration, and would probably be put on the statute book next session, whereby this class of crime would be taken out of the scope of a charge of manslaughter, and would be designated as causing death by neglect. It was considered that when this was effected juries would consider the facts without the term “manslaughter” frightening them. In this case the accused was charged with the omission, without lawful excuse, to perform or observe the legal duty; this was the real charge, although it was designated as manslaughter. What were the legal duties that accused was charged with having failed to perform ? The first was he drove the gig at night time without lights, and with the use of motor cars becoming more general and being used at all times it was a really very dangerous thing to go upon the road at night with an unlighted trap. In nine out of ten instances in which collisions occurred in such circumstances it was the person who failed to carry lights who suffered; but in this case it was the reverse. It was a serious matter, and should not be treated lightly by the jury if they thought there was a breach of that duty owed to the safety of the public, and that the death had been caused by the non-observance of the rule.

DUTIES OF DRIVERS. The next breach of duty that Officer was charged with was that he drove the gig on the wrong side of the road. There was a third duty, and this really was the most important one. Accused was in charge of a horse and gig, and had no lights. To go upon the road without lights was, in the absence of reasonable precautions, a dangerous act, and one likely to endanger human life. In these circumstances it was his clear duty to take reasonable precautions to avoid an accident. This particular duty should be the first one for the jury to consider, because it embodied the other two. It would be just as well to consider the accused’s own statement. First of all it was admitted that he had no lights. The question was. Did accused, in face of this, take reasonable precautions to avoid danger? If they believed upon his own statement, which was not contradicted, that the precautions were not reasonable in the circumstances, then they need not consider whether he was on the wrong side or not. On the other hand, if the jury thought the precautions were reasonable they would have to decide whether he was on the wrong side. Analysing further facts in connection with accused’s statement, His Honor remarked that Officer was driving his gig so that one half of the vehicle was on the asphalt. The asphalt was given as thirteen feet wide, and half the width of the gig would be 2ft 6in. There remained clear 10ft Gin of asphalt. Accused would know that when travelling on an apparently clear road cars kept to the centre. The car, which was sft Gin in width, would therefore be 2ft 9in on each side of the centre line of the asphalt. The asphalt was 6ft 6in on each side, and the width of the gig plus the width of the car on one side would make sft 3in, leaving 15in of space in between. Accused admitted that cars cut this particular corner, but risked everything on the driver of the car seeing him. Was that the act of a prudent man? He had lift 6in of clear road off the asphalt on his left hand side, and would he not have known that if he drew his gig on to that portion he was perfectly safe? If it was daylight there was no necessity for a gig to give way to a motor car, but in this case a man was driving a gig without lights, and the jury would have to consider whether they, as prudent men, would have deemed it wise to still stay on the asphalt when by drawing off a few feet to one side would have given absolute security. OTHER POINTS.

Another point was that accused had driven a motor car himself, and would have known that 25 miles an hour was quite an ordinary speed for a motor car to travel on an apparently clear, asphalt road. His own gig was going at 7 miles an hour, making a speed of 32 miles an hour at, which the vehicles were approaching e-ach other. The Lights of the car showed about 25 yards in front; consequently if the motor car driver noticed the gig immediately it came within the full limit of the lights there was just one second and a half for the motor ear man to avoid any danger that was in front of him. A momentary glance to one side and the time was gone. There was a I rain passing at the time, and, the road being apparently clear, the driver may have glanced momentarily at the train. It could not be said, however, that this was neglect. Had the accused the right to take the risk of a momentary distraction of the vision of the motor car driver when he could have avoided the whole danger by pulling to one side of the road when he saw the car coming ?• Perhaps it might be that the accused was justified in reckoning upon the motor car driver being able to observe him coining along before the lights. This

car was coming down an incline/ consequently the gig would not be passing a skyline, and was backed by a dark ground of It would be for the jury to decide whether the story told by accused was correct or whether Barlow was right I in saying that Officer was on the wrong side of the road. It vzas not a case between Barlow and accused, however; it was an action by the Crown, representing the interests of the public, against accused. It might be that Barlow had an interest in misrepresenting the position, but accused had an interest in this direction too. His Honor said he did not propose to consider the evidence in detail, but the only matter which might be referred to was the position of the vehicle. The injuries were on the left hand side of the motor car and on the left hand side of the gig, but this might be in accordance with the story told by either party. It was quite clear that the man’s death was caused by the collision, so that if accused did not use all reasonable precautions there should be little difficulty in finding that death was due to that. There was a responsibility cast upon the jury because as was rightly pointed out by the Crown Prosecutor it was really the juries who settled what precautions must be taken. If it was known that juries would acquit a man who was convicted of manslaughter it might result that the care which was to the advantage of the public would not be taken. Mr. Moss asked His Honor to direct that if the jury found accused was negligent they would still have to find that the neglect was the cause of death. His Honor said he had alreadj' dealt with this point. The two matters followed one upon the other. The jury retired at 10.40| a.m. and returned at 11.40 to announce their verdict of not guilty, and Officer was discharged.