The Daily News. TUESDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1920. THE JUTLAND DISPATCHES.

Taranaki Daily News, 21 December 1920, Page 4

The Daily News. TUESDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1920. THE JUTLAND DISPATCHES.

The publication of the Jutland official dispatches, though leaving the controversy as to whether Admiral Jellicoe had it in his power to destroy the German Fleet, still unsettled, should do much to clear up several important points connected with British naval tactics and efficiency. It may be recalled that Lord Jellicoe, when speaking | at the Aldwych Club, London, in February, 1918, said: "This war is carried out in two distinct forms: First, the battle between surface ships, a form of warfare which our forefathers successfully undertook; and, second, the battle under the sea, which our forefathers never had to meet. For the first form this country was prepared; for the second, neither Germany nor this country was ready." Equally necessary is it to remember the pronouncement made by Mr. Lloyd George, in the House of Commons, in August, 1918, in emphasising the fact that "Unless the Allies had been completely triumphant at the outset of the war at sea, no effort on land would have saved them," Viewing the official record of the battle of Jutland in the light of these statements, it would seem that, under the circumstances con.

nected with the engagement, the British Navy and its personnel of all ranks emerged from the conflict with untarnished reputation for courage, skill and tenacity of purpose. A certain measure of disappointment will certainly be experienced at the revelation that the Imperial Navy was robbed of what would have been the most brilliant and decisive victory in naval history, through the "jamming" by the Germans of a vitally important signal by Flotilla Commander Faulkner, giving the enemy's position. To the obliteration of this message, whieh thus | failed to reach Admiral Jellicoe on the Iron Duke, the German Fleet owes its escape from annihilation, as it is claimed that had it reached its destination it might have prevented the enemy reaching home, as about that time von. Sclieer was crossing Admiral Jellicoe's track as the latter's battleships were then speeding southward to cut off von Scheer. The question whether (excluding all consideration of the effect of the jamming of the wireless signals) the adoption of Admiral Beatty's advice to Admiral Jellicoe would have secured a decisive victory must remain a matter of controversy. It is quite possible that a full, impartial and accurate account of the battle of Jutland is no more likely to be obtained than was the case of the ill-fated Gallipoli campaign. There are, however, certain features con-

nected with the Jutland affair that admit of no controversy. The Germans had the initial advantage of fixing their own time and locality for the battle, and they did so with a skill that displayed considerable strategy, knowing .that a fight to a finish was impossible unless begun early in the day. It is evident that the British had been deceived both as to the speed and gun-power of the enemy, but not as to the tactics likely to be adopted, these having been accurately forecasted. It was demonstrated that the German gunnery was of a very high standard, iheir organisation at night time very good, and their recognition of signals—a very vital matter—excellent. This was one of the lessons of the fight, another being that the gun is still supreme. With the advantages possessed by the Germans, why did they go home? Lord Sydenham answers that question thus: "They went because their seamen were not as good as the ships they ■ sailed in. This one hammering knocked the fighting spirit out of them. . . . Not all the tech-

nical science in the world can supply the place of born seamen." Among the other lessons appear to be the failure of torpedoes in an engagement like that at Jutland, and that the future will see the battle cruiser disappear, except for sweeping the seas, while the battleship and the destroyer will fight the big actions. It would be presumptuous on the. part of laymen to attempt to forecast the verdict of history on this battle, but the indications are that the views of Captain von Hase, the chief gunnery officer of the Derrflinger, are likely to be verified. This German officer considers that Admiral Jellicoe's strategy was unimpeachable, and that the battle, though indecisive from his point of view, "in no way impaired Britain's mastery of the sea." The controversy over Admiral Beatty's signalled message will, hov>rever, have to be reviewed in the light of the fact that it was not sent until half an hour subsequent to Admiral Jellicoe's manoeuvring away. The main point is that Britain, should profit by the lessons of the battle, and the Empire may confidently assume that the British Navy will continue to hold the mastery of the sea.