LUDENDORFF’S DEFENCE.

Taranaki Daily News, 19 March 1921, Page 9

LUDENDORFF’S DEFENCE.

VIOLATION OF BELGIUM’S NEUTRALITY.

In a review of General von Ludendorff’s book, “The General Staff and its has just been published, The Times says: —

• The book is one to be studied lather than read continuously, and, unlike Hindenburg as an author, Ludendorff has no airs and graces, and is content to throw his bundles of documents at the reader’s head The variety of subjects dAcusscd in the book gives a great diversity of interest, and incidentally shows that W'hat we call militarism in Germany was a philosophy of the whole of politics, and not merely theory of the art of war.

The book opens with a citation of some documents on the German preparations for war. It is notable that in July, 1910, the General Staff has just played a war game based on the assumption of war with France, Russia, and England, and that the chief problem in this game was how to deal with an English landing in Schleswig-Hol-stein. By December, 1912, the General Staff had definitely made up its mind to' invade Belgium. If there is no change in the political situation of Europe, Germany’s central position, will compel her to form a front on*several sides. We shall (says Ludendorff) therefore have to hold one front defensively with comparatively weak forces in order to be able to take the offensive on the other. That front can only be the French. A speedy decision may be hoped for on that side, while an offensive against Russia would be an interminable affair. But if we are to take the offensive against France, it will be necessary to violate the neutrality of Belgium. It is only by an advance across Belgian territory that we can hope to attack and defeat the French army in the open field. On this route we shall meet the English Expeditionary Force, and—unless we succeed in coming to some arrangement with Belgium—the Belgian army also. At the same time, this operation is more promising than a frontal attack on the French fortified eastern frontier. (Memorandum of December 1, 1912).

On such questions as recruiting and labor, this book supplies many pieces justificatives for the arguments already set forth in General Ludendorff’s former book. Ludendorff was surely right in thinking that German women were doing much less work fop4he war than women in England and France. Already, in October, 1916, he was urging a scheme of compulsory labor for women, and' the closing of the higher schools and'universities. It is mentioned incidentally, in the course of argument on man power in June, lplB, that the Germans lost 300,000 wounded in March and April of that year. On the submarine campaign, the documents how quoted add a good deal to our knowledge, both of the so-called offer of peace made by Bethmann-Hollweg at the end of 1916, and of the reasons for the delay in begihning unrestricted submarine warfare. The chief rhason was that Ludendorff did not wish to begin sinking the-shipping of neutral Powers at sea» until he was in the position to take military precautions against their attacking Germany. Further, he insisted that before any “offer of peace” was made, Germany must be in a strong military position, and also able to begin her intensified naval warfare in the event of the offer being rejected. Ludendorff believes that America would have come into the war anyhow, and that the submarine campaign was not to blame. Ludendorff guarantees the truth of the story that on July 15, 1918, Foch said, “If the German attack at Rheims succeeds, we have lost the war.” On the same day Ludendorff said to Lefsher, “If my blow at Rheims succeeds now, we have won the war.” In the mass of documents on the peace and armistice negotiations, the most interesting is the report of the conference in Berlin on October 17, at which Ludendorff, who sixteen days before had been so insistent in his demand for peace, argued against it. At this conference the War Minister gave it as his opinion that he could give Ludendorff some 600,000 new men. “If I get these men,” said Ludendorff, “I can face the future confidently.” He told the conference not to over-rate the Americans. They are certainly smart, but we have beaten them hitherto, even when we were inferior in numbers. . . Our men are not anxious about the Americans. They are about the English.” At this same conference General Ludendorff u asked the Civil Government to do something to rouse the spirit of the masses, to which the Secretary of State (Scheidmann) returned the reply that will become classic —“It is a question of potatoes.” One of the most important documents given is General von Eulitz’s report on a statement made by Ludendorff on September 30, ascribing the German defeats ' not so much to their dwindling numbers but to the tanks. “Owing to the effect of the tanks,” said Ludendorff, “our operations on the Western front have now practically assumed the character of a game of chance. Staff ( can no longer work with definite factors.”