WARSHIP OF FUTURE.

Taranaki Daily News, 4 February 1921, Page 6

WARSHIP OF FUTURE.

. PASSING OF CAPITAL SHIP. PACIFIC THE NEW ARENA. London, Jan. 12. Admiral W. H. Henderson, who is taking a prominent part in the discussion on naval policies, asked to apply the lessons of the war to Australian necessities, writes as follows: — “The question is, ‘Does the existing type of capital ship fulfil the Empire’s present and prospective strategical requirements?’ The answer is, ‘No.’ She has long passed her maximum of efficiency as a human mechanical production, and her offensive power is reduced to a minimum, too great a proportion of her weight being taken up in self-protecting devices, and her cost being prohibitive, except to those who have money to waste. “The increasing size of the capital ship will necessitate enormous expenditure in docking facilities.' She was evolved for the- narrow seas of- Europe, and is unfitted for a naval war in the Atlantic or Pacific, to which the strategic outlook would be transferred, if the Empire joined in the competition now starting between the United States and Japan. “Her antagonists, in the form of mine, torpedo, submarine, and aircraft', have developed, and will further develop so much that her position at sea will be that of a hunted hare, her main object being to secure her own safety. In short she is no longer supreme on the water. “Don’t imagine, however, that it is. yet possible to rely solely on the submarine and air offensive for heavy merchandise will always be carried on the surface, and therefore surface craft of many descriptions are likely always to be required as component parts o.f havies;

“The term ‘capital ship.’ which was recently introduced, indicates that the term ‘battleship’ is no longer valid. It simply means the term applied to the largest units of the navy. What these units will be in the future we are not yet able to say. Meanwhjle the Empire should go slow, and not accentuate competition by joining in the naval race. Strategy depends upon pdlicy, and our naval strategic outlook in Europe is assured for 25 years. Competition with Japan and America will transfer the outlook from the Atlantic to the Pacific, where affairs are in an altogether different standpoint, needing a new view of our constructional requirements; but our policy concerning these oceans cannot be defined until the .Tune conference. “It seems to me that Australia will never have an aggressive policy in the 1 Pacific, her aspiration being the status qKo. Therefore her naval policy should he defensive. I suggest that she maintain her existing surface ships, and examine and experiment on all developments in submarine vessels and aircraft, not- forgetting the necessity for training I an efficient personnel and staff, and pro- | vision for auxiliary services. “She should keep in close touch with New Zealand in all these matters, for I her outlook is identical, and both should co-operate with Canada, when the policy iof the Empire is defined. She should ■ rentember that great as her interests in - ’ the Pacific are, the interests of the (United States, with its comparatively I. enormous j)o»ulatiom are greater still"